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Sill+1ARY 
The thesis argues for the pertinence of the Kantian 'topography' of the mental 
faculties and the power of critical thought in assessing the philosophical 
importance of Georges Bataille' s writing. Such an argllDent nms counter to 
the received tradition of interpretation of Bataille's work, which has, given 
the influence of Derrida, construed these texts as works of phenomenological 
philosophy. The thesis shows that Derrida's interpretation must, by virtue 
of its exclusivity, be incorrect. Bataille is concerned with the trajectory 
of thought - that is with the dynamics or energetics of thought - rather than 
with the articulation of the logic of representation, an articulation which 
characterises phenomenological thinking. The thesis argues that Bataille's 
concern with the energetics of thought represents an extension of Kant's 
critical project. This relation is borne out by the new uses to which he puts 
the Kantian terminology of continuity, transcendence, subjectivity and 
communication. Rather than simply exaggerating the power of critique, which 
Kant countenanced as an influence on the mental processes, Bataille dissolves 
the critical difference and fuses the status of all thought with its energetic 
and thermic trajectory. For Bataille, thought is associated with the free 
contagions or infections of thermic communication. Thus Bataille's relation 
to Kojeve and Hegel is -only part of a wider move in designating the energetic 
nature of critique over and above its restricted and conceptual uses. 
Critique does not survive this definition. The thesis shows the nature of the 
critical project as it is articulated by Kant in the critiques of pure reason 
and judgement and how Bataille's major concepts come to inhabit this terrain 
whilst subjecting themselves and it to the dissolution which is the result of 
the rational groundlessness of critique. Bataille's treatment of this 
topography shows that it can be used to infer the attributes of a philosophy 
of intensities and change. 
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Introduction: INFLUENCE AND INFECITON 
This thesis argues that Bataille' s importance as a philosopher lies in his 
revaluation of the Kantian notion of critique. At the general level of 
philosophical history and at the level of concepts specific to the Idealist 
and phenomenological traditions within that occidental philosophical history, 
Bataille's writings constitute an irruptive force, a quanta of energy in an 
influential and infectious mode which transforms the tenninology of Kant's 
critical philosophy by challenging the values which underlie Kant's rational 
and restricted use of critique. Bataille' s writing can be related to the 
tradition of post-Kantian libidinal energetics (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, 
Freud, Deleuze and Guattari), especially Nietzsche's genealogy of morals in 
relation to the will to power; but a rigourous examination of this relation 
lies outside the scope of this thesis, which is rather interested in 
Bataille's revaluation of the Kantian 'conceptual geography' or 'topography' 
which underpins those instances of libidinal energetics themselves. The 
point of departure of the thesis is an argued refutation of Derrida' s 
influential interpretation of Bataille as a quasi-Hegelian philosopher (in 
other words, as a philosopher like Derrida himself). I argue that Bataille's 
transformation of the Kantian conceptual topography (the deployment of 
concepts in an 'inner space') is of primary importance for understanding every 
single one of his fundamental philosophical notions: Time and the annihilatory 
subject, the distinction between continuity and discontinuity, or inmanence 
and transcendence, communication, general economy and the sacred. 
I would argue that Bataille's writing (insofar as it is philosophically valid) 
is a contestation of Kantian discourse. Insofar as it is irreducible to the 
rigourous conditions of that discourse, it mutates into a complex discursive 
chaos which contests the principles of a wider Kantian culture, that is the 
epoch of interested or restricted capital, which is itself slowly but 
contemporaneously dissolving into a technocracy which is much less humane than 
the rationalised slow progress of the last half a millenium. Kant's critical 
project represents the highest achieved degree of formulation and regulation 
of the processes which were conceived as the conditions of the growth of 
occidental capital. In Kant's work human mental processes and morals are 
described as suited to a careful but optimistic movement of the expansion of 
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wealth, in which the minimal forms of transactions (mental or commercial) are 
optimised as quantitative events by their conforming to the universal form of 
human 'communicability', that is the innate human capacity for communication 
(for mental processes or for comnercial transactions to occur). Within 
Kant's account of mental processes, the forms of transactions imply a 
distinction between formal or transcendental Subjects and real events; yet at 
the same time the major distinction between the formal and the real is 
subordinated to the minimal distinction between the transcendental and the 
empirical; together these form for Kant a virtual realm of possibilities which 
are lent a dynamism of sorts by the innate tendencies of mental faculties to 
conform to the form of 'cormnunicability'. 
For Kant critique shortcircuits judgement and exposes concepts to their formal 
or transcendental conditions of possibility. Kant visualises the set of 
concepts regulated by critique as affording a set of legitimate uses for 
concepts, and in an essential spatial analogue, as designating their 
deployment in an expanding but limited realm. It is with this visualisation 
that Kant most obviously bridges the gap between conceptual and trade-economic 
or political schemas. Trade and warfare, like philosophical argument require 
justification (if they are to appear 'just'). Kant attempts - in the first 
and third critiques - to present critique as a regulated interference of the 
empirical employment of the understanding, which is regulated by the 
attractive power of the higher faculty of reason. But this is no regulation 
at all because reason is simply the unnecessary idea of a maximal capacity in 
general, and inversely critique is a free mental process, separate from the 
understanding and only minimally oriented by reason. Kant's major interest is 
in the limited order which reason can still impose through critique; his major 
fear is critique's further and inevitable interference in reason. Kant only 
presents this fear and this sense of infectious critique indirectly, through a 
strict (and usually uni-lateral as one proceeds up the hierarchy of the 
faculties) regulation of the influence of mental processes on one another, 
through the relegation of influence to the low faculty of sensation and 
through his negative presentation of the object-in-itself (noumenon) and the 
concept of nothing. Kant's disavowal of influence presupposes the static 
spaces and equilibrium which critique and transcendental philosophy are 
incapable of vouchsafing; thus if the interface of interior space and external 
- 2 -
stimuli is Lmpossible as far as Kant is concerned, it is only because of the 
extent to which influence happens inevitably. And the magnitude of this 
extent is suggested by the influences which affect reason from within inner 
space. Influence is an Lmpossible yet real quantity in the relation of 
critique to reason. 
The attempt to exclude the quanta of influence from its rationalised definite 
spaces is the primary characteristic of Kant's critical philosophy. 
Bataille's writing charts the ultimate outcome of such an attempt. If 
influence is simply an (albeit catastrophic) moment of the interface of a 
virtual schema with quantities of stimulus (which we can only so far designate 
as 'external'), in the impossible economy of reason; then critique and 
transcendental philosophy are themselves rather active infections or 
contagions within those inner spaces, infections which share their contagious 
attributes with the general movements of energy which pertain 'outside' inner 
space. Bataille' s post-critical gesture consists in relaying the 
transcendental as libidinal energy rather than mental form towards the 
energetic level of immanence or intensive zero from which the specific 
magnitudes of the play of energy in general can be registered. The maximal 
law in the energetic universe is that energy intensifies as the communication 
between energetic particles increases; thus Bataille replaces the Kantian 
rational idea of communicability with the principle of intensive 
coomunication. 
It would be wrong to suggest that Bataille subordinates philosophy to 
thermodynamics with this post-critical gesture. It is in order to distinguish 
the levels of a universal energetic model that Bataille concentrates on the 
limit experiences of the human animal. These experiences express the 
centrality of the ecstasies of infection and death to a libido which is human 
but unconscious and impersonal, and in which the particular hunan is 
undisturbed by thoughts of its own safety. Only certain sensations and even, 
exceptionally, thought brought to the peak of sensation communicate with the 
overwhelming rages of infection, virulence and death which constitute our 
~iate environment. In fiction, theoretical analyses and near psychotic 
ramblings Bataille's 'subject' is always the human craving for the intensity 
commonly associated with the sun, an intensity which must damage then destroy 
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the thirsty supplicant. Bataille never ceases to meditate on the 
indifference shown to the rational sense of utility and individuation (on 
which the deviations of occidental philosophy in general and the historical 
results of protestantism depend) by this primary addiction of the emotions and 
sensa tions , an addiction which conditions both individuals and cultures, as 
well as determining their belief systems (for instance the 'useful' as a means 
to rational ends). Any account of Bataille's contribution to the lazy habits 
of our libidinal energies which we call philosophy which does not capitalize 
on his ecstatic perception of the infections which wrack and kill us in time 
can only constitute a neo-kantian regressive reorientation of the schema of 
critical philosophy around the restricted senses of the notions of influence 
and affect. 
The etymology of the word 'influence' emphasises why it is such an important 
term for unders tanding the tra j ec tory of Kan tian critique and Ba taille ' s 
relation to Kant. It is a word which has two tendential senses, one linked to 
the ideal schemas and models which characterise the projects of Occidental 
rational science, religion and philosophy; and a more primitive base 
significance in which 'influence' designates the affective mode of simple 
quanta. It is this latter sense which has informed the relatively recent 
sciences of virology, the thermodynamics of dissipative structures and 
information theory, - and been intuited at the interface of philosophy and 
psychosis by the ragged pack of writers weakened by their bulimic feasts of 
scrupulous thought and libidinal energy. Bataille runs with them. 
The word's Romantic language source (Latin 'in-fluere' = to flow in) suggests 
'primitive' origins in the agricultural understanding of base hydraulics, 
necessary for the planning and building of irrigation channels. The term 
suggests an operative schema which foregrounds the mode of the process 
involved rather than the essential qualities of its quantities understood as 
objects. This base conception of influence predates the antinomy of process 
and state (in which states are necessarily transformed by flows) as well as 
the problematic of the object which comes to dog rational conceptions of 
influence. It is only with these latter conceptions that influence gains its 
irruptive sense and yet is at the same time opposed - as involving a passive 
relation - to the active operation of infection (in facere = to make in or 
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through [a process] ) • From the 4th century AD onwards the sense of 
influence appears to have been distanced from the meaning of the term 
'process'; processes carne to be understood in terms of causal agents and 
effects whilst influence was conceived either as a rigourous determination of 
a state/entity or the determining attribute of an entity, determined by divine 
power. The very neutrality of the quanta involved in the initial operative 
schema of influence lent itself to the overcoding which produced the 
abstractions of metapsychological entities, such as divine power, cause and 
emanations and the psychological states they effected, the human or sublunary 
effects/states of influence. Perhaps a basic fear of the process of 
influence (associated with the great fluxes of hydraulic natural phenomena and 
time) necessitated its identification with divine power; thus inadvertantly 
causality and the human projection of order onto the universe was born. 
Dark Ages' astrologers associated influence with the fluid or matter of divine 
emanations, thereby subordinating fluid or energetic matter to its divine 
cause. [1] Their accounts of astral influence identify an ethereal fluid 
streaming from the stars and acting on the character and destiny of all things 
sublunary. The general trajectory of early accounts of influence lies in 
identifying inmaterial astral fluid with the abstract divine power which 
causes it, so that influence comes to be associated with the infusion of 
'insensible' divine power into persons or things. Such an account is 
quintessentially religious; influence is seen as an unknoweable operation 
which is only given in its effect of derangement, disease or vision. The 
cause (the fluid) is insensible and the cause of the cause (God) is only given 
in an 'act' of faith. 
With the growth of Occidental science the relation between God and human 
changes and the sense of influence changes with it. The mystery of influence 
had been safeguarded by the very height of the gap dividing the heavens and 
the sublunary, a distance which stressed the radicality of the changes which 
influence brought about. With the growth of science culminating in the 
doctrine of 'physical influence' in the 19th Century, [2] the spectacle of 
influence, of violent influx, the irruption of 'divine' lunacy in humans was 
replaced by the sense of influence 'on' or between entities, objects or 
people. The turbulence of the process of ' flowing in' is replaced by the 
'state' of influence between two bodies, a state which tends towards 
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stability, continuity and even reciprocity because the distance between the 
two bodies has decreased, and the magnitudes of influence are measurable and 
minute relative to the magnitude of lunatic behaviour. Yet even this 
scientific conception can be seen as analogous to a religious conception, 
since the Enlightenment humanists had drawn the paradigm for such a reciprocal 
relation when they reduced god and human to a minimal relation of projection 
and consonance. 
Priestly's 1767 text 'The History of Electricity' [3] exemplifies the modern 
connotations of influence; where electric fluids can be said to influence each 
other, the chaos and unpredictability of influence tends to be denied and 
influence is identified with induction, that is with the exercise of a 
quantified cause. Priestly's' influence machine' built according to the 
principle that electrical fluids influence each other is also called an 
'induction machine', a machine within which a closed system of electrical 
processes can be initiated and regulated and tenninated usefully, to bring 
about a state of electrification or magnetization. 
This supplanting of influence by induction occurs in the human sciences too, 
where influence is either identified with induction, with the initiation of a 
process to a certain end, for ins tance the logical induction of general 
principles from particular examples; or else influence is considered in 
opposition to formal legitimate authority, as psychological manipulation, or, 
as with Kant, the influence and irruption of the sensible - the emotive, 
influenced, and unfounded - as opposed to the rational - the substantiated or 
the argued.[4] 
The strict regulation of influence in scientific and philosophical closed 
systems canpletes the denial of the base hydraulic sense of influence; it 
becomes impossible for quanta of influence to 'flow in' and disturb balances 
unless this transfonnation is the effect of a known cause, already explicable 
as the exercise of a known quantity. Influence is thereby supplanted by the 
tenn exertion, in relation to directed dynamical action, in which the quanta 
of an influence is necessarily related (as was the fluid medium of 
astrological influence to divine power) to a strict and detennining local 
cause and its definitive nature and attributes (for example resistance or the 
property of conduction, or most importantly in Kant, sensation's attribute of 
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tmi-directional relay into the hierarchy of the faculties). The 
intransigences of both medium and affect are denied by the scale of the closed 
dynamic systems in which they are situated, and by the objective status of the 
transactions taking place within them. A concern with the states of 
influence proper to objects replaces the base hydraulic sense of influence, in 
which the quanta channelled were simply fluxes showing turbulent, chaotic and 
arbitrary behaviour. 
The history of the usages of the term influence in science and philosophy 
presents us all too often with the image of restricted closed energetic 
economies, that is limited energetic mechanisms tending towards a ftmctional 
equilibrium of symmetrical and reversible relations between terms - a further 
example would be the exchange-cycle of influent and refluent blood in 18th 
century biology.[5] The fact that science and philosophy are both informed 
by the same image of mechanistic space will be of ftmdamental importance when 
it comes to characterising Kant's accotmt of influence and energetics in more 
depth. 
Steam power and the science of energetics (thermodynamics) represented 
influence in relation to energetic systems which were open (to influence) yet 
ideally isolated by boundary conditions. In a thermodynamic system quantities 
of energy available for work are inevitably dissipated as heat in the process 
of that system. In classical thermodynamics this growing entropy within a 
closed system tends to a thermodynamic state of a maximal en tropic value 
within a given system. Olaotic or dissipative thermodynamics elides the 
measuring sense of this boundary condition: insofar as a growing entropy 
represents the adaptation of a system to outside conditions, and represents 
one system as influenced by a larger one, that system's entropy can be seen as 
an irreversible and evolving process, the process of change of that system in 
relation to a larger system which itself represents the continuity of the 
potential maximum of the non-equilibrium state of spontaneous behaviour and 
free molecular movement relative to each system. In other words the 
regulation of entropy by boundary conditions is replaced by concerns of scale, 
micro- and macro-systems and the tmilateral relations as one pours into the 
other. 
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Philosophers especially find the positivity of entropic or intensive zero -
the free and useless radiations of heat - abhorrent. Anthropology is a full 
witness to the fact that historically waste products and the useless have 
provoked fear and repulsion; the ultimate proof of this is their treatment in 
the guise of the abstractions of death and nothing by the Idealist and 
phenomenological traditions as negatives or lacks, which remain preferable -
as markers of the hold of logic - to the positivity of useless thermic death. 
Zero is also more palatable when considered in terms of the process which 
ult~ately leads there; but even this inevitability is challenged by 
philosophical logic. Bataille's writing charts this inevitability in 
processes of thought and culture without the complacency of science - the 
irruption of overwheLming influences into the rational schemas of human life 
gives death a rabid and exclusively human sense. As we have seen influence 
was deemed destructive at some inscrutable point of sacred pre-history, and 
its disturbing quanta regulated by its association with a divine power. The 
return of the import of unbridled influences attests less to the universal 
progress of scientific method than to the dissolution of moral certainty which 
follows from the aborting of that divine power in the processes of global 
capital: 
"The true universality is the death of God" (OC1 473) 
For Bataille, infection is the properly human mode of influence, the influence 
that rages virulently and impersonally, that is, which is most simply 
designated by its contagious spread and intensity. And this sense of 
infection is linked to the base significance of influence - the flow of 
quanta. Since the Middle Ages, Europe has suffered mysteriously anonymous 
viral assaults of gargantuan proportions, which were annotmced by similar 
s~le symptoms across great swathes of the continent. In 1504, the Northern 
Italians, totally ignorant of the cause of one such viral spread simply called 
it 'influenza', thereby designating nothing except a pattern of growth. The 
cause of the disease and its means of transmission were both tmknown and the 
term designated a pattern of epidemic growth rather than a general relation of 
cause to effects. This statistical point of view became the original 
perspective of epidemiology, in which it is not causal relations between 
entities but the new directions and patterns of growth of a contagious disease 
which constitute the basic information; a science of quantitative 
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conrnunications which is concerned with the simultaneity of effects or a time 
of evolution rather than temporal causality. The term 'influenza' spread to 
other social events; 'religious' and 'financial' influenzas struck church and 
financial markets. [6] In each case, the infection 'influenza' is an 
~rsonal and unconscious energetic communication with potentially disastrous 
results for individual or social life. 
The fact of the discovery in 1933 of the viral conditions of influenza 
foregrounds the base hydraulic sense of influence in identifying it with the 
viral sense of infection. This viral sense of influence and infection 
entails a rigour foreign to the metaphorical use of the term in science, 
psychology and philosophy. The nature of the virus even destroys the sense 
of certainty which was associated with causal relations in scientific enquiry; 
the virus is a biological non-entity prone to turbulent and periodic behaviour 
and only exists in its active parasitic mode as a pattern of influence and 
ingression or growth within a host biological being. Viruses like the 
influence of libidinal energy in critical philosophy are optimally described 
using (biological) models of irreversible but periodic processes evolving 
against a background of normal (cell) functions which are themselves changed 
by the foreground activity; rather than using mechanistic models of basic 
states. Bataille's account of the trajectory of critical philosophy supplies 
us with such a lucid description, but his writing also resounds with the 
fevered ecstasy of infection; and this is less a summation and resolution of 
critical philosophy than its dissolution in the fever-coursings of the 
impersonal and unconscious intensities which condition it. 
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Chapter One: DERRIDA - TIfE LANGUAGE OF CCl1PLICI'IY AND CONSTRAINT 
Phenomenology versus libidinal materialism 
The enonnous influence which Derrida' s essay 'From Restricted to General 
economy - a Hegelianism without reserve' [1] has had on the reception of 
Bataille since its first publication in the journal 'L'Arc' in May 1967 should 
not be underestimated. The influence has been general rather than specific, 
in so far as commentators on Bataille following after Derrida have picked up 
on the broad alliances which Derrida draws; either the Bataille-Hegel 
connec tion which Derrida foregrounds in this article or else the Heidegger-
Bataille connection which is suggested by Derrida' s own irrmediate 
philosophical antecedents. The 1990 Yale French Studies 78 collection [2] of 
papers, included work by Jean Luc-Nancy, Rebecca Comay, Jean Michel Heimonet, 
Denis Hollier and others which emphasised the strain of 'marginal logic' or 
the economics of philosophi~l logic which Derrida extracts as the fundamental 
motif of Bataille's work. The value of this work lies in the fact that it 
renders the one-sided nature of Derrida's representation of Bataille's writing 
explicit, if only by extending and consolidating this prejudice. These 
writers emphasise the importance of the regulative function of the necessary 
'double bind' of Heideggerian 'presencing' in Bataille's philosophy; this idea 
is presented as the most noteworthy philosophical problem in his texts. For 
me, their presentations irrmediately gives rise to the question of how so 
massive a denial of the contents of the 6000 pages of the Oeuvres Completes 
could occur. For it mus t be obvious to any reader of Ba taille 's wri ting that 
in his texts the importance of the logic of representation is the primary 
victim of the revaluation effected by the intensive and contagious quantities 
of libidinal energetics. The logic of representation is subordinated to its 
further condition of possibility in the intensive flows of the inhuman will to 
expendi ture. 
Recent work on Bataille by sociologists who are reappraising the French 
anthropology of Durkheim, Tarde and Mauss, has done nothing to alter the 
conception in Philosophy/Literature/Olltural Studies departments of Bataille 
as a mad, bad, 'black' - to use Descombes' phrase in his Modern French 
Philosophy'[3] - excessive Hegelian, who takes Hegelian logic to an explosive 
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conclusion. Although Derrida cannot be held responsible as the originator of 
this position, he is its most public proponent. Foucault's lecture 
'Introduction to Transgression' [4] which predates Derrida' s article by five 
years and which appeared first in the journal 'Critique' 19S-6 1963 does not 
avoid being retroactively sucked into this sphere of influence. Derrida' s own 
work is an example of the fact that (at least the appearance of a) radical 
transgression in thought and written style can in fact designate an eminently 
Hegelian operation. Derrida' s work constantly demonstrates the necessary 
reliance of transgression on law in general, and the reliance of deviations 
from reason on the mechanisms internal to reason. According to Derrida 
transgression is compromised by reason, whereas for Bataille transgression 
attests to the energetic conditions of possibility of reason and law. 
Deleuze appears to have shied away from discussing Bataille, although the work 
of both is based on Kantian problematics and their Nietzschean solutions; an 
important exception is the passage in Anti-Oedipus[S] which emphasises the 
relation between The Accursed Share and Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals. One 
reason for Deleuze's ignoring of Bataille may be the very extent of Derrida's 
hijacking of Bataille for his own speculative and Hegelian ends. In 
Dialogues[6] Deleuze refers to Bataille as a hybrid of Hegel and Freud, as 'an 
eminently French writer' fixated on his own oedipaliSed 'dirty little 
secrets'. Even Kristeva' s early championing of Bataille in the Powers of 
Horror[7] is played out sLmply at the level of sensibility, i.e at the very 
level which the phenomenological and idealist traditions disparage and 
subordinate, from Kant to Derrida. 
Contesting Derrida's interpretation of Bataille is difficult first and 
foremost because of the disproportionate effect which the essay 'From 
restricted to general economy' has had relative to its clumsy or 'strategic' 
[8] (as you will) arguments, claims, and selective readings. The idea of the 
primary importance of 'the Hegelian shade to Bataille's work has penetrated so 
deeply into institutional criticism in general that a contestation of any 
particular text will almost definitely appear lIDconvincing, because it must 
fail to destroy the hegemonic hold of Derrida' s interpretation. However, 
the general influence of the essay is a cause for joy when one considers the 
magnitude of its perverse rejection of the facts of the Bataillean text, from 
the initial premise to the details of 'arguments'. It seems obvious to me 
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that Bataille' s relation to Derrida and the phenomenological tradition can 
only be called superficial because Bataille is blatantly a thinker of the 
post-kantian tradition which opposes the phenomenological tradition. Bataille 
and Derrida represent the different responses of different traditions to the 
problematics of transcendental philosophy. 
Kant sought the grounds of possibility of thought in the structures of human 
perception; his critical account of what is possible according to these 
structures can itself be read critically. The critical reading of Kant 
concludes that the possibility of a ground of knowledge is continually 
qualified by its inability to account for its own status, a contortion that is 
based on the transcendental principle that if the ground is a possibility it 
cannot also be a ground. Thus critical enquiry is continually faced with its 
own groundlessness. In the history of philosophy after Kant there are two 
responses to this problematic: Hegel and the phenomenological tradition 
curtail the 'bad infini ty , of the critical regress in emphasising the 
(historical in Hegel's case) bilateral mediation of grounds and 
groundlessness as proper to the ' logical's truc tures of hunan reason: the 
energetic or economic tradition (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud) takes this 
groundlessness as a symptom of the failure of the logic and values of reason, 
and seeks to explore those values and terms encountered in reason's 
haemnorrhage into groundlessness. This experiment revalues aspects of 
transcendental philosophy that are the sites of more or less explicit 
repressions and restrictions of sense in both Kant and the phenomenological 
response to Kant; the noumenal (and its association with the negative, insofar 
as Kant calls the noumenon a negative concept), the intensive, the 
transcendental, and sensation. 
The first tenn of transcendental philosophy to be transfonned in this 
experimental tradition is that of the 'will', which is after Kant thought as 
a productive will (producing objects of desire) whilst re:naining distinct from 
(and for Kant at least secondary to) the machinations of reason. Will is no 
longer considered as a rational will, but as a desiring will; and its 
~rsonality is emphasised by the non-alliance of this primary production to 
the rational restrictions produced by the container-forms of the mental 
processes which inevitably define for Kant the arena of an individual's moral 
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action. With Schopenhauer and Nietzsche the prLnary processes of 'will' and 
the measures which pertain to their productions are superimposed on the 
rational schemas which they are now seen as constituting. It is important 
not to reduce the effects of this superimposition to a logical structure, to 
reduce the critical difference that appears between two levels of will or 
energy to a difference internal to reason, or, which is the same thing only 
reoriented by degree, in a relation of any qualitative kind to reason. The 
form and project (critical or eugenic in Nietzsche's case) is always secondary 
to the productions of will and their creative articulation. Freud's 
psychodynamics [9] gives a similar account of the productions of unconscious 
libidinal energy which constitute and dissolve the integrated organism/ ego 
(and even its unconscious attempts at self-protection from the flows of 
psychic energy). In all of these thinkers • will' or 'desire' exceeds the 
human power of rational control, is inhuman; at the same time human experience 
'plugs into' the impersonal movement of these forces in artistic creation and 
very strong sensations. 
In the course of the thesis I shall attempt to situate Bataille in relation to 
several aspects of the Kantian inheritance. For our purposes at the moment it 
is more important to situate Derrida in relation to transcendental philosophy. 
Derrida cannot without qualifications be identified as part of the 
phenomenological tradition: he uses the rhetoric which one associates with the 
energetic and economic tradition to conceal a response to Kantian problems 
which is still phenomenological. This can be seen most clearly in relation to 
his own account of Bataille in his use of the term • general economy'. For 
Bataille the term refers to the levels of the cosmological dissipation of 
energy. For Derrida, the term ~lies an economy of concepts considered as 
writing (as syntactical units) which of necessity find themselves in a minimal 
logical structure of binary oppositions and which are regulated by a (quasi-) 
transcendental principle of the irreconcilable difference between identity and 
non-identity. This is the marginal law of (re)presentation. One can 
contrast the critical role of this quasi-transcendental principle and its law 
of representation with Bataille' s transfonnation of the Kantian 
transcendental principle into a principle of Lmmanent differentiation in which 
things are differentiated from the zero of irrrnanence (i.e, things transcend 
the zero of Lnmanence to different intensive degrees). There is a swamping 
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or flooding of 
(the irrmanent). 
differentiation 
the difference between the transcendental and the empirical 
Bataille's principle is a principle of intensive or energetic 
rather than a law of representation. Derrida solves the 
Kantian problem of transcendental grOlmdlessness in replacing it with a 
principle of transcendental and constitutive impossibility proper to 
signification. Derrida calls this principle the principle of 'differance'. 
This difference is irreconcilable because phenomena are for Derrida, as for 
Heidegger before him, essentially linguistic and thus given in a paradoxical 
manner - given in language rather than in themselves. This principle is the 
basis of the reconstruction of metaphysics which the deconstructive method 
effects. For all concepts are given in this paradoxical manner, not as 
'present' but in a process of 'presencing' which is never completed because of 
the passive intervention of the absence which is constitutive of language. 
Derrida's philosophy is only phenomenological in a marginal sense, because it 
undoubtedly stretches the phenomenological logic which one associates with 
Hegel, or rather it associates that logic with the more general logic of a 
transcendental principle of difference. This principle of difference is 
itself the product of a binary opposition which is essentially logical 
(pertaining to the opposition of identity and non-identity). Deconstruction 
is also only marginally phenomenological because of its veneer of energetic 
radicality; because it rigourously coomandeers the names and terms of the 
energetic tradition and forces them to speak its phenomenological 
obnubilations. 
This stretched logic entails that any possible term must be drawn into a 
relation with the (quasi)-transcendental principle of difference and the 
traditional conceptual baggage it carries with it. It is the reduction of 
energetic and economic terminology to the conceptual level and logical jargon 
of identity and difference which is particularly repulsive to the intensive 
reader of Bataille' s writing. When Nietzsche and Bataille have charted the 
course that runs from concepts to physiological sensations and the energetic 
economies of intensive quantities, the mapping of conceptual economies is a 
redundant activity, only minimally less redundant than returning to Kant's 
descriptions of mental mechanisms. Yet here comes Derrida, translating 
concepts into written units, and thereby reducing the patterns of energetic 
quantities to the level of conceptual economies played out within a porous 
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logical structure. And these regressive steps are concealed by a spurious 
gesture of radicality! The porous structure of logic in relation to the 
transcendental principle of differance entails a dynamism of sorts between the 
grapheme elements. The principle regulating them is minimal, and thus their 
relations are freed up relative to the strict stasis of metaphysics; but in 
this weak regulation another sort of necessity is incurred - the complicity 
and constraint which Derrida explores between Bataille and Hegel - , that is, 
the constraint of metaphysics' relation to the transcendental differance, and 
the complicity of Bataille (and all discourses) in that metaphysics. Such an 
account is woefully inadequate for describing the dynamic forces which the 
energetic tradition liberates. Dynamic effects are irreducible to the 
necessary (non) relations contained in a revisionist transcendental 
philosophy; in fact if Bataille is convincing, those (non) logical relations 
are themselves first and foremost speeds and intensive quantities. 
Derrida's achievement lies in having singlehandedly created a generation of 
readers of Bataille who cannot register the speeds and intensities of his 
prose and the values they represent, who home in on the dried out, brittle and 
contorted bones of the law of differance, using the deconstructive method to 
ignore the evidence of a totally different approach (which is irreducible to 
the jargon of logical difference) to the inherited Kantian problematic. 
The critical mode of the deconstructive method operates by consolidating the 
function of a given rational binary opposition (thereby consolidating the 
bilateral and reflexive structure of the logic which is constituted by such 
oppositions). This necessary form of philosophical terms - which privileges 
one term over the other - is then reversed, and related to the quasi-
transcendental 'ground' of the 'principle' of differance [10]. The hold of 
oppositional logic is stressed not only despite the relative liberation of the 
terms fram a spurious conceptual reflexivity and equality (a liberation which 
is equally spurious because of the relation of the terms to the law of 
differance in relation to which the opposition still holds): but also because 
the first move of the deconstructive method is to perfect the megalomania of 
metaphysics in order to contrast it with the 'radical' dissolution of presence 
achieved by its own method. Deconstruction describes, in its first instant, 
tendencies as completed metaphysical events, as presences, as totalities. 
These remain in deconstruction as the backdrops against which an economy of 
-15 -
conceptual writing shows up, as the negative image of these presences and 
totalities. The relation to these metaphysical entities is emphasised in the 
very distance of the deconstructive method and the principle of differance 
from them. Such a relation gives deconstruction a strong sense of self-
legitimation. At the same time the articulation of the same relation in all 
possible conceptual cases eliminates the possibility of different movements 
which it might be possible to follow in specific cases. We are left with a 
general principle of all texts and a general effect of deconstruction which 
itself necessarily accompanies the necessary general effect of metaphysics. 
As the relation between deconstruction and metaphysics is consolidated, 
becomes necessary, other effects and trajectories of thought are repressed. 
We are left with the single path of metaphysics and its deferral. Bataille 
(and even Kojeve) take issue with this idea of the virtual possibility of the 
totality of a system of knowledge, as it appears in Hegel's work. As we shall 
see, their rejection of the relevance of the issue of totality is the point at 
which both see the need to return to the Kantian problematic. 
The most important term of transcendental philosophy for Derrida' s 
deconstructive approach is 'the negative'. For Kant, as we shall see later, 
the negative is associated with that which is beyond the limits of 
conceptuality which are marked out by the limit/ negative concept of the 
noumenon. The energetic tradition associates the will with that which is 
irreducible to the concept and thus embraces the negative of the concept as 
the basis of a transformation of thinking, which rejects the values and 
attributes of the logic which excludes the negative (except as a formal limit 
to reason which is internal to reason). This transformation entails an 
experimentation with the discernible attributes of the negative, or that which 
is excluded. For Hegel, the negative is associated with the resource and the 
process of reason itself (abstract negativity, determinate negation) in 
overcoming the limits of conceptuality as formulated by Kant. 
For Derrida, the negative is the limit concept of reason, which places the 
restricted economy of reason into contact with the general economy of reason 
regulated by the law of writing as differance. Derrida calls this wider 
structural logic an 'economy', thereby foregrounding the quasi-energetics of 
the freer flow or circulation of syntactical units in the written trace which 
is essentially impenetrable to rational discourse. Thus the negative 
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regresses from one limit to another, from the limit of oppositional logic to 
the limit of the opposition which regulates that oppositional logic (the 
irreducible difference between presence and absence). In relation to the 
experiments with the negative that come under the general heading of 'general 
economy' in Bataille's writing, Derrida's notions of the negative and general 
economy constitute a peculiar revisionist 'logicization' which he justifies 
using the necessary principle that logic is an economy of oppositions and 
relations conditioned by the impossibility of writing's determination of 
presence, i.e by his conception of the negative. Presence is not 
annihilated by the negative, but simply deferred, precisely because according 
to Derrida the negative works only one way (in a strictly Kantian fashion), 
qualifying the project of philosophy from within, regulated by the limit law 
of representation i.e differance. Derrida is in this sense very much a part 
of the Kantian project of negative critique, and involved in policing 
philosophical claims (especially the claims of radically different solutions 
to the problems of transcendental philosophy). 
For Derrida, the negative, like the related notion of death is a limit law of 
representation; whereas for Bataille it is the communicative flows of energy 
with their designated speeds and intensive magnitudes. Derrida cannot even 
countenance what Kant suffers in the Critique of Judgement - the impact of 
death as sensation on rational philosophy, and the dizzying nausea caused by 
the unilateral propulsion of critique into the negative of the concept and 
into death. For Derrida, there is only a bilateral reflection, a reflection 
onto differance within a propulsion towards the phenomenological determination 
of the impossibility of plenitude. 
Kant and Hegel are the obvious antecedents of the tortured clumsy leviathan of 
deconstruction in the belly of which the flows and movements of concepts are 
translated into involuted and near-meaningless logic-speak which are almost 
identical to the basic categories of logic. The simple addition of a negative 
prefix to a logical concept appears to be sufficient proof for Derrida that 
the invasive claims of reason are deferred. Derrida champions the minimal 
difference between non-relations and the thoroughly metaphysical Hegelian 
concept of indeterminate relations; champions the reciprocal (non) 
determination of the concept and its negative etc. But these differences are 
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minimal and therein lies their compromising relation to the metaphysics of 
Kan t and Hegel. 
On 'From Restricted to General Economy' 
The deconstructive method, in its youth, had a certain hooligan charm: 
assertions without close readings (let alone arguments), swift generalisations 
without epigrammatic wit, but with some bravado. How unfortunate that these 
outrages to intellectual decency and standards, perpetrated in the name of 
the phenomenological tradi tion, were swallowed up in the neurotic indexing 
which characterises Derrida's later work. This future trajectory is perhaps 
already given in the philosophical concerns which induced such acts of 
intellectual bravado. Early in the essay, Derrida brusquely asserts: (WD253) 
[llJ 
'~aken one by one and immobilised outside their syntax, all of 
Bataille's concepts are Hegelian. We must acknowledge this without 
stopping here." 
No amount of careful textual close reading can conceal the tendency of 
decons truc tion to make s ta temen ts such as this. In Derrida' s hands the 
deconstructive project gains legitimation from the generality of its claims 
and from the generality of its (alleged) effects. The attributes of 
metaphysics are couched in the abstract terminology of phenomenology, as are 
the attributes of differance, and thus the generality of the jargon common to 
both forms the 'economy' of the written trace. This economy is not primarily 
a mapping of writing as intensities or quantities, but rather the economy or 
circulation of logical concepts which have been 'transformed' by their 
relation to a (quasi) transcendental principle of difference, and rather 
spuriously called graphemes etc. The nature of this transformation is 
minimal because th~ difference between the metaphysical concept and the 
concept subject to differance is minimal; it is simply subject to a further 
relation, between empirical 'concepts' and a quasi-transcendental principle. 
In their relation to the transcendental principle of differance, such 
metaphysical concepts are constituted as both present and absent, as having 
both identity and not. Thus the imperfection of metaphysics revealed by 
deconstruction is also its sole possible perfection, the only way in which it 
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can be perfect and self-identical. The generality of the deconstructive 
jargon which relates metaphysics and differance (and that is all it does), 
that is, Derrida's notion of general economy, appears to allow the tendencies, 
movements and intensities repressed by metaphysics to operate, but they remain 
inarticulable outside the logic-speak of differance. These speeds and heats 
of thought are represented as little more than resonances, echoes of or 
metaphors for the central relation of concepts to differance, as interferences 
on the logical relay from metaphysics to differance, the relay which carries _ 
according to deconstruction - the only philosophical message: the news of the 
relay's own status. 
For Derrida all 'philosophemes' must relate to the porous structure of logic 
regulated by the transcendental principle of differance; thus the difference 
between Bataille and Hegel can only be considered as a difference proper to 
this expanded structure of logic. It is thus totally consistent for Derrida 
to use the terms "complicity" and "constraint" (WD251) to describe Bataille's 
relations to other philosophers (above all Hegel). It would be impossible 
for Bataillean 'concepts' to extricate themselves from the rule of differance 
which is, according to deconstruction, the sole concern of any philosophy 
which is trying to. think itself out of metaphysics. The effects of this 
expanded logic are general and formal i.e self-representing (albeit qualified 
by the law of 'constitutive absence'). Derrida has a Kantian taste for the 
dramatisation of concepts and thus still entertains thoughts of Idealist 
space; the totality or the 'Whole' of Hegelianism can be represented, and at a 
more empirical level the field of the play of graphemes develops into 'scenes' 
(see [13] below). 
Derrida follows Kojeve in identifying the most developed metaphysics, the 
sUIlDit at which the impossibility of full presence becomes most apparent, with 
the name of Hegel. This identification conceals the importance of Kant for 
Hegel, Derrida, and Bataille. All can best be conceived in terms of the 
attempts to dissolve the problems of transcendental philosophy inherited from 
Kant. Hegel's phenomenology is nothing more than one such attempt. Derrida 
like Hegel seeks to cancel the problem of transcendental groundlessness and 
critical regress, but with the notion of transcendental impossibility 
(constitutive absence etc) rather than in the processes of a self-transcending 
reason powered by circular presuppositions. Decons truc tion 's presupposi tion 
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of the quasi-transcendental principle of differance appears to achieve what 
Kant could not, that is the containment of critique; because the formulation 
of this principle regulates the whole field of possible phenomena qua 
representations, including the overwhelming flows of critique which 
~~ntinually unbalance transcendental philosophy. These flows, liberated and 
intensified by the groundlessness of the enquiries associated with them, are 
themselves regulated, according to deconstruction (and thus curtailed in so 
far as they are reduced to the status of representations in relation to this 
principle), by the principle of differance, the principle of the paradoxical 
constitution of representations. 
For Derrida, Hegel is the tyrant of philosophy because he proposed that the 
self-transcending processes of reason were actual and necessary and embodied 
in the course of world culture and history. The name Hegel appears wherever 
transcendental philosophy cuLminates in teleological metaphysics, that is, in 
the sublimation of the empirical real in the processes of transcendent 
conceptual abstraction. If Hegel is the inescapable trajectory and 
cuLmination of philosophy, one can, according to Derrida, recognise the "self-
evidence" (WD 251) of the inescapable, and this entails recognising the 
necessary failure of the inescapable to complete itself. For Derrida 
philosophy must traverse Hegel to arrive at deconstruction, which is 
essentially the deconstruction of "Hegelianism". Derrida's identification of 
Hegelianism and metaphysics paves the way for the phenomenological terminology 
of deconstruction, and emphasises its spurious exclusive necessity. Derrida 
continually stresses the danger inherent in the philosophical bypass of Hegel, 
in the other routes of transcendental philosophy and its aftermath. His 
argument is nonsensical and unarguable - such moves compotmd Hegelianism's 
''historical domination" - and presupposes the inescapable 'constraint' of 
Hegel. In fact, Derrida conceives of these other routes - in a typically 
self-important phenomenological manner - as involving the claim to have 
"undo (ne) the constraint of Hegel". For Derrida philosophy is simply a 
question of degrees of awareness of the Hegelian logic of the negative: 
"Treated lightly, Hegelianism only extends its historical domination •• ~. 
Hegelian self-evidence seems lighter than ever at the moment when 1t 
finally bears down with its full weight" (WD251). 
But the energetic tradition is more concerned with contesting transcendental 
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philosophy in general than Hegel's particular and peculiar brand of 
me taphys ics • 
Derrida presupposes the essentially unquantifiable relationship between 
Bataille and Hegel, (provided by their shared proxtrnity to the formulation of 
the fonnal - i.e unquantifiable - law of representation) by developing 
Bataille's comment on the 'self-evidence' of Hegel into the essential moment 
of his thought. [12] As we shall see, the empirical evidence at the level 
of concepts is against htrn; however the presupposition remains and 
consolidates the relation between Hegelianism and deconstruction. Derrida 
approaches this question of intellectual influence with little regard to 
Bataille's own comments. For Bataille intellectual inheritance is less a 
question of the 'figures' and 'scenes' which Derrida deploys [13] than of the 
mode of influence itself (i.e contagion) which is linked to the impersonal 
libidinal excitation' which require novel types of description or 
quantification. Derrida reduces the importance of the mode of influence to 
the secondary question of psychological identification and thereby relegates 
the importance of the intellectual influence of Nietzsche on Bataille - which 
would urge an account of the contagious mode of influence - to the status of 
a proof of the necessity of Bataille's relation to Hegel and the importance of 
the fonnal law of representation: (WD 251-2) 
"And if Bataille considered himself closer to Nietzsche than anyone 
else, than to anyone else, to the point of identification with him, it 
was not, in this case, as a motive for s~lification: 
'Nietzsche knew of Hegel only the usual vulgarization. The 'Genealogy 
of Morals' is the singular proof of the state of general ignorance in 
which remained, and remains today, the dialectic of the master and the 
slave, whose lucidity is blinding ••• no one knows anything of himself if 
he has not grasped this movement which determines and limits the 
successive possibilities of man It'. 
Due to the extended power of representation - the increased and inclusive 
self-representation of the idealist spaces of philosophy - made possible by 
the quasi-transcendental principle of differance, Derrida can argue (WD 252) 
that Bataille inflects the whole Hegelian economic model and its terminology; 
that he traverses the Whole of the Hegelian model in order to exceed it. 
According to Derrida, Hegel seeks to include all the different moments 
contained in his account of the movements proper to the history of self-
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consciousness (in the The Phenomenology of Spirit) [14] within an Absolute 
Spirit which is substantiated in the very machinations of self-consciousness. 
Hegel does not, according to this reading, posit the possibility of either an 
exteriority to that movement, or a renmant after the kinked loops of Spirit in 
which all moments are always already given and one moves endlessly from one 
presupposition to another. Even aporias, failures and contradictions are 
revealed within and thus proper to reason, are necessarily recuperable and 
thus can be considered as capitalising or profitable risks. Even the 
negations of reason, the enunciations of that which is not rational are 
regulated by reason: "the slunber of reason" is "slunber in the form of 
reason, the vigilance of the Hegelian logos." Derrida argues that 
Bataille's discourse remarks on this "ruse of reason", and that this is not 
simply another moment of super-vigilance proper to reason, but rather a 
philosophical position which cancels itself out at the same time as it is 
reached through philosophy. Derrida treats this 'cancellation' as an 
'expiation' effected through the principle of the paradoxical constitution of 
presence at the empirical level of the space of concepts as writing. At the 
same time Derrida designates the dissolution of concepts qua writing 
general spatial economy of the play of graphemes as ' laughter' • 
identifies general economy (as he understands it i.e as the 
differance) with the base energetic realm of the sensible 
physiological: (WD253) 
into the 
Thus he 
play of 
and the 
'~o bear the self-evidence of He~el, today, would mean this: one must, 
in every sense, go through the 'slumber of reason", the slunber that 
engenders monsters and then puts them to sleep; this slllDber must be 
effectively traversed so that awakening will not be ••• a ruse of 
reason ••••• [for Bataille] it is necessary, in order to open our 
eyes ••• to have spent the night with reason •••• To laugh at philosophy 
(at Hegelianism) - such, in effect, is the form of the awakening -
henceforth calls for an entire "discipline", an entire "method of 
meditation" that acknowledges the philosopher's byways, understands his 
techniques, makes use of his ruses, manipulates his cards, lets him 
deploy his strategy, appropriates his texts. Then, thanks to this W?rk 
which has prepared it ••• quickly , furtively and unforeseeably breaking 
with it, as betrayal or as detachment, drily, laughter bursts out. ,And 
yet, in privileged moments that are less ~ents than th~ always rap1dly 
sketched movements of experience; rare, d1screet and 11gh~ movements, 
without triumphant stupidity ••• very close to that at wluch laughter 
laughs: close to anguish." 
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Derrida's is an inadequate description because it formulates Bataille's 
writing in tenns of a method and more importantly because it misses the 
irreducible difference between the confessional mode of critical philosophy 
and the libidinal shudderings of physiology (and the base energetics which is 
the condition of them both). Dissolution is not a limit concept which 
inflects the stale jargon of the phenomenological tradition but an energetic 
process of transfonnation, that is a process which transforms events into 
energetic quanta on the heels of the critical irruption of sensibility and 
physiology into rational schemas. Derrida uses the physiological phenomenon 
which has its own economy of intensities, tensions and releases - in line with 
base energetics itself - as a metaphor for a limit state of conceptual 
phenomena; justifying this with the basic yet determining idea that writing 
and the principle of paradoxical presence it embodies is the sine qua non of 
all possible representation. But laughter is more than a symptom of the 
(logical) difference between reason and differance. In so far as Bataille 
opposes laughter and reason (at the level of his general economy they are both 
energetic phenomena), he consistently opposes the contagious mode of nervous 
excitation to limited static philosophy, and describes the quantities of a 
nervous excitation as a physiological sensible response to an impossible 
rational position (cf OC5 388-92, OC6 71-5, 154-5). Derrida however subsumes 
the two positions under the principle of differance, with all its logico-
structural resonances, and drags reason and sensibility back into an implicit 
ethics of critical super-vigilance. 
As we shall see with Kant sensations can be differentiated from the logicised 
relations of idealist philosophy and designated as intensive quantities, which 
allows for a scalar mapping of concepts and events as energetic fluxes. 
Derrida moves from analyses of simulation and proximity in the currency of 
his Kantian dramatisation of general economy, to the implicit ethics of 
philosophical canplicity in the phenomenological tradition; but Bataille 
follows the trajectory of the opposition between the physiological and the 
rational, - where laughter is the irrecuperable physiological ruination of 
conceptual economies and does not itself live in their shadow through the 
operations of linguistics, but is a symptom of the opposition between the 
intensive/ the energetic and the linguistic. 
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Derrida's claim that Bataille is constrained to Hegel and complicit with 
Hegelianism does not simply refer Bataille's texts to the principle of 
differance. Derrida claims that Bataille is engaged in a methodical and 
disciplined simulation and betrayal of the entirety of Hegelian terminology 
(thankfully he does not attempt to argue this term by term). How can 
Derrida make such a statement when Bataille's mutterings on Hegel are clumsy, 
generalised and uninformed? How can Bataille's improvisations around the most 
obvious elements of one text of a notoriously difficult philosopher's work, 
(improvisations which are only explicitly related back to a substantial 
reading of this text in two late essays on Hegel ('Hegel, Death and 
sacrifice', 'Hegel, Man and History'[15]); which are themselves passed down as 
'the ideas' contained in this text by a bizarre literalist coomentator 
(Kojeve) , be called a serious encounter let alone "a complicity without 
reserve" with Hegelianism? It is tmdeniable that Bataille had a vulgar and 
indirect reading of Hegel, and I would argue that this has a sense: Bataille 
believed that Hegel's logic was characterised by obvious and restricted moves 
(Kojeve's account of Hegel certainly was), and could therefore discard it in 
order to experiment with elements of post-Kantian thought in a manner which 
also has nothing in conmon with events wi thin Derrida' s ' scenes' of 
identification and simulation conditioned by the written trace. 
simply not that interested in Hegel. 
Bataille is 
Yet Derrida rationalises Bataille's methodless philosophical stammerings and 
represents them as exemplifying the method of deconstruction. Derrida does 
not worry unduly about the insubstantial nature of the 'relation' between 
Bataille and Hegel: (WD 253) 
"rarely has a relation to Hegel been so little definable: a complicity 
without reserve accompanies Hegelian discourse, "takes it seriously" up 
to the end, without an objection in philosophical form, while however, a 
certain burst of laughter exceeds it and destroys its sense, or signals, 
in any event the extreme point of 'experience' which makes Hegelian 
discourse dislocate itself: and this can be done only through close 
scrutiny and full knowledge of what one is laughing at". 
Derrida presents Bataille' s superficial and secondhand accotmt of Hegel, in 
which depth is sacrificed for a perception of the breadth, i.e Hegelianism's 
internal economy is sacrificed for a perception of its energised trajectory, 
("I have wanted to demonstrate the incomparable breadth of his 
t.mdertaking ••• and [its] even inevitable degree of failure"(WD nl 333)) as a 
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rigourous accotmt of the totality of Hegel's system. Ironically, Derrida 
proceeds to substantiate his claim in a fashion which lacks rigour to an 
alroost Bataillean extent, all the while characterising Bataille's method as 
~ssibly precise and delicate: (WD253) 
·~o take such.a system seriously, Bataille knew, was to prohibit oneself 
from 7x~ract1ng c?ncepts from it, or from manipulating isolated 
propos1t10ns, draW1ng effects from them by transportation into a 
discourse foreign to them ••••• Bataille doubtless put into question the 
idea or meaning of the chain in Hegelian reason, but did so by thinking 
the chain as such, in its totality, without ignoring its internal 
rigour". 
Derrida, as we shall see, proceeds to break each of these impossible rules of 
well-mannered deconstruction, extracting and manipulating isolated concepts 
torn from context in order to prove with the help of the 'formal law' of 
differance that all Bataille's concepts are Hegelian: (WD253) 
''Taken one by one and inmobilised outside their syntax, all of 
Bataille's concepts are Hegelian. We must acknowledge this without 
stopping here." 
For the deconstructor this is surely an incitement to heresy; the isolation of 
concepts is necessary - their representation in an ideal pure state - in order 
to register the transformations ("the rigourous effect of the trembling") to 
which they succumb in the play of differance, once back inside their contexts. 
Astotmdingly then, Derrida' s formal law of differance appears to allow him to 
distinguish a transcendent realm of pure ideas from the empirical realm of 
textual free motion! 
Derrida diagnoses Hegel correctly in pointing out the intentional form of 
reason, its figures and its fotmdation: (WD 260) 
"[With the notion of the necessity of logical continuity] Hegel has bet 
against play, against chance. He has blinded himself to the possibility 
of his own bet, to the fact that the conscientious suspension of play •• 
[is] itself a phase of play ••• meaning is a ftmction of play". 
But he perpetuates this intentional structure with his minimal logical 
principle of differance and associates Bataille with this move. Derrida 
wants to posit the notion of a single philosophical impossible or paradoxical 
discourse, resulting from the opposition of sovereignty and discourse; he then 
wants to identify that discourse with Hegelian logic: (WD 261) 
'~ere is only one discourse, it is significative, and here one cannot 
get around Hegel". 
Derrida believes that Bataille' s language is a language of simulation and 
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ruse, simulating presence and allowing the impossibility of presence 
sovereignty - to 'shine through' as the fotmdation and trajectory of utile 
language. The paradox contained in language becomes the model for all 
Bataille's concepts: (WD 263) 
"[ each] risks making sense, risks agreeing to the reasonableness of 
reason, of philosophy, of Hegel, who is always right as soon as one 
opens one's mouth in order to articulate meaning." ' 
Bataille is much more concerned with the degrees of the inadequacy 
(informational redundancy) of language in expressing that which is not 
servile, i.e the sovereign inmensity of cOlIlIIUIlications of energy which 
condi tion this redtmdancy. In Inner Experience he decides that sovereign 
language is impossible and entertains a paradoxical and anguished style of the 
'impossible'. The 'impossible' is the real, that is the necessity of 
experience and sensation exceeding rational possibility, utility, and 
language. The impossible is only a problem in so far as it is formulated by a 
philosophy which operates according to a del~iting, exclusive and subsuming 
logic. The notion of statistical improbability associated with science is 
often used by Bataille to resolve this tmnecessary problem [16]. Bataille 
makes extensive use of scientific discourses throughout the Oeuvres Compl~tes, 
in order to circumvent the tedious and washed out problems of self-referential 
idealist philosophy, which involute endlessly so that out of mad paranoid 
confusion can be drawn the liberal coomonsense of morality and ethics. He 
uses discourses without too much 'discipline' and 'method'; the overwhelming 
sensation is of discourses crtmching together and a reSUlting belittling of 
the concerns of anthropocentric idealist philosophy. Such discourse is 
ironic and paradoxical but the compromise of the object of knowledge by the 
subject is minimal, given that this discourse foregrounds the different scales 
of perception which are not all effectively intentional, and which do not all 
result in the useful activity of the human subject. In fact the telescoping 
scales of perception, and their extremes of activity (the energetic activity 
of micro-molecules and macro-environments) overwhelms human perception; this 
is evidenced by the credibility gap presented by Bataille' s accotmt for the 
idealist philosophical mind. 
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The impossible is thematised in Bataille' s accotmts of general economy [17]; 
the discourse he uses is quasi-scientific but its improbability resonates with 
the tension of utile values and the sovereign commmication of expenditure. 
In this sense there is no contradiction between a text like 'The Accursed 
Share' and surrealist early work in which stylistic anguish and biological 
science are juxtaposed. In general, it seems to me that Bataille does 
~lement an alternative discourse to that (Hegelian) discourse which Derrida 
deems exclusively necessary. Bataille's general economy is related to the 
sciences of therm<Xlynamics and infonnation theory, as well as the schizoid 
dissolution of philosophical discourse which is typified by Nietzsche, rather 
than to any self-reflexive analysis of the intentional structures of Kantian 
and Hegelian reason. 
A complicity without reserve? 
Derrida uses cheap rhetorical tricks to promote the deconstructive method of 
'ethical reading' and force the issue of the exclusive importance of the 
relation between Bataille and Hegel. He equates the Bataillean term 
'sovereignty' and the Hegelian term 'lordship' (WD254) in a passage describing 
the Hegelian account of the lord/slave relation, then suggests that Bataille 
himself equates the two terms in his reflections on Hegel ("Such, according to 
Bataille, is the center of hegelianism"). Derrida adds that "Bataille did not 
cease to meditate ••• this absolute privilege given to the slave" (in philosophy 
and CUlture) as if 'slave culture' was an exclusively Hegelian notion. Of 
course Bataille' s conceptions of sovereignty and servility contain all the 
attributes of Nietzsche's notions of sovereign and slave morality and are 
deployed in similar genealogical contexts [18]; but his conception of 
sovereignty also has important connections, as we shall see, with the Kantian 
idea of the rational freedom of the hunan capacity for camnmication [19]. 
Derrida 
general 
figure. 
emphasises the connection between the figure of sovereignty and 
economy, and between general economy and the space that contains that 
Bataille's general economy, unlike Derrida' s, does not regulate any 
space or scene, nor contain the restricted economy of reason and utility. 
Such structures of containment are thoroughly metaphysical. It is important 
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to associate Bataille' s notion of sovereignty with his notion of general 
economy, that is, with the impersonal flows of energetic matter and their 
principle of expenditure. [20] Sovereignty is simply a problematic 
designation of that economy (problematic because of its intentional 
resonances). 
Derrida admits that 'sovereignty' and 'lordship' are different without giving 
the obvious proofs; that Bataille always distinguishes the two terms (even in 
the 'Hegel, Dea th and sacrifice' essay [21] ) and tends to use the term 
'sovereignty' in relation to the ecstatic expenditures of religion, art and 
the philosophy of Nietzsche (cf Theory of Religion, On Nietzsche, Manet, 
Sovereignty [22]). For Bataille, the problem with the tenn lies in its 
designation of both an ~personal libidinal motor and its intentional, human 
element [23]. The accounts of religious sacrifice and Nietzsche foregrOtmd 
this general economy of sovereignty (the relation between the human desire -
conscious or unconscious - to expend and the general energetic economy which 
conditions that desire), and defend sovereignty from the accusation of 
"voluntarism", which Derrida describes as an "operating activity of the 
subject" (WD336 n27). Throughout the essay, Derrida emphasises the term 
'sovereignty' because it still has a figurative sense which relates it to the 
figures or personae of Hegel's system. 
It comes as no surprise to find Derrida examining several Bataillean 
'concepts' in tenns of major Hegelian concepts; he uses the fonner to 
articulate the quasi-transcendental principle of difference which affects the 
latter, thereby emphasising that his pr~ry interest lies in the treatment 
and transformation of the tenninology of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and 
to extend the critical application of that tenninology (to, for instance, the 
genealogical mode of critique in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals [24]). Thus 
Derrida equates sovereignty and Hegelian lordship (WD254) in order to show 
that the difference between the two defines sovereignty exclusively in 
relation to lordship and to an extended Hegelian terminology: 
"And we are interested, first of all, in the difference between lordship 
and sovereignty. It cannot even be said that this difference has a 
sense: it is the difference of sense, the unique interval which 
separates meaning from a certain non-meaning". 
For Derrida, this interval has the logical status of a necessary (non-) 
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relation, a status which remains eminently logical if like Hegel and Derrida 
and against Bataille's professed position one is an 'idiot of 
rationalisation' who thinks that "the absence of a system is still a system" 
(OC1 183). According to Derrida this interval remains an element in an 
extreme or extended logic because logic is characterised by oppositional 
relations and 'non-relation' is - in the Hegelian tradition - one term in the 
logically primary oppositional relation of 'relation/non-relation'. Derrida 
is obsessed with the relational syntax associated with phenomenological logic. 
He connects general economy to dialectics through the logical base unit of 
relation; relation (dialectics) and non-relation (sovereignty) are members of 
the set regulated by the notion of relation. Ultimately sovereignty is 
related to the trajectory of the master and slave as Derrida describes it in 
relation to the principle of differance. According to Derrida, sovereignty 
attests to that trajectory, voids itself of the same rational characteristics 
as the master (memory, consciousness, interiority). Sovereignty is simply 
Hegel's master transformed by the imperative of the principle of differance: 
(WD 265) 
"It must expend itself without reserve, lose itself, lose consciousness, 
lose all memory of itself and all the interiority of itself". 
For Derrida, the effects of the principle of diffefance show up best when 
superimposed on the limit notions of transcendental philosophy/phenomenology, 
notions which are under-determined by traditional logic, unlimited and open in 
their Kantian/ Hegelian situations to the necessary relations of a qualified 
or 'expiated' logic. Thus Derrida, like Hegel before him, turns to the notion 
of the negative to intervene his deconstructive logic into the terrain of 
transcendental philosophy. In the context of this essay, Derrida takes his 
cue from Bataille who uses the Hegelian notion of negativity as an example of 
restricted expenditure (an example which he recognises as thoroughly 
restricted; as a reversal and domestication of the value of consumption) in 
'Hegel, Death and sacrifice' [25] • The notion of the nega ti ve as Derrida 
understands it can contain the critical moment implied by Bataille's example 
within its own second-order rationalisation, reducing the importance of the 
different intensive magnitudes of the terms in the thematisation of similarity 
itself. The negative is transformed back into a problematic logical concept 
because similarity and the simulation of presence are the operative modes of 
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the differential principle of which the 'negative' is only a symptom. 
Both Hegel and Derrida are involved in a logicisation of the negative which 
Kant restricted himself from exploring. Hegel uses negativity as the motor 
of reason, whilst Derrida transforms the negative into a principle of 
transcendental impossibility, that is a principle of representation which 
regulates the movement of significations, which are constituted as partial, 
deferred or suspended presences. The negative and death are thus associated 
with a lack or absence which constitutes presences. 
Even though Bataille makes a fundamental distinction between Hegelian 
'abstract negativity' and the 'negative' of expenditure in relation to 
rational and utile values, Derrida, like Descombes [26], describes Bataille in 
terms of an extreme process of abstract negation in which the restricted 
economy of investment and return, risk and capitalisation symbolised by the 
mutual relations of master and slave is haemorrhaged. In that economy, the 
standoff between master and slave must not result in death; both must remain 
alive in order to sustain a recognition of self-consciousness. For Derrida, 
the 'extreme' or 'excessive' Hegelian economy entails a 'rush' to self-
destruction: (WD 255) 
"To rush headlong into death pure and simple is thus to risk the 
absolute loss of meaning, in the extent to which meaning necessarily 
traverses the truth of the master and of self-consciousness. One risks 
losing the effect and profit of meaning which were the very stakes one 
hoped to win. Hegel called this mute and non-productive death, this 
death pure and simple, abstract negativity." 
It seems to me that the values associated with this 'non-productive' death 
have little to do with Hegel's notion of abstract negativity, and everything 
to do with a misinterpretation of Bataille's interpretation of Kojeve. 
Bataille, in 'Hegel, Death and sacrifice' and 'Hegel. Man and History', posits 
a negative of expenditure and consunption which is associated with the 
biological life or ~se energetics which the abstractions of rational life, 
including that of abstract negativity, come to rationalise and conceal. 
This negative is associated with death (the degree of the negative at which 
the integrity of an organism is irremediably overwhelmed) in so far as both 
are considered as the tendential intensifications of positive quanta, as 
increases or intensifications of libidinal or general energy, attesting to the 
tendential loss of the inhibition of energy in an organic system and its 
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release as an increase in the energetic communications between that system and 
its environment, an increase which designates the overwhelming of the defenses 
of the system (including reason) and its equilibrated economies. If human 
thought can survive such intensive conrmmication (up to the degree we call 
death), it will be necessarily increasingly and irreversibly transformed. In 
Bataille' s ph~losophical writings thought survives, but not to repeat the 
tortured and impossible syntax of logic; in fact as thinking becomes 
impossible (and thus as 'suited' to the flows of the energetic unconscious as 
remains possible) it can dimly stammer out the jargon of speed, intensity and 
magnitude which describe the patterns of its dissolution. [27] 
Derrida assumes too much in associating the non-productive death of abstract 
negativity with Bataille's notion of expenditure; the association is a major 
part of his attempt to include this notion in the logic or non-logic which is 
the issue of Hegelianism and differance. 
Derrida continues his attempt to assimilate Bataille's philosophical schemas 
into the extended logic of differance by identifying abstract negativity, 
considered as an absolute risking of death and thus as a challenge to the 
restricted economy of dialectics, with 'laughter': (WD256) 
"Laughter alon.e exceeds dialectics and the dialectician: it bursts out 
only on the basis of an absolute renunciation of meaning ••• what Hegel 
calls abstract negativity". 
As before Derrida' s connection relates the energetic and the physiological 
(the negative, death, laughter), which are, in Bataille's work, refutations of 
dialectics and the privileged sites of 'sensing' energetic magnitude in 
sensation, to a concept from that dialectics (abstract negativity) which also 
has a 'marginal' sense which articulates the principle of differance. 
Derrida uses the tenn 'laughter' as a bridge to minimize the dif ference 
between energetic expenditure and dialectics; to minimize its oppositional 
effect on dialectics by the addition of similarities. For him, laughter is 
not a physiological response to the massive magnitude of sovereignty or 
energetic immensity, but a measure of the distance of sovereignty from and 
relative to dialectics; laughter defines sovereignty as "more and less than 
lordship ••• simultaneously more and less a lordship than lordship" (WD 256), 
but still defined relative to dialectics. 
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Derrida can even distance sovereignty/expenditure from the specific marginal 
concept of abstract negativity given that he has connected expenditure and 
dialectics at the level of a general economy of dialectics. Unsurprisingly, 
however the 'novel' aspect of expenditure/sovereignty remains less ~rtant 
to Derrida than the trace of this cancelled link: (WD256) 
"Far fro~ being an abstract negativity, sovereignty (the absolute degree 
of putt1.ng at stake), rather, must make the seriousness of meaning 
appear as an abstraction inscribed in play. Laughter ••• is not a 
t · . t " nega 1. V1. y ••• 
Derrida replaces negativity with negative logical definitions; the exceeded 
model and its terms recur as the negative concepts which restrict access to 
the experimental values of expenditure. 
Derrida deconstructs and propagates the essential operation of transcendental 
philosophy, i.e the limiting of the critical regress; the logic of 
representation is considered as the exclusive general formal frame of meaning 
and thereby conditions a dramatisation of the scenes of philosophy: (WD 256-7) 
''What is laughable is the subnission to the self-evidence of meaning, to 
the force of this imperative: that there must be meaning, that nothing 
must be definitely lost in death, or further, that death should receive 
the signification of 'abstract negativity', that a work must always be 
possible ••• [which through a discourse] gives meaning to death, thereby 
simul taneously blinding itself to the baselessness of the nonmeaning 
from which the basis of meaning is drawn, and in which this basis of 
meaning is exhausted •••• Thus is sketched out a figure of experience -
but can one still use these two words? - irreducible to any 
phenomenology, a figure which finds itself displaced in phenomenology, 
like laughter in philosophy of the mind, and which mimes through 
sacrifice the absolute risk of death. Through this mime it 
simultaneously produces the risk of absolute death, the feint through 
which this risk can be lived, the impossibility of reading a sense or a 
truth in it, and the laughter which is confused, in the simulacnm, with 
the opening of the sacred." 
Derrida substitutes the simulated phantoms of dialectics for Hegel's 
'Aufhebung'. The terms of dialectics stretch grey ligatures over the 
botmdaries of phenomenology to drag back their intensive conditions, and 
inhabit them parasitically. Thus laughter and sovereignty remain 'figures' 
which necessarily replicate the phenomenological foms which they have shot 
beyond. 
Derrida relates the attributes of the sovereign operation to the "point of 
non-reserve" (WD259) at the margins of yet proper to the phenomenological 
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model, in that such a point 'opens up' that model, constitutes it as such: 
'''!he blind spot of Hegelianism, around which can be organised the 
representation of meaning, is the point at which destruction 
suppression, death and sacrifice constitute so irreversible ~ 
expen~i!ure, . so radical a negativity ••• an expenditure and a 
negat1v1ty W1thout reserve - that they can no longer be determined as 
negativity in a process or system". 
He is thus still involved, despite all his protestations, in the "inlnense 
revolution" of critical philosophy, which liberated, valued and 'gave meaning' 
to the negative, thus transforming it into a resource for the positivity of 
meaning. To 'go to the end' or the limit of phenomenology and discover the 
general economy of dialectics remains a phenomenological project, and its 
effects are different from those of the general economy of energetic matter 
which is regulated by the principle of expenditure. The difference is scalar: 
Bataille's scale (on which he designates what is 'general') is bigger, more 
general than Derrida's, as proven by the disparity (magnitude of the 
difference) between restricted and general economies, i.e the meaninglessness 
of the latter from the perspective of the former and the difference (which is 
not simply the effect of a a formal principle) between the values associated 
with both. This difference is exemplified in the wild and irrational quality 
of Bataille's descriptions of general economy; arguments and terminology have 
an experimental edge and an evanescent power of conviction which rather 
influence the reader with their intensity, incautiousness and speed. [28] 
For Derrida, general economy is a negative, self-limiting process in which the 
intenninable end of phenomenology is followed and described as "exhibit[ing] 
within the negative, in an instant, that which can no longer be called 
negative". The rigourous links which attach sovereignty/ expenditure to 
phenomenology create a vortex of imperatives which produce increasingly more 
self-legitimating links and ultimately a project for philosophy in general (as 
well as Bataille specifically): (WD 259) 
"[Bataille] must mark the point of no return of destruction, the 
instance of an expenditure without reserve which no longer leaves us the 
resources with which to think of this expenditure as negativity [i.e as 
a resource for positivity]". 
Derrida's careful analysis relates sovereignty/ expenditure back to the safety 
and self-assurance of phenomenological jargon and figural positions: (WD 260) 
"In doubling lordship, sovereignty does not escape dialec:-tics. It could 
not be said that it extracts itself from dialectics l1ke a morsel of 
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dia~~tics which ~s suddenly become independent through a process of 
dec1s10n and tear1ng away. Cut off from dialectics in this way, 
sovereignty would be made into an abstract negation". 
Derrida's perverse argument is that any philosophical quanta detached from 
phenomenology would become a moment of phenomenology! This is an archetypical 
Hegelian argument because it presupposes the determining power of its own 
presupposition. Derrida transforms the restricted economy of Hegelian logic 
into the linguistic currency of his general econcxny. In Bataille' s account of 
general economy the figures of dialectics do not survive their dissolution in 
the general economy of energy flows; it is these flows which become the 
impossible object of discourse. Thus Derrida thoroughly domesticates 
sovereignty and the general economy of expenditure when he describes its 
critical power as resulting from its simulation of all the figures of Hegelian 
dialectics (rather than from its status as their energetic condition) and its 
constitution of a critical shadow wherein the impossibility of Hegelian 'full 
presence' is revealed. For Derrida, this impossibility becomes the new sense 
of Hegelian dialectics: 
"Far from interrupting dialectics, history, and the movement of meaning, 
sovereignty provides the economy of reason with its element, its milieu, 
its un limiting boundaries of non-sense. Far from suppressing the 
dialectical synthesis, it inscribes this synthesis and makes if function 
within the sacrifice of meaning." (WD260-1) 
Derrida must misconstrue all of Bataille' s important 'concepts' because he 
approaches them as a phenomenologist. For instance, Derrida associates 
continuity with the impossible language of sovereignty, and sovereignty with 
an experience of the continuum of this impossible language. In repressing 
Bataille's own formulations of continuity and discontinuity [29] which are 
irreducible to the context of a discussion of sovereignty or language, Derrida 
relates continuity back to the figures of experience in the Phenomenology. 
Continuity is: 
"the experience of the continuun • • • the experience of absolute 
difference, of a difference which would no longer be the one that Hegel 
had conceived more profoundly than anyone else •••• " and thereby reduces 
the difference between the two thinkers to and links them finally in 
"the difference between these two differences"(WD263). 
The notion of continuity is irreducible to the experience of the continuum (an 
experience which itself remains outside the structure of the logic of 
experience). The differentiation of discontinuity from continuity is not 
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primarily an "incision of difference" (WD263) within discourse or language. 
Discontinuity refers, as we shall see, to the intensive degrees of 
transcendence of events from the zero of continuity. The degree of matter 
in its spatio-energetic dissipation is wholly different from the point at 
which language affects the metaphysical ideality of concepts. 
For Derrida, the difference between the two thinkers lies exclusively in the 
displacement to which Hegel's concepts are treated in Bataille's work. Thus 
Bataille's concept of sovereignty depends on the similarity of Hegel's concept 
of lordship; sovereignty is a contrastive concept. This difference is 
revealed in the neutral space of textual differences in which concepts are 
incribed or erased and traced in a general economy of writing. One symptom of 
this general economy is the very displacement of those concepts from Hegel's 
to Bataille' s texts. The concept remains as a problematic presence, as the 
displacement or sliding proper to it which occurs in the general economy of 
writing: (WD 267) 
"this displacement is powerless to transform the nucleus of predicates. 
All the attributes ascribed to sovereignty are borrowed from the 
(Hegelian) logic of "lordship" ••••• Since the space which separates the 
logic of lordship and, if you will, the non-logic of sovereignty neither 
can nor may be inscribed in the nucleus of the concept itself (for what 
is discovered is ••• that the concept is produced within the tissue of 
differences); it will have to be inscribed within the continuous chain 
or functioning of a fom of writing." 
Once again, differ-ance emphasises the initial promise of presence (the 
concept) as well as its final impossibility; (WD 265) 
"presence is irremediably eluded in [the trace], from its initial 
promise, and onlr if it constitutes itself as the possibility of 
absolute erasure.' 
Derrida is more concerned with the forms of differance and general writing 
than with describing the empirical flows of texts (in fact, as we have seen, 
when he does describe these flows he gives us a static representation of the 
drama of philosophical scenes and personae). Derrida's economy of 
phenomenology constantly reinvests in itself as an abstract conceptual economy 
rather than being simply a series of figures of experience (like Kojeve's 
account). Derrida is concerned so exclusively with the "fonusl necessity" of 
concepts as graphemes (Bataille's included) that he does not need to indulge 
in close reading. He presupposes the fonusl necessity of a neutral point of 
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difference which affects every discourse. This makes reading Derrida an 
oppressively repetitious experience. Derrida's analysis is an arch example of 
negative critique; critical and suspicious, resentful and reactionary it 
approaches Bataille' s writing which distances itself from the jargon of 
phenomenology, only to apply that jargon again, without bothering to examine 
the new directions implied in Bataille's texts. Bataille's implicit claim to 
philosophical experiment is not even examined, but simply represented in the 
language of a phenomenology presided over by differance. The transgression 
of the limits of philosophy by the novum of intensive thought is represented 
as consolidating the general model of phenomenological logic (a model which 
includes a critical or quasi-transcendental moment which is the condition of 
metaphysical logic): (WD 268) 
''The transgression of meaning is not an access to the inmediate and 
indeterminate identity of a non-meaning, nor is it an access to the 
possibility of maintaining nonmeaning" 
Derrida is obsessed with the status of the relation between knowledge and 
unknowledge (and their interdependence); according to him Bataille is 
concerned - in relating knowledge and sovereignty - with "institut[ing] a 
relation in the fonn of a non-relation" (WD268). The stability of this 
relation and the logic which conditions it gives Derrida the safe critical 
position from which to pinpoint the source, the trajectory and the principle 
which regulates reason, its opposite and even the critical perspective of 
differance: 
"an absolute unknowledge from whose nonbasis is launched chance, or the 
wagers of meaning". 
But Bataille is concerned with the unilateral and irreversible direction from 
restricted knowledge to its energetic conditions. The idea of a similarity 
between projectile reason and its energetic result is irrelevant in Bataille's 
propulsive scheme of things. For Bataille, there is only one economy and that 
is the general economy of energetic quanta; he can only register the stability 
of the relational logic of phenomenology (however extreme or absolute) and its 
impossible jargon of absolutes (minus the absolute of intensive zero) as 
energetic resistors. 
Derrida 's protestations that the sovereign non-basis of meaning must not be 
considered a condition of possibility or the transcendental principle of a 
discourse (WD269) cannot be taken too seriously: if both concepts are exposed 
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to differance and the law of their own articulation their functions are also 
only minimally altered. Derrida describes such an alteration in tenns of a 
reduction of sense and a restriction of the possible discursive moves; thus 
the attributes of the quanta of Bataille' s general economy - intensity and 
tmmensity - are logicised as the involuted and simulating moves of discourse 
itself. Due to this restriction, non-knowledge simulates intentional reason 
to the extent that it can replicate its projects: (W0269-70) 
"In this simulation, I conserve or anticipate the entirety of knowledge, 
I do not l~it myself to a detennined and abstract kind of knowledge or 
unknowledge, but I rather absolve myself of absolute knowledge, putting 
it back in its place as such, situating it and inscribing it within a 
space which it no longer dominates". 
According to Derrida, a final moment of absolution from the reduction of non-
sense to reason and the complicitous involvement of non-sense in the powers of 
reason is provided by the simple formulation of the minimal effect of the law 
of representation; this suffices to offset the perfect simulation of reason 
and expiate the spurious consolidation of the powers which characterise 
knowledge. This is not a sufficient response. 
Linguistic and energetic general economies 
Derrida ignores Bataille's definition of general economy as a 'political 
economy' of expenditure rather than utile values (W0270), and relates general 
economy back to sovereignty; ignoring the fact that sovereignty is not only 
an example of the constitutive impossibility of conceptual meaning, but is 
also the value associated with the intensive magnitudes of general economy. 
Derrida relates the significance of general economy exclusively to the 
necessary paradoxical structure of sovereignty: (WO 270) 
"'!he writing of sovereignty places discourse in relation to abso~ute 
non-discourse. Like general economy, it is not the loss of ~Il1ng, 
but the "relation to this loss of meaning". It opens the quest10n of 
meaning. it does not describe unknowledge, for this is impossible, but 
only the effect of unknowledge" 
Derrida I s account is a massive reduction of the sense of general economy, 
which no empirical interpretation would read as simply designating the logical 
relation of a utile object (of knowledge) to that which allows no relation, 
i.e the relation to a nonrelation, or the relation to its own loss of 
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, ., Gen 1 . mean~ng • era economy ~s first and foremost a discourse which describes 
the flows of energy towards intensive zero including the increases of energy 
due to the dissolution of restricted energetic economies. Any rigourous 
interpretation of Bataille's work inevitably encounters these principles and 
their effects on philosophy before any other philosophical concerns. 
The fonn of the logical relation implicit in Derrida' s notion of general 
economy entails the 'inscription' of restricted economy "within the opening" 
(WD 271) of general economy: 
"General economy folds •• [the] horisons and figures [of meaning] so that 
they will be related not to a basis, rut to the nonbasis of 
expenditure ••• to the indefinite destruction of value." 
'!his inscription is the reinvestment of phenomenological tenninology in the 
process whereby it is inflected and related to the deferral (not dissolution) 
of its own optimal (and unquantifiable) value. Bataille' s general economy 
cannot be conceived as 'folding' or 'relating' the series of phenomenological 
figures, because it does not 'inscribe' the elements of restricted economy, 
but dissolves them in the trajectory towards intensive zero. His general 
economy is not a paradoxical or constitutively impossible discourse, but a 
dissolving discourse, becoming incoherent. A discourse about meaninglessness 
or immensity which is in the process of becoming meaningless and immense. I 
would want to minimally distinguish the content of general economy from its 
epistemological status as a discourse; general economy's lack of credibility 
stems from its stating the irrational truth of the drive towards immensity, 
and thus its own dissolution as a discourse into meaninglessness (into what 
that discourse designates - immensity); there is no implicit relation here 
between meaning and meaninglessness, but simply a single irreversible 
direction towards meaninglessness, a haemorrhage at variable speeds. 
Derrida's account of general economy is unconvincing because it accounts for 
the sensations induced by the inevitable dissolution of Bataille' s texts 
(sensations and dissolution which these texts carry like viral agents) in 
tenns of a traditional logico-epistemological structure. 
Derrida is correct in defining restricted economy as "the circuit of 
reproductive consunption" which marginalises its condition, "the absolute 
production and destruction of value, the exceeding energy as such" (WD271); 
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but he identifies restricted economy with "phenomenology in general", when the 
term applies to any economic process which produces utile values and is 
subject to changes of speed, growth and intensity, i.e is subject to forces 
inconceivable in the phenomenological model. The incompatibility of any 
energetic sense of consumption and 'phenomenology in general' is emphasised 
each time Derrida is forced through incomprehension to account for Bataille's 
concepts in terms of phenomenological logic. The essential difference 
between Derrida' s and Bataille' s accounts of general economy lies in the 
currency of their respective economies. For Derrida the currency is language 
as writing, for Bataille energy. The former currency reinvests itself; the 
latter dissipates. Derrida justifies his particular brand of philosophical 
regression (reinvestment) as a strategy of ''backwardation'' in the fight 
against the tyranny of metaphysics: (WD 272) 
'~e concepts of general writing can be read only on the condition that 
they be deported, shifted outside the synrnetrical alternatives from 
which, however they seem to be taken, and in which, after a fashion, 
they must also remain. Strategy plays upon this origin and 
''backwardation''. " 
Thus, in the writing of the relation between restricted and general economies: 
"that which indicates itself as nonvalue within the closure of 
metaphysics, refers beyond the opposition of value and non-value, even 
beyond the concept of value, as it does beyond the concept of meaning." 
(WD272) 
For Derrida, this logical formulation exhausts the sense of this economy; 
there is nothing less formal or abstract to say of this space beyond 
oppositions, and what has been said is alone necessary ("can be read only •• It). 
But expenditure is not an extreme logical possibility, an abstract non-value, 
it is the actual tendency to the dissolution of value (meaning, negentropic 
information) in energetic matter. 
Derrida identifies the haemorrhage of meaning in the surface matter of 
Bataille's texts with the structural logic proper to concepts; the elements, 
relations and predicates of these concepts, petrified in the limbo of 
differance cause these surface textual effects. He states that in the 
concepts of general writing, "the predicates are not there to mean 
something •• ru t in order to make sense slide, to denounce it or deviate from 
it" (WD 272). Derrida attempts to describe the single surface on which 
concepts as writing are deployed. This writing does not disseminate 
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conceptual unities, but rather the major and minor modes of concepts, and the 
difference between them. Derrida even attempts to characterise this new 
conception of a plane of concepts by introducing magnitudes (those heralds of 
the post-critical) as the major attributes of those grapheme-concepts: the new 
concepts are distinguished not by essential predicates but '~y qualitative 
differences of force, height etc, which themselves are qualified in this way 
only by metaphor. Tradition's names are maintained, but they are struck with 
the differences between the major and the minor, the classic and the 
archaic"(WD272). Bataille has no concern with such a surface; his general 
economy is an open field of energetic flows, which has many planes or levels 
of scalar intensity on which the filters (or entities) of restricted economy 
can be situated. 
Some basic rule of typology has to be applied if one wants to gauge the 
intensity of a set of such filters; concepts have to be distinguished from the 
flows of syntax, rational thought from sensation, life from liberated energy; 
and these distinctions will themselves designate the differences of degree of 
intensity traversing the levels and planes, from the high degree of 
restriction and thus intensification associated with strictly aggregated 
filters (pure static concepts, higher animals) to the low degree of the freer 
flow of textual intensities and speeds, and onto the intensive zero of the 
random and free flow of energy in a free state. In an early text 'Academic 
Horse' (OC1 160ff) Bataille writes of classic culture and its barbaric 
simulation, of classic and barbaric (as opposed to archaic) forms; the 
difference between Bataille' s barbaric mode and Derrida' s archaic mode is 
telling; the archaic is the conceptual and logical precondition of all aspects 
of the classical, whereas the barbaric is associated with the mutation of 
specific existing cultural commodities and artefacts. Bataille's discourse 
can be considered barbaric or virulently mutational at the level of norms of 
rational discourse without thus necessarily and exclusively reconfiguring 
logical structures of reason. 
Derrida's logicisation of intensive degrees on a single surface of diff~ance 
creates its own future fears; given the proximity of the play of difference to 
Hegelian 'anticipated discourse', it might be subordinated to the return of 
the anticipated discourse of reason in another guise: (WD273) 
"One must not subnit contextual attentiveness and differences of 
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signification to a system of meaning pennitting or premising a formal 
mastery" • 
Given the proximity which characterises Derrida's discursive relation to the 
Hegelian system, the fear of this influence can not be put aside. Derrida is 
so obsessed with the trace of the full structure of possibility (differance) 
that the ghost of metaphysics cannot but haoot him. In stressing the spaces 
of metaphysics, and the "distances" and "proximities" (WD271) proper to 
elements of phenomenology as figures of an 'erased' metaphysics, Derrida 
cannot avoid the fear of influence, the fear of microscoping differences which 
is proper to reason as an extensive space. He thus rediscovers the 
essentially critical or transcendental fear of the grooodlessness of the 
critical position. The hysterical tone of this polemical essay is itself a 
symptom of this fear; we are no longer in the Kantian 'scene' of the equal and 
opposing dogmatists. Derrida' s critic-spectator does not present two 
arguments (Bataille and Hegel), but one (deconstructed Hegelianism), in 
neither a 'sober' nor 'just' fashion, because he himself is on the rtm, 
reduced to praying for a return to order in the face of a critical meltdown, 
in proclaiming the necessity and detennining importance for philosophy of the 
self-evidence of Hegel; and thereby himself promoting and extending a minimal 
fonn of Hegelian ''historical domination". For there can be no doubt that 
articulating the melodrama of Hegelianism (and the logical necessity of 
'complicity' and 'constraint' which can only be partially 'expiated') as a 
grand historical tyranny encourages it, not to anything grand of course, but 
to the pcxnposity of the the most petty form of Statism, academic Teutonicism, 
that is academicism which is blind to its own obsolescence. 
Because he is a phenomenological thinker, Derrida cannot fathem Bataille's 
energeticist approach. He interprets each marker of the intensive dissolution 
of energetic matter as proposing projects within the enclosed field of writing 
as constitutive of reason. Where Bataille' s notion of the inmediacy of 
experience as opposed to reason is conditioned by the sensations induced by 
the approach of 'irrmanence' or intensive zero, Derrida conceives it as 
conditioned by a structural super-phenomenology, that is phenomenology related 
to the critical position of differance: "How can mediacy and inmediacy be 
transgressed simultaneously?": How can the "philosophical logos be exceeded in 
its totality?" (WD273). These questions ignore Bataille's revaluation of the 
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Kantian notion of the ltmiting function of concepts. For Bataille, the limit 
is a rational abstraction - a rational defence mechanism against energetic 
flows - which is applied by the understanding to real energetic economies of a 
low intensity. All concepts contain this function, but those concepts which 
reveal it have a privileged relation in experience (i.e in their very 
irreducibility to knowledge, in the failure of a logic which can only 
represent) to energetic excess and inmensity. Thus limit, totality and 
transgression are ltmit-concepts and thereby, agents of the intensive 
haemmorrhage of reason, modes of excess and inmensity and symptoms of an 
intensive energetic drive cammon to all matter. The whole energetic terrain 
of restricted economy is only minimally differentiated from the inmensity of 
intensities and speeds which is general economy, by this ltmiting function; or 
rather, restricted economies are the specific discontinuous entities which are 
formed, primarily as degrees of intensity from intensive immanence or zero by 
this ltmiting function.[30] Rationalised restricted economies are premised on 
the notion that independence from energetic conditions can be attained in an 
involuted expansion, extension and replication of this ltmiting function, 
which in itself only registers a degree of intensity. In fact there are no 
real ltmits, only degrees of intensity. 
Derrida reduces the sense of intensive or real dissolution in analysing its 
status as an element within a problematically constituted conceptual 
discourse; for htm the destruction of meaning multiplies signification (!), 
precipitates and engulfs words in "an endless and baseless substitution whose 
only rule is the sovereign affirmation of the play outside meaning ••• a 
potlatch of signs" (WD274). For Bataille, potlatch [31] is an example of a 
cultural limit-event, in which a social whole (which occidental reason would 
rationalise as economically organised around the principle of the accumulation 
of wealth, and which Bataille thereby calls a restricted economy) demonstrates 
- over and above the complexities of human interest - its energetic condition 
in general economy; insofar as potlatch favours the dispersal of the quanta of 
energy that constitute that social whole. Potlatch is a dissolution, or a 
becoming-flow of energy rather than an endless substitution effected within 
language by its relation to its impossible and sovereign outside. Derrida's 
idea of destruction is defined within the limits of the logical analogue of 
concept or sign for presence, i.e within the erased structure of reason and 
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the interminable play or substitution of its conceptual elements. Concepts 
and the rational demand for metaphysical presence are subject to deferral not 
dissolution in this play of substitution: 
"none of the concepts satisfies the demand, all are determined by each 
other, and at the same time, destroy or neutralise each other" (WD274) 
The impossible demand for presence, for metaphysical full structures and 
integrated systems remains in this 'destruction', and yet Derrida calls this 
ghostly replay of metaphysics a "transgression of discourse"! It is no 
surprise then to find Derrida trotting out the Hegelian cliche concerning 
transgression, with regard to Bataille's work, precisely because Derrida 
cannot understand that Bataille designates the notion of the limit as a marker 
of an intensification which can only be registered in the local flows of the 
general econany of energetic matter. I refer to the cliche that relates 
transgression in general to the moves of phenomenological logic: Derrida 
states that such a 'transgression of discourse'; 
"must, in some fashion, and like every transgression, conserve or 
confirm that which it exceeds. This is the only way for it to affirm 
itself as transgression and thereby to acceed to the sacred, which is 
presented in the violence of an infraction". (WD274) 
I have examined Bataille's use of the notion of transgression below [32]. It 
suffices here to note that for Bataille the term designates the relay of the 
Hegelian logical cycle of law and transgression to the energetic trajectory of 
general economy. For Bataille, the 'violence of infraction' - the rupture of 
the logical law which connects law and transgression - designates an 
intensification of energy which is itself a symptom of the general economy of 
energy. [33] 
Derrida defines transgression as a simulacrum of Hegel's notion of the 
'Aufhebung', a superimposition which emphasises the extent to which he is 
blind to Bataille's major concerns and simply intent on presenting his own 
intellectual project: 
"Bataille •• can only use the empty form of the 'Aufhebung', in an 
analogical fashion [to designate that] within a form of writing, •• the 
speCUlative concept par excellence, is forced to designate a movement 
which properly constitutes the excess of every possible philosoph~. 
This movement then makes philosophy ap~ as a form of natural or na1ve 
consciousness ••• natural and vulgar ••• [because] it does not see the 
nonbasis of play on which the history of meaning is launched. "(WD275) 
Derrida would have Hegelian phenomenology - which is 'naive' and 'vulgar'! -
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revised by its Bataillean simulation and refinement. This ignores the 
relevance of the very passage from Method of Meditation which Derrida quotes: 
''between extreme knowledge and vulgar knowledge ••• the difference is 
nil"(WD276) which surely means that, according to Bataille, the difference 
between any states of knowledge is unworthy of mention from the point of view 
of the general economy of energetic fluxes. The whole idea of a Bataillean 
simulation of the 'totality' of Hegelian discourse is preposterous when every 
Bataillean text is in such a state of fragmentation as to teeter on the edge 
of semantic explosion. No Bataillean text is intact enough to be inflected, 
so its parasitic constitution cannot be recognised as even an adequate 
simulation of a logical discourse such as Hegel's. Den;ida consistently 
takes Bataille too seriously in relation to phenomenology (and not at all in 
relation to the post-Kantian energetic tradition). The difference or 
fragmentation present in Bataille' s texts is pragmatic and empirical rather 
than absolute and phenomenological; it is a product of the crashes of sense 
and the resulting release· of contagious intensities which is designated in 
these texts by the tangible juxtapositions of different discourses, or rather 
by the fragmentation of senses proper to hereto rigourous discourses. The 
novum of Bataille' s philosophical position lies with this registering of 
'rigourous' phi los opheme s as intensive quanta and a concomitant virtual 
reduction of their negentropic sense. This virulent fragmentation of meaning 
cannot plausibly be reduced to the simple philosophical formulation of the law 
of discursive presence. Derrida's texts, like Hegel's, impose a sense of 
their authority through the repetitiveness of a spare vocabulary, a style 
suited to the restricted m.nnber of contortions of which phenomenological 
reflection is capable. This distances them both from the scandal of 
Bataille's textual surface, with its concepts butchered by intrusive 
scientific (biological and physical) fragments in an aborting barbaric 
interdisciplinary half-sense. This language cannot be considered simply as a 
simulacrum of 'full' phenomenological rational discourse, nor simply as the 
language of the effects of a fonnal and abstract statement of an absolute 
difference on phenomenological logic. [34] Even when Bataille is most 
conceptual - with his notion of general economy - the transcendental 
groundlessness or impossibility of his discourse does not preclude it from 
being a substantial discourse, ranging from thermodynamics to a genealogy of 
morals and religion. For Bataille, the result of the critical examination of 
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the conditions of possibility of discourse is the exacerbation of critical 
energies (his texts remain interesting and thought-provoking) and not s~ly 
an intenninable meta-discourse which articulates the law of signification 
thereby arresting critique in the banal repetition of its formula. Derrida's 
deconstruction should rather be thought of as a 'metaphenomenology' in which 
the erasure or qualification of the phenomenological series is added to that 
series, as a minimal critical difference. Deconstruction is no solution to 
the problems of transcendental philosophy; it poses as a critical examination 
of the conditions of possibility of metaphysics only to arrest its movement at 
the articulation of the law of signification. Bataille on the other hand 
analyses the logic of representation and then goes on to discover its 
energetic conditions. [35] But this latter move can no longer be considered 
critical as it dissolves into a jargon of intensities and speeds which tend 
towards the incoherence of sensation. The critical discourse about the 
~ensity of energetic conditions (meaninglessness) itself becomes intensely 
energetic, irrmense and meaningless. For this reason Bataille must be 
considered a post-critical thinker, whereas Derrida has halted the revolution 
of critique in metaphenomenology. 
The project to 'bear the self-evidence of Hegel' which emphasises the 
orientation of philosophy around Hegel results in the articulation of the 
indifferent neutral formal law of differance which presides over the history 
of metaphysics. Such a law constitutes Derrida' s own peculiar brand of 
Hegelianism. All Derrida's 'arguments' in this essay seek to emphasise the 
relation between general economy and the phenomenological logic of reversible 
or reflexive terms. I have shown the inscrutability of the currency 
circulating in Derrida's notion of general economy: this currency is graphemes 
- concepts as syntactical units - and yet these units can form themselves into 
the scenes and figures which are associated with specific phenomenological 
posi tions • Given this inscrutability, why does Derrida not remark on the 
self-evident character of the quanta which differentiate Bataille' s general 
economy from his own? Bataille's claim is clear: the quantities liberated in 
general economy (and thus circulating in restricted economy) are quantities of 
energy, which remain distinct from their formal representation as signifiers 
and elements of a discourse, as well as from the discontinuous intense matter 
they constitute. This level of general economy is disavowed by Derrida, who 
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is more interested in understanding general economy in terms of its linguistic 
pre-conditions, that is, the interweaving of nonmeaning and signification. 
This is an exclusive and therefore unnecessarily restricted identification of 
general economy with syntax in which general economy is conceived as exhausted 
in subsuming or containing the play of significations. 
To contest the cla~s of deconstruction one need only be empirically 
statistical and show the amount of Bataille' s text that does not utilise 
obsessive phenomenological language. Using the same method we note the 
amount of phenomenological jargon which informs Derrida's texts (despite his 
attempts to conceal it in contorted stylistic and rhetorical tricks, which are 
themselves eminently Prussian). Statistically, this text 'From restricted to 
general economy' conserves the broad outlines of a phenomenological language 
(albei t a language in relation to the general economy opened up by the 
principle of written differance) which is itself archetypically associated 
with restricted economy, by the very frequency of its use of the terms and 
models of that language. Whereas it seems obvious to me that Derrida is open 
to charges of philosophical conservatism, I note with alarm that he still 
enjoys the hype of radicality - turning to a recent 'Dictionary of Modern 
Culture' I found next to the Derrida entry a symbol which was shorthand for 
the highest accolade: 'anarchist/punk/deconstructor', the term even making it 
into the basic currency of contemporary culture. Is deconstruction the 
manner in which Hegelianism ult~ately extends its historical domination? 
It is ~portant to give a collected works-wide perspective to the arguable 
necessity of each assured move which Derrida makes in his article. Derrida 
attempts to convince us of the importance of Bataille' s relation to the 
phenomenological tradition, with little more than the urgency of the terms 
'canplicity' and 'constraint' behind h~. He substitutes the anguish of the 
concept for the anguished sensation of death and immensity. He substitutes a 
drama based on the inflection of a philosophical tradition for the account 
which leads to the overcoming and obsolescence of that tradition. This drama 
of substitution conceals the mundanity of Oerrida's philosophical position in 
a complex tangle of phenomenological terms and spurious hijackings of the 
extremes of sensation which Bataille associates with the intensity of 
dissolving thought. Derrida ignores the way in which primarily Kantian 
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notions such as ccmnunication, continuity and discontinuity, inrnanence and 
transcendence are oriented by Bataille' s notion of the general economy of 
energetics. He stresses only those articles where Bataille appears to 
regurgitate Kojeve's account of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and 
Bataille's infrequent throwaway manifestoes for aborted and Lnpossible 
projects. [36] It seems to me that the general tenor of general economy is 
self-evidently extra-phenomenological, yet Derrida worries about the 
preconditions of such a discourse and reorients it around essential 
phenomenological presuppositions. It is now time to show how Bataille arrives 
at his general economy of energetics through 1) a contestation of the thought 
of Hegel and Kojeve, in those very texts which Derrida uses as proof of the 
their influence on Bataille and 2) an examination of the essential terms which 
I have noted above and which Derrida ignores, both in their Kantian deployment 
and their reorientation within Bataille's notion of general economy to the 
post-critical dissolution of the problems of Kant's transcendental philosphy. 
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Olapter Two: BATAILLE - lliE NOVUM OF INFECITON 
Ridiculing intellectual influence 
We have seen that Derrida' s image of Bataille owes much to his own meta-
phenomenological concerns. However, there must be some reason for the 
similarity of their approaches to Hegel, however inessential this similarity 
is, and however much Derrida comes to overcode it in the fashion which I have 
described. Alexandre KoJeve' s interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spiritis the coomon link between them; Bataille attended his lectures in 
1930's Paris, and Derrida's work on Hegel can be construed as a correction of 
Kojeve's reading of Hegel, from a Heideggerian perspective. This correction 
is the basis of Derrida' s claim to a rightful supercession of the French 
throne of Phenomenolog~; just as Kojeve presented Hegel and Heidegger to the 
French intellectuals of the 1930's (he was the first - and an inaccurate -
translator of Heidegger, and a vulgar over-simplifying literalist interpreter 
of Hegel), Derrida presents these figures to the post-modern millennial world. 
In fact, Koj~e's reading of Hegel emphasises an essentially Kantian 
topography of the space of reason, a topography which, as we have seen remains 
an essential element of Derrida's interpretation, and which as we shall see, 
remains importan t for a proper unders tanding of Ba taille ' s texts. [1] 
Bataille's forcefully critical use of the Kojevian interpretation of Hegel 
includes an account of the physiological conditions of the Phenomenology 
which neither Hegel nor Kojeve concern themselves with. The presence of this 
element in Bataille' s account may be conditioned by the real psychological 
influence that Kojeve exerted on Bataille in the 1930's. It is probable that 
the presence of a personal relationship between the two men, developed at the 
interface of philosphical argument and emotional recrimination facilitated 
Bataille's theoretical writings on the psychodynamical and energetic 
conditions of transcendental and phenomenological philosophy in general. 
It is almost certain that Bataille's access to Hegel's work was exclusively 
mediated through Kojeve' s Paris seminars at the 'Ecole Pratique des Hautes 
Etudes' of 1933-9 and the notes from the years 1937-9 compiled by Raymond 
~eneau in a book Introduction to the reading of Hegel (Gallimard 1947). 
Bataille's contestation of the values of Hegelianism feed into a general 
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critique of 'utile' values which predates his exposure to Hegel's work, a 
critique which results from reading Nietzsche in 1923 [2] and which can be 
found fully formed in important essays from the pre-1933 era of his writing 
('Base Materialism and Gnosticism', 'The use-value of DAF de Sade', 'The 
Notion of Expenditure'[3]). 
I will show in this chapter that Bataille warms to Kojeve's account of Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit only in so far as it presents an example of the 
refutation of the necessity of the rationalised dimensions of restricted or 
utile economy - (in the terms of the Phenomenology: experience, knowledge and 
history) - in the process of their epistemological dissolution into their 
intensive and energetic conditions. Hegel's Phenomenology is thus, for 
Bataille, an example of a system of utile values which comes to eradicate 
itself, or is dissolved in a Time irreducible to the 'logic' of History. 
Bataille's attitude to the teaching and personality of Kojeve (and thereby the 
figure of Hegel) might be. described as ambivalent, and thus Bataille would 
appear as a traditional pupil, both disciple and contestant, loving the rigour 
of Hegelian logic as revealed in Koj~ve's simple prose yet desiring to escape 
its hold. Such a view of their relationship would justify itself at a textual 
and the tic level by noting the contradiction which becomes apparent as soon as 
one treats Bataille's texts as rigourously philosophical. Bataille intends to 
describe the dissolving trajectory of critical philosophy, in which his own 
discourse inevitably becomes meaningless, and yet he associates this 
trajectory with Hegelian discourse, which combats its inevitable dissolution 
in time with all the ingenious obfuscations and disavowals which the lunacy of 
Gennan Idealism could intrigue. It suffices to apply the phenomenological 
reflexive model of logical relations at this empirical level of hunan 
relations (a literalism vulgar enough to be worthy of KoJ~ve), to miss the 
essential direction of Bataille's attitudes to Hegel and Koj~ve. For 
Bataille, Koj~e' s interpretation reveals the simple mechanisms which 
characterise the Hegelian rationalisation of experience; and this 
simplification permits Bataille to relish and slaver over the spectacle of 
Hegel as an inevitable intensification of reason, an intensification which 
blows itself out [4]; whilst admitting that this intensification, this 
influence or infection proper to reason, is itself only a symptom of the 
energetic imnensities of annihilatory Time. Bataille could fonnulate his 
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notion of general economy - which was informed by readings in the biological 
and physical sciences - because Koj~ve reduced the stature and importance of 
Hegel, made him representative of a general problematic of logic encountering 
its own Lmpossibility which was, for Bataille, the starting point of another 
type of intellectual enquiry, one concerned with events considered as 
intensive quantities. The real contestation of Kojeve's philosophy by 
Bataille concerns the ultimate relevance of the former's own uncritical 
representation of Hegel's texts; over an extensive period of years he appears 
to have sLmply elaborated the systems of the Logic and the Phenomenology [5]. 
The real confrontation, which is resolved in Bataille' s texts, was between the 
value of an uncritical account of these phenomenological mechanisms and the 
scientific and Nietzschean discourses which gave Bataille grounds for a 
revaluation of the relevance and importance of the former. 
Many texts in the Oeuvres Campl~tes - right across Bataille's writing career -
show the influence of biological or physical theses; and these are not mere 
addenda or additions to a primary tradi tional philosophical discourse, but 
rather are constitutive of a specifically Bataillean discourse. Bataille 
considered that the scientific enquiries he engaged in and the rigour of 
Hegelian discourse were fundamentally opposed, which suggests that this was no 
ordinary scientific enquiry; it lacked method, but Bataille had had enough of 
method with Hegel: 
''From 33 (I think) to 39 I attended the course that Alexander Koj~ve 
gave over to the explanation of 'The Phenomenology of Spirit' (an 
inspired explanation, to the standard of the book: often Queneau and I 
left the room - suffocating, nailed to the floor.) 
During the same period, due to a lot of reading, I knew the way the 
sciences were moving. 
But Ko j eve's course broke me, crushed me, killed me ten times over." (OC 
6 p416) 
The level of scientific research he engaged in can best be gauged by looking 
at the those texts he wrote whilst a member of the College of Sociology (1937-
39). [6] Bataille referred to this period as a time of the most 
scientifically adventurous and ultimately useless research. The importance of 
this research lay in its speculative nature as he admits in the 1946 article 
'The moral sense of sociology' [7]: (0C11 58) 
"It is doubtful that, on the limited level of scientific knowledge, any 
great results carne from it. But the new realm of interest as thus 
defined, demonstrates, without a doubt, Lmportant sorts of unrest." 
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I do not intend to discuss the scientific texts which Bataille read; he 
himself mentions some of the authors he studied: the biologist Rabaud, the 
physiologist Edith Bowen, (who are mentioned in the College's 'Connections ••• ' 
lectures (OC2 291ff), Paul Langevin, the physicist author of The Notion of 
Corpuscles and Atoms (OCS 98), and the physicist Georges Ambrosino - who was a 
member of Acephale and the College of Sociology - who is thanked for helping 
Bataille with his knowledge of physics in the Preface to The Accursed Share 
(OC7 P23), and who wrote essays on physics for the journal 'Critique' in the 
years after the war when Bataille was editor. [8] 
The important fact is that this scientific line of enquiry was contemporaneous 
with Bataille's attendance of KOjE!ve's seminars. Given that Bataille's 
scientific enquiries continually faced him with the fact of chance and 
~robability in natural existence - totally foreign to phenomenological logic 
- in relation to the multiplicity of different forms of life and the scales on 
which life operates, we can start to comprehend his oppositional and at t~es 
s~ply uninterested attitude to the 'rigourous logic' of the Hegelian system. 
Raymond Queneau states of Bataille's lecture-roan behaviour: 
"He was not a listener whose attentiveness was exemplary ••• sometimes he 
even managed to doze" [9]. 
Was Bataille thinking of hours spent staring glazedly at Kojeve when he wrote: 
"It is ~possible to reduce the appearance of the fly on the nose of the 
speaker to the pretentious logical contradiction of the I and of the 
whole of metaphysics. But if we lend a general value to the ~robable 
character of the scientific universe, it becomes possible to proceed to 
an operation contrary to that of He&el, and to reduce the appearance of 
the I to that of the fly" OCl 184). Ll0] 
These scientific enquiries which Bataille followed were speculative and as 
useless as the freeflows of energetic matter in the universe, the truth of 
which they measured. Wi th their concern with scales of perception, cell 
growth and the nuclear forces of attraction and repulsion, they circumvented 
the spurious restrictions placed on intellectual thought by the traditional 
philosophical concern with the given scale of the form of perception and the 
content of reflexive or hierarchical relations proper to hunan-centred reason. 
With regard to the human, these enquiries reached nature's level of insulting 
indifference. Only later would the extent of the critical power of such 
'speculative' thought become apparent to Bataille. So, at the same time he 
continued to do his Hegel-speak homework and could regurgitate the schemas 
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which Koj~ve used to characterise Hegel's work: 
'~lst I wrote a ladybird flew under my lamp and landed on my hand: I 
lifted it off and placed it on a piece of paper. Some time before I had 
copied on the sheet a schema of the diverse forms, according to Hegel 
from one extreme to the other: from universality to particularity. Th~ 
ladybird landed on the colurm 'Spirit', where it went from Universal 
Spirit to sensible consciousness (particularity), passing through The 
People, State, and Universal History. Starting its disconcerted walk 
again it ended up in the colurm 'Life', its own domain before 
attaining, in the central colurm 'unha~py consciousness', irreievant to 
it except as a named creature" (OC5 281). [11] 
Bataille's response to Kojeve' s Hegelianism is thematised in the two essays 
from the middle 1950's which I shall deal with in some detail. Bataille's 
ambivalence has become the object of the articles, the matter of the 
interpretation, whence Bataille' s ability to give a calm appraisal of the 
~rtance of the 'man' as an intellectual figure: 
"Alexander Koj~ve's originality and courage, it must be said, is to have 
perceived the impossibility of going any further, the necessity, 
consequently, of renouncing creating an original philosophy, and thereby 
the intenninable reconmencing which is the avowal of the vanity of 
thought" ( 0C12 326) 
This appreciation reaches a peak of over-zealousness in the 1948 Theory of 
Religion, with a celebration of Kojeve's brand of Hegelianism which is belied 
by the substantial critical arguments against the tenor of Hegelian logic 
contained in that text and more especially, in the essays which I examine 
closely below: 
''Whatever opl.nl.on one might have of the correctness of his 
interpretation of Hegel (and I believe the possible criticisms on this 
point should be assigned only a limited value) the 'Introduction to the 
reading of Hegel' - relatively accessible - is not only the primary 
instrument of self-consciousness; it is the only way to view the various 
aspects of hunan life ••••• No-one today can claim to be educated without 
having assimilated its contents" (OC 7 359) 
The earlier evidence of Bataille' s relation to Kojeve foregrounds the same 
critical arguments as the later essays, but in a fashion which suggests the 
initial resentful ferocity of Bataille's intellectual difference of opinion. 
[12]. This is best represented by the letter of the 6th December 1937, later 
published in an abridged form as an appendix to Le coupable (OCS 369-71). 
Bataille's contention is that Kojeve (and by implication Hegel too) has not 
asked himself what happens to the Negativity or Action which drives History at 
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the end of history.[13] Bataille posits the idea of a final figure - a 
Nietzschean 'Last Man' [14] of phenomenology, a man of "tmemployed 
negativity" (OCS 371) who recognises the redundancy of his power of 
negativity: 
''No matter how disquieted he is he knows that henceforth nothing can be 
ruled out since negativity no longer has any prospect". 
Bataille identifies h~self as such a man and equates such an identification 
with the refutation of Hegelianism and the effects of its logico-reflexive 
linguistic models in history and experience: (OC5 370) 
"I imagine that my life - or better yet, its aborting, the open wotmd 
that is my life - constitutes all by itself the refutation of Hegel's 
closed system". 
Bataille says that he approaches his "irrevocable insignificance" gay and 
serious. The man of unemployed negativity has a project: 
''What he has 'to do' is to satisfy the portion of existence that is 
freed from doing". 
The refutation of Hegelianism is here seen in terms of a consciousness of 'the 
accursed share' in human affairs, the inevitable release of positive quanta of 
energy which is the end product of rationalised processes of reinvestment and 
use. Bataille still considers this outcome, this 'abortion', as an object of 
consciousness, which would open h~ to the recurrent charge of voltmtarism, 
the ghostly shadow of Kantian morality which also dogs Bataille in his 
accounts of general economy and the hypermorality of sovereignty [15] except 
that this negativity is the noumenal or affective object itself, tmder the 
influence of which rational schemas of thought are translated into their 
energetic conditions, the positive quanta associated with physiology, 
sensation and base energetics. For Bataille, Hegel's importance is limited 
to having made this transformation possible: the ultimate abstraction 
performed by reason - the description of energy as lack - the least empirical 
and least canpelling abstraction, demonstrates the irrationality of reason and 
results in the recognition of the artificiality of the systemic edifice built 
over this abstraction and the wracking of conceptual schemas by the liberated 
quantas of that base negativity. If Hegel is to be praised for recognising 
negativity, writes Bataille, it is because he described it as effecting 
radical changes in the history of reason. Hegel described negativity "at the 
moment when it enters the workings of existence as a stimulus to major vital 
reactions", and attempted to contain this motor within reason. But in the 
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light of the nature of the motor and the overwhelming quanta which it 
produces, these defensive reactions can no longer be justified and eternalised 
as mental, rational and necessary, but are subject as sensation to turbulent 
intensive changes and ultimately, a 'rigourous' dissolution. 
It is the radicality of the physiological aspects of negativity that Bataille 
perceives as lost both in KoJ~ve and in the supreme rationalisations which 
Hegel imposes in his notion of negativity. In so far as Hegel could not 
envision the role of the man of 'recognised negativity', affirm the knowledge 
of negativity and the redundancy of such a knowledge of the excessive energies 
which condition the restricted sense of negativity and the rational monster 
that crystallises fran it, he "risked nothing", writes Bataille. Although 
the terms of reference of Bataille's argument necessitate a certain 
campranising involvement with the babble of phenomenological terminology, the 
tenor of his complaint is as clear as it is irreducible to that terminology. 
It only remains for this difference to be substantiated in an argument, for 
the critical power of base energetics to shine briefly before it too blows 
itself out. The two essays, twenty years on from the letter to Koj eve , 
provide us with this. 
Kojeve & Hegel - energetic matter and the logic of representation 
Bataille published two essays in the mid 1950' s that are critical 
appreciations of Kojeve's Introduction to the reading of Hegel. The first, 
'Hegel, Death and sacrifice' appeared in the journal 'Deucalion' no 5 in 1955. 
The second, 'Hegel, Man and His tory' appeared in 'Monde Nouveau-Paru' no 96 in 
1956. Both essays are worth looking at in detail because they lay to rest 
the misinformed idea that Bataille' s work is an extension of the scope of 
Koj~e's 'anthropological history'. These essays refute that idea in the 
face of explicit statements on Bataille's part - both here and scatterd 
through his texts [16] - that he is involved in analyses based on Kojevian 
principles. The essays are useful in showing, through Bataille' s cri tical 
appreciation of KoJeve' s work on Hegel, the details of the intellectual 
distance between them. 
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These essays emphasise the fact that Bataille's perception of Hegel's work can 
in no way be divorced from the KOjevian account of Hegel's Phenomenology as a 
philosophy of negativity or death; an account which describes Hegel using neo-
kantian terminology from which, I will argue, Kojeve and Bataille extrapolate 
and concentrate on the metaphysical notions of totality and limited entities. 
I would argue that even though Bataille distances himself from Koj~ve _ 
especially in these essays where the difference between commentary on 
(Koj~ve's) text and a critical position on it is marked - that Bataille 
relies - to an extent which we will have to measure later, but which we can 
provisionally call 'unnecessary' - on the terminology of a philosophically 
'restricted economy' to describe the basic attributes of a 'general economy' 
of philosophy, morals and culture. With the exception of these essays, this 
terminology is explicitly Kantian rather than Hegelian [17]; thus this 
compromise of the language of intensities 'proper' to general economy can be 
considered symptomatic of the fate of critique itself, as one mode of the 
general infection, contamination and collapsing of the distance from 
intellectual internecine combat of the 'safe seat' of the Kantian critic. [18] 
Even in these essays Bataille' s contestation of Kojeve' s Hegelian agenda 
implicitly refers to the relay of intellectual influence from Kant to 
Nietzsche to Bataille, the very relay which Derrida ignores in his treatment 
of the texts. 
Bataille states at the beginning of 'Hegel, Death and sacrifice' (OC12 327) 
that Kojeve finds the key to Hegelian philosophy in the idea of 'free 
determinate negation'; which Kojeve is quoted as describing thus: 
"the idea that the foundation and the source of hunan objective reality 
(Wirklichkeit) and empirical existence (Dasein) are the Nothingness which 
manifests itself as negative or creative Action, free and self-conscious". 
Bataille is correct to point out (0C12 327-8) the distinction implicit in 
Kojeve's statement between 'Nothingness' - the imnanent relation of hunan 
existence to Nature - which is a potential reserve for acts of consciousness, 
with a single condition i.e that human existence differentiates itself 'within 
it' for only a duration within the annihilation which is time; and the 
principle of that differentiation, the principle of action of the ego on 
Nature, which Kojeve calls 'Negativity', and in which the human negates the 
natural, destroys and transforms the world in the process of history. Kojeve 
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also calls this process (OC12 333) 'the actualisation of Nothingness' (the 
reserve) through 'the annihilation of Being' (for Koj~ve, 'Being' designates 
the natural world in so far as it is not simply included in Nothingness). 
Abstract rationalisation or negativity induces a death of sorts but 
nothingness (or the inInanence of man and nature), in so far as it 1S 
irreducible to the abstract totality of a reserve of rational processes, is 
the more radical (and illogical, non-rational) negative, because it can be 
subtracted from the rational processes as their 'condition'. 
Bataille remarks on the non-logical differentiation which this radical 
negative makes possible, yet the essay in general is rather concerned with 
Kojeve's juxtaposition of the abstract totality of a reserve of possibilities 
and an indeterminate process of actions. Kojeve links the two phases of 
'negativity' at the level of discourse; he sees the special project of 
Hegelian discourse as, in Bataille's words, "to describe the totality of what 
is" (OC12 328) which· includes the discourse which reveals that totality. 
Kojeve conceives of the Hegelian totality as a 'concrete totality' of natural 
knowledge and experience or history (OC12 329), which arises from the logical 
structures 'appropriate' to Nothingness and Negativity, in the course of the 
fragmentation of the pre-logical structure of the fonner in the logical 
history of the latter (OC12 332). For KOjeve, the totality of 'Nothingness' 
is an abstract but spatial reserve of possibilities, the inInanent totality of 
Nature, wherein no 'constitutive elements' are separated by the transcendence 
of language or action, and all things are connected by material and 
indissoluble bonds, including the human considered as animal. The violence 
of reason comes to particularise and individualise objects and subjects, and 
thus the human elements come to feel their own particulari ty and f ini tude. 
The fear of death is born and in turn the power and violence of 
rationalisation is increased - to overcome that fear. As we shall see, the 
trajectory of such a restricted economy entails the endpoint of an ultimate 
extension of rationalisation, a state of completion which returns the human to 
the death it feared, through its own rational processes. [19] 
Bataille uses KoJeve' s account of Hegel's Phenomenology to emphasise the 
notion that lies at the base of his genealogy of restricted economies in human 
cultures; that it is the finitude of the human being and its conscious fear of 
death which goads the human to action and into history. This point is 
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central to Bataille's accounts of general economy and the genealogy of morals 
and religion, and its full import can only be shown when it has been liberated 
from the context of an appreciation of Koj~e's work on Hegel [20]. However 
this notion basic to the differentiation of restricted and solar or general 
economy is indubitably present in Bataille' s reading of Koj~ve. Here, 
Bataille concentrates on the specifics of the Hegelian articulation of this 
fear of death. Hegel's contribution to philosophy is reduced to the status of 
an example of a thesis which his work only unconsciously demonstrates; but the 
critical extrapolation of this exemplarity - cOOlIlOn to both Kojeve and 
Bataille - posits it as the ultimate example of rationalisation. For Kojeve 
and Bataille the characteristic impossibility of this ultimacy is given in the 
final concept/figure of the Hegelian Logic/Phenomenology: the Hegelian Sage. 
For Bataille, the critical examination of the impossibility of the figure of 
the Hegelian Sage (i.e of a figure embodying the concept of the 'absolute 
knowledge' of the totality of natural knowledge and history) results in a 
'comic recapitulation' of ,the processes of knowledge which culminated in the 
figure of the Sage; in which these processes are conceived as different 
rational attempts to evade the overwhelming influence of energetic flows and 
are thereby transformed into intensive quanta in relation to the intensive 
zero of death. [21] Bataille follows Kojeve in interpreting Hegel's 
phenomenology as a 'philosophy of death', but for Bataille this description 
simply highlights the irruption of the magnitude or intensity of death in 
human affairs and the revaluation of those affairs in the light of this 
intensive measure of zero. Thus Bataille writes that the human reaches 
knowledge in general only by 'raising itself' to the 'height' ('magnitude' or 
'intensity') of death. 
We should not lose sight of the critical basis of this essay (the conception 
of the condition of the energetic negative) and its critical result (the 
revaluation of the processes of knowledge as intensive quanta) despite all the 
complexities and compromises which arise as a result of the form of Bataille's 
commentary on Kojeve and Hegel. Otherwise we might overemphasise the extent 
to which Bataille's own 'concepts' are irremediably tainted by their 
superimposition onto elements of the traditional framework of 
phenomenological logic. [22] If this compromise concealed the importance of 
the critical base, Bataille could be said to be deconstructing his own radical 
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departure fran transcendental philosophy and phenanenology, domesticating 
notions such as immanence and transcendence, continuity and discontinuity in 
relation to a phenomenological logic which subordinates their independent 
~rt to the functioning and complication of traditional metaphysical 
arguments and topographies. To an extent (the boundaries of which I discuss 
later [23]) Bataille necessarily injects the jargon of transcendental 
philosophy into his accounts of all his major 'concepts' ; the mode of 
transcendence has a l~ited and necessary sense for a philosophy of ~anence, 
not as the transcendent operations of abstraction, exclusion, confinement or 
l~itation, hIt as the transcendent degrees of immanence (i.e of the inmanent 
flows of energetic matter). Matter is made up of degrees which 'transcend' 
or are differentiated from the zero of immanence. The matter of ~anence is 
necessarily discreet and thus transcendent; and it is only the relations of 
degrees to zero-immanence in general economy and the revaluation which 
accompanies this relation which renders obsolete, for Bataille the 
abstractions of 'Nothingness' (as a reserve of consciousness and thus as a 
totality) and the posited totality of history. [24] 
Bataille turns from analysing Kojeve's account of Hegel to a comparison of the 
Hegelian doctrine of death and his own notion of sacrifice (OC12 336ff). He 
emphasises the substitution which occurs in both sacrificial practice and the 
stand-off of the Master and Slave and their 'consciousness of death' in 
Hegel's Phenomenology [25]. For Bataille, this substitution characterises 
rational thought and human life itself; an encounter with death is mediated 
through this substitution, a fusion with zero is replaced by identification 
with the sacrificial an~al, or with the thought, or the fear of death and its 
myriad perverse formations; desire for completion, fear of completion, 
deferral of canpletion. The perverse formations which inhabit the site of 
this substitution also include erotic transgression; all are responses to the 
fear of death, the fear of a fusion with the ~ensity of intensive zero. In 
so far as Bataille distinguishes judgementally between these reaction 
formations, he approves the substitution which most nearly disintegrates and 
returns to fusion and thus designates the highest intensive degree sufferable 
by the human. Bataille's dark enthusiasm manages to discover suicidal energy 
even in Hegel. Hegel supplies the validation for such a masochistic 
aesthetic; Bataille states that the requirement fulfilled by such an extreme 
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and fragile substitution is the Hegelian formulation that "Spirit attain its 
truth only by finding itself in absolute dismemberment" (OC12 335). 
Of course, as far as Bataille is concerned, Hegelian discourse in general 
lacks the intensive energy associated with other effusive substitutions, for 
instance the sensation of "sacred horror" (OC12 338) that rips through a cruel 
religious community when faced with an act of sacrifice. Bataille suggests 
that Hegel can only have experienced the fear of death despite his 
rationalisations (as well as because of his rationalisations; his fear 
intensified when the attempt to alleviate it failed). For Bataille, these 
fears [26] characterise the post-Kantian, post-critical individual of 
"involuntary sensitivity", who is panicked by the groundlessness of its 
rational defence mechanisms and their auto-immune failure in the flows of the 
intensive energies liberated by the productions of unbounded capital. 
Bataille juxtaposes the involuntary and implicit sense of Hegel's fear to the 
unconscious yet socially "intentional" excitation of sacrifice as a social or 
communal value and as a given degree of intensity with a contagious mode which 
corresponds to that communal value. [27] The difference between Hegel's 
negativity and Bataille's notion of sacrifice is thus a difference of 
intensity, and of t~e immediacy of the registering of that intensity. The 
most that can be expected of a reading of Hegel is a conscious formulation of 
the subterfuge implicit in the rationalisations of the fear of death. [28] 
The sacrificial participants' unconsciousness of the causes and effects of the 
sacrificial act allows for a different level of perception with regard to 
their action; rather than a self-knowledge, a fusion in the dimly glimpsed 
motions of intensity and intensification which wrack the group, and which can 
be peremptorily perceived by the armchair anthropologist as affecting 
individuals and societies in general, if in specific and evanescent 
formations. Bataille attempts a bastard fusion of the two approaches with 
the perspective of the 'lucid consciousness' of death (0C12 342): 
"Gaiety, connected with the work of death, causes me anguish, is 
accentuated by my anguish, and in return exacerbates that anguish" 
This curtailed phenomenological and rationalised economy of exacerbation 
(which is dangerously pat and glib) still manages to attest to a disturbing of 
the optimal Hegelian state of equilibrium (which is identified with the end of 
history), a leaking in of the concerns of forces and affects which are 
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themselves the quanta of dynamic tensions which imbalance and destroy the 
symmetrical and logico-reflexive models of phenomenological figures from 
within; and which thereby relate those figures back to their quasi-energetic 
conditions in the siege logistics of the Kantian mindscan. 
The intensive attributes of these diversions from zero (thought, sacrifice, 
sex •• ) allow for the prolixities of second order pleasure, the weak 
attractions of an almost rational certainty that stimuli can be channelled 
through privileged and numbed, fixated senses. And doubtless pleasure - as 
the deviation from zero, as the deviation from deviation itself, towards order 
- can reinvest in its own deviation from and domestication of death in the 
compromise formation of transgression. Bataille is thus correct to state that 
(OC12 340): 
"the idea of death helps, in a certain manner and in certain senses, to 
multiply the pleasures of the senses"; and to go on to associate this 
pleasure with "the breaking of an interdiction". 
The psychological complexities of the second-order subterfuge whether pleasure 
or sacrifice's "sacred horror" (or some clever mixture of the two) are 
endless, but secondary for Bataille to the general question of utility that 
they pose. Pleasure is the currency of the substitutions for death; every 
extreme sensation, if it is not fatal, can be transformed into useful servile 
pleasure; that is the nature of the subterfuge:(OC12 343) 
"the simple manifestation of Man's link to annihilation, the pure 
revelation of Man to h~self (at the moment when death transfixes his 
attention) passes from sovereignty to the primacy of servile ends". 
Bataille seeks to describe intensity without phenomenology or individual 
psychology, to describe intensity at the point of "absolute dismemberment" of 
the compromise formations of the substitutions for death, the point at which 
these formations dissolve, and the point at which the duration which 
transforms intensity into the l~ited organism dissolves into a larger time. 
Bataille calls this point 'sovereign'; at the same time he distinguishes the 
sovereign from the mundane privilege given to the moment or point in Idealist 
and utile schemas such as the occidental conception of the line of time. [29] 
The sovereign is associated with the proliferation of scales of perception 
rather than with the single scale implicit in those schemas. The sovereign 
designates scales on which the models of intentional psychology and utility 
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are irrelevant, that is, it designates the scales of the compositional flows 
of energetic matter. 
It seems to me that the notion of sovereignty can only be detached from utile 
values in so far as it is associated with the will to intensity, i.e. the 
quantifiable excitations which traverse and wreck organisms, excitations which 
are themselves associated with the general economy which registers where the 
l~its of organisms return them to their constituent energetic flows. 
Bataille also attempts [30] to associate sovereignty with the Kantian and 
Hegelian notions of independence and autonomy, as distinct from the 
characteristic 'non-logical difference' or detachment of general economy 
(considered as a parallel energetic accont of phenomena which itself makes 
possible an energetics of morals) from the restricted sense of these 
phenomena. Such an attempt can only be impossible and repeat endlessly the 
move between two rational absolutes (absolute knowledge, absolute 
dismemberment) and its result in the type of failure which is constitutive of 
the subterfuges of death under the logic of representation. 
If Bataille only repeated the conceptual moves which are regulated by the 
logic of representation (with its model of constitutive absence demonstrated 
by the subterfuges of death) his concept of sovereignty would remain eminently 
Hegelian and Derridean [31]; an incomplete concept or a sensation of 
incompletion without dismemberment - his failure would be the characteristic 
failure of phenomenological logic. Bataille is correct to call this failure 
"an authentic movement, weighty with sense" because this is the proper realm 
of phenomenological logic and of the ambivalent status of all its concepts: 
(OC12 344-5) 
'~ is always in pursuit of an authentic sovereignty. That 
sovereignty, apparently, was, in a certain sense, originally his, but 
doubtless that could not then have been in a conscious manner, and so in 
a sense it was not his, it escaped h~ •••••• The essential thing is that 
one cannot attain it consciously and seek it, because seeking distances 
it. And yet I can believe that nothing is given us that is not given 
us in tha t equivocal manner." 
The absolute is always a source of failure, the source of a controlled 
intentional compromise or subterfuge - a representation - in which the min~al 
deviation from the zero of death can become a source of pleasure, that is a 
concealing of fear and pain. Extreme intensity shortcircuits the logic of 
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representation because it is registered as an overwhelming sensation in the 
physical body and as an intensity on the scale of ceilingless degrees which 
register any degree including those which envelop the degree associated with 
the complex fonnations of the rational subject, and those which waste and 
destroy the physical body. To seek sovereignty as an absolute independence or 
autonomy (and not as the chaotic state of flux associated with intensive 
energetic degrees) is to flirt with the Hegelian logical substantiation of the 
Kantian One of communication [32], with the Hegelian project of the Hegelian 
Sage; and to remain exclusively tied to the forms of substitution associated 
with 'servile' discourses when the transformation of these forms into chaotic 
accidents and thennodynamic inevi tabili ties can be traced and described, as 
can the tensions specific to each formation which affect the duration and 
intensity of their composition and dissolution. The perspective of 
intensities is radically different from the perspective of the still 
metaphysical doublebind of the second order subterfuges of representation. 
[33] 
Bataille starts the essay 'Hegel, Man and History' by making a strong claim 
for the importance of Hegel's account of the opposition of the Master and 
Slave in the Phenomenology, not only for understanding the fundamental 
dialectic of Hegelianism, but for contemporary thought in the human sciences 
in general: 
"[This representation] exists and imposes itself to the extent to which 
we know it" (OC12 349). 
Yet he proceeds to transform the dialectical account into a Nietzschean 
genealogy of cultures, a genealogy which is fuelled by the critical forces of 
energetic expenditure and the energetic value of sovereignty, rather than the 
desire for recognition. Firstly, Bataille relates the (0C12 351) 'fight to 
the death' which constitutes 'the dialectic of the master' to the 'similar 
form' of the sovereign. Thus Bataille's point of departure is the Nietzschean 
notion of sovereignty, rather than the sequences of the birth and history of 
reactive resentment which he construes as detailed in Hegel's account of the 
dialectical struggle of master and slave. Again, Bataille inmediately 
relates the moments of the dialectic to a general genealogy of cultures [34] 
in which the history of servile action is designated as a restriction of the 
positive value of expenditure (which sovereignty designates). 
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Bataille contests Hegel's account at the level of a philosophy of history 
(replacing the motor of the dialectic with the value of expenditure) and at 
the level of history itself; for Bataille the move from the value of sovereign 
expenditure to the idea of the dialectic has a historical parallel in the move 
from religious societies of sacrifice and internal expenditure, to military 
and expansionist societies. It is military society which regulates its 
expenditures in order to maximize its extensive potential. The Hegelian 
dialectic is the rationalised or utile model of the history of a military 
culture, which has streamlined itself into high capitalism. 
According to Bataille, in the servile history of philosophy typified by Hegel 
the motor of history - the sovereign glory of waste for pure prestige which 
can end in the dissipation of the wealth of a culture and even its death (for 
instance Aztec culture as Bataille describes it in 'The Accursed Share' [35]) 
is replaced by the mechanism of the dialectic and the restricted struggle 
over the desire for recognition by individual figures in which death must be 
deferred. The tendency for cultures to expend in a useless and sovereign 
fashion and thereby endanger their continued existence is replaced in the 
historical era of capital by the tendential flows of the accumulation of 
wealth and the desire to protect it from dissipation. For Bataille, this 
tendency is typified in Hegel's formulation of the dialectic of the master and 
slave. [36] 
Hegel's account of the master and slave dialectic is transformed beyond 
recognition by Bataille's 'interpretation' which is itself filtered through 
his own 'anthropological' interests in the 'social and religious functions' 
of expenditure. Bataille's account of the (pre-) history of expenditure [37] 
has only a few resonances in cannon with the ' Introduction' of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Bataille realises that Hegel's internalised history 
of consciousness from the point of pure negativity has little in cannon with 
his own empirical anthropological and ethnological examination of the 
opposition of religious and military powers within a society which is based on 
the primary process of sovereign or energetic expenditure [38]. He presents 
this fundamental difference of approach as a mild criticism of the 
Phenomenology, as if it were reducible to an anthropological account of the 
history of proto-capital (0C12 356): 
" •• The most bizarre thing in the developnent of forms described in the 
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Phenomenology is the ignorance of any properly human existence anterior 
to the the reduction of the vanquished to slaves." 
Bataille is aware of the general structure of the Phenomenology and its 
effects; that it is atemporal, that its condition is the constructed whole of 
Absolute Knowledge, and that history is thereby reduced to a logical 
succession of figures within a historical consciousness. He even admits that 
this structure embodies the conviction which his own intellectual product 
lacks: (OC12 356): 
"The logical construction of a series of appearances which consciousness 
'conserves' has more weight than anx reconstitutive discussion arising 
from the fragmentary data of science'. 
So when Bataille analyses pre- or extra- phenomenological figures such as the 
sovereign, in relation to phenomenological jargon, he is not simply referring 
them back to that jargon; he is concerned with determining their difference 
from it. The difference or compromise of those figures, notions or values, 
has an empirical existence as well; thus Bataille asks whether sovereign 
events are not contaminated by utile concerns. [39] 
Bataille associates the 'structure' of the Phenomenology with the operation 
which I argue [40] characterises Idealism in general; the conception of time 
as subject to a spatial distribution, an operation which I call 
'spatialisation'. Bataille argues that the figures of the Phenomenology 
inhabit an internalised space rather than a timespan. In this internalised 
space the clear distinction of the parallel continuums of sacred and profane 
t~e is eradicated by the process of division internal to this given, enclosed 
space; the relative distance and proximity of the dialectical oppositional 
figures blurs the difference between these oppositional terms (0C12 357): 
'''!he transition from t~e to space implies a reversal: in temporal 
division, the clarity of the opposition [between sacred and profane 
t~e] was an (obviously provisional) element of stability: in the 
spatial division, the opposition of the Master and the Slave announces 
the instability of history: the master is what he is not and is not what 
he is, he cannot have the 'autonomy' of 'sacred time', he even inserts 
the movement of profane time into sacred existence •• His being even 
introduces, given that he lasts, an element contrary to the 
instantaneity of 'sacred t~e'''. 
The use to which Bataille puts this fundamental difference between temporal 
and spatial differentiations in this passage is less important than the 
articulation of this difference itself. [41] The difference between the 
- 64-
account of the temporal sacred-profane distinction and its Hegelian spatial 
interruptions is clear, and is a continuation of Bataille's radical rethinking 
of ttme which we find in the early writings [42]. For Bataille, it is the 
association of ttme with the compositions and decompositions of energetic 
matter in general (rather than with the single mechanism of mental processes) 
which lends it a critical power. Ttme is intensity as annihilation, 
inevitable destruction; and therefore the most effective 'critique' of 
rational concerns. Ultimately it is ttme that renders Hegel impossible, and 
in this sense everything given or possible is also impossible [43]; that is, 
the real is irreducible to the category of the possible, and is conditioned 
and dissolves in a larger fluid energetic virtuality. However, the very 
affectivity of time renders any attempt to reduce it to the level of a 
critical power slightly ridiculous. It would be ludicrous to treat time as if 
it were subject to any sort of rational revisionism. Bataille's early 
writings do not cease to present the bowel-loosening terror and unsublirnable 
impact of annihilatory time as terminal condition rather than idealistic 
category. We face time and lose; only when it is transformed into a weak 
value can it perform critical operations. There is only a resonance between 
annihilation and critique, shared attributes when both are subjected to low 
levels of rationalisation. 
For Bataille, this impossibility of the Hegelian Totality, the effect of time, 
is - like the linked problematic of the end of history - another facet of the 
~ssibility of a fully conscious human interface with death (OC12 359): 
"I can imagine - and represent - such a perfect achievement of 
discourse, that following it no other developments have any meaning or 
teach anything, but stand to mark the abyss left by the end of 
discourse. Thus I touch on the last problem of Hegelianism. This 
ultimate moment of the imagination tmplies the vision of a totality from 
which no constitutive element can be separated, and which, consequently, 
lastly, leads all elements to the moment where death touches them: which 
moreover, tears the truth of each element from this ~inent abso~tion 
in death. But this contemplation of the totality is not truly poss~ble. 
It is no less out of our reach than death." 
The impossibility of this totality and its enclosed spatial structure provokes 
a representation of the energetic dissemination of its contents and the 
inevitable growing redundancy of meaning as it radiates vertiginously towards 
a free brownian motion of information as energy at the intensive 'zero' of 
entropy. Bataille' s reading of Koj~ve is itself a product of this post-
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rational fusional freefall. The strength of the 'vulgar' reading of Hegel is 
that it attests to the failure of the Hegelian project which must result in 
the release of the constraint of the primary discourse on its interpretations. 
The conjectures extrapolated from it fall faster and wilder and cannot 
meaningfully be reduced to the status of misinterpretations of a subsisting 
rational text. Bataille emphasises the pressure created by the containment 
and restriction of this Lmpossibility, and its inevitable release and 
intensive impact on rational and utile projects in general, teasing us with 
the extent of those restrictions and their final intensive impact (OC12 359): 
"Hegel's discourse only has meaning in so far as it is finished, and it 
is only finished at the moment that History itself, and everything 
finishes. For, if not, History continues and other things must be said. 
The coherence and even the possibility of the discourse is thus put into 
question. " 
Bataille will suggest that both death and the end of history are anticipated 
and deferred by the subterfuge of discourse or thought; whereas for Hegel, the 
fonm of the Book mirrors this circular anticipation (OC12 361). The death of 
the rational or the possible and the death of history are only "second-degree" 
(OC12 360) deaths, deaths in discourse, and thus although they remain 
'necessary' conditions of thought and discourse, Bataille is not interested in 
their function. Bataille is not primarily concerned with the structural 
inadequacies constitutive of thought; for him the Hegelian project and the 
idea of the end of history pose the question of the inadequacy of the 'map' 
provided by the Phenomenology of Spirit of the "apparent fonms of existence" 
(OC12 360). Bataille is interested in the general map or chart which can be 
glimpsed beyond the revealed form of the double bind of representation, and on 
which the physical patterns of sovereign expenditure [44] can be registered. 
Bataille uses Kojeve's text to attempt to determine the attributes of this new 
map, which Koj~e could still only conceive under the rubric of the 
hypothetical sense of the 'end of history'. Unfortunately Bataille' s reading 
of Kojeve's work remains too close to the literalist spirit of the latter to 
perform an adequate critical transformation; thus he in part regurgitates 
Koj~ve's weak formulations on the historical reality of the end of history: 
1) subject and object disappear (OC12 361) "Man disappears in so far as he is 
def ined as the negating Action of the given.. and, in general, the Sub j ec t 
opposed to the Object" 2) Rational servile action is replaced by "Art, love, 
play, in brief everything that makes Man happy" [45]. 
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Despite this lapse into metaphysics, I would argue that the general trajectory 
of Bataille's use of KoJ~ve's text edges towards a conception of time and 
energetic movement which is free from the spatial restrictions imposed on both 
by the Idealist structures of thought. From this perspective the notion of 
the end of history is both a metaphysical conception which replaces the 
spatialised time of history with the indefinite time of eternity; and also the 
marker of the redundancy of metaphysics which itself suggests radical if 
tentative steps towards a new conception of time after philosophy and history. 
In this essay, Bataille has an ambivalent attitude to the panic reSUlting from 
the failure of reason: he wallows in the still rational effects of its Lnpact 
- to the point of digging himself into the last-ditch humanism of the 
'fugitive knowledge' (OC12 364) of the inescapable subterfuges of 
representation which defer any effective sense of the completion and death of 
reason [46]. At the same time he moves beyond that knowledge of the logic 
governing representation . itself to what for our purposes is an initial 
formulation of the general economy of energetic matter which conditions that 
logic. For Bataille, general economy is also the 'project' of human freedom; 
the ultimate htnnan freedom lies in self-overcoming, becoming different 
indefinitely in emulation of the intensive degrees of the free energetic 
transformations which constitute the universe of energetic matter, zeroing in 
on the transformative energies of the will to expenditure. The insanity of 
this position is clear and I shall examine its status as a bizarre mutation of 
Kantian autonomy in a later chapter [47]. It suffices to state here that even 
to articulate such a 'project' is to haemmorrhage the very possibility of its 
results - the results can only be inhunan and the project thus abortive. 
There can be no symmetry in the relation between the immensity of the universe 
and the hunan scale of perception [48] - the hunan scale is bound to dissolve. 
Bataille states that from the perspective of the unfolding of Time, the human 
acts as part of living (energetic) matter, which is indefinitely producing 
more energetic quanta than is necessary for its subsistence. Thus the human 
emulates the universe: (OC 12 365) 
"Everything occurs like a slow firework explosion; from this explos~on 
rain out the multiple arabesques of life and death, rut the explos10n 
never stops prolonging (or intensifying) its explosive movement. If 
even death is thus sunptuous, everything is sunptuous in nature." 
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The 'principle' of solar radiation, of sumptuous expenditure, applies 
throughout nature. Only at the secondary level of species and habitats does 
the concern with scarcity arise. At this secondary level, Bataille argues, 
species, habitats (of every scale) and organisms attempt to balance their 
growth and expenditure in relation to a "point of saturation" (0C12 366) 
proper to them, which Bataille defines as a point '~yond which one would see 
the individual share of resources diminish". This notion of a point of 
saturation has an ambiguous value; on the one hand it simply designates the 
tendency of energetic systems operating a restricted economy to dissolve into 
the general economy of energetic matter; on the other hand it is a retrograde 
step connecting Bataille's study of general economy to the spatial model which 
I have associated with Idealist systems of thought; not only because of its 
explicitly spatial frame of reference, but also because of the logical manner 
in which it presents the relations between individual and species (i.e as a 
form of the relation between the particular and the universal). I will argue 
later that this logicization of general economy only operates as a minor 
restriction to the sense of general economy [49]. I argued above that the 
privileging of the human perspective in general economy could not be sustained 
given the sovereign 'project' or will to expenditure and transformation. 
Bataille's notion of the point of saturation in restricted economies 
represents an attempt to accentuate the parallelism between the human utile 
and evolutionary perspective and the 'perspective' proper to the universe in 
general by distinguishing the human from natural and biological systems. 
Bataille argues that only the human can defer the point of saturation, by 
creating useful and useless expenditures (development of the means of 
production, sacrifice etc); he thereby imposes a perverse evolutionary 
argument in which the human is shown to be best suited to the energetic 
conditions of the universe, yet one in which hunan and utile evolutionary 
concerns apply to the rest of the biological universe (Bataille implicitly 
suggests that organisms are utile and concerned with what is 'best' for the 
growth of their communities or species). But as the 'College of Sociology' 
lectures make plain [50] micro-organisms (and viruses) also develop resources 
through growth, and their growth is not simply the sort of extensive growth 
which necessarily leads them to points of saturation; the complexities of the 
possible transfonnations and thennic changes of shape and size within 
organisms makes the viewpoint of the point of saturation irrelevant (or rather 
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the point is best understood as a point of transformation [51]). The 
sovereign project of transformation is as applicable to these organisms as to 
the human; and who knows whether our transformations after the human may not 
lead us to a potential for further transformation equal to that of the virion 
or the amoeba. 
In other words, Bataille overemphasises the restricted nature of the 
biological organism in relation to the general economy of energetics and 
privileges the human (and essentially Idealist and spatial) perspective on the 
difference between biological spaces (and their integrity) and their 
dissolution in their energetic conditions. But these differences are only 
thermic or energetic and the same potential for difference is found at every 
level, on every scale of energetic economy.[52] 
Thus I would argue that the double sense of the term 'point of saturation' 
should not be used to reduce it to the level of an ambiguous concept; because 
one of its senses entails a radical transformation and revaluation of the 
other, and this 'novum' should be emphasised. The same is true for many of 
Bataille's terms; they have a traditional antecedence and a radical new sense 
which even Bataille h~self underplays. I shall consider this model of the 
divergent senses of Bataille's terms in relation to the paradigmatic notion of 
transgression below. [53] 
Analysing these two essays, I am struck by the unintentional rigour with which 
Bataille finally deduces the attributes of energetic materialism from a melee 
of Hegelianism and anthropology. Bataille describes the ''Hegelian Totality" 
(0C12 363) as "a holocaust offered 'in the face' of the devastation of Time". 
The function of the representational subterfuge extends, as we have noted, to 
the extreme metaphysical ideas of totality, canpletion and death; rut it is 
not only the ftmction of that subterfuge which is revealed in these ideas; the 
terrifying inmensity of change in t~e is also glimpsed at the point of 
substitution. Death is not disarmed, neither deferred nor second-guessed by 
any discursive or sacrificial substitution, for it would then be an entity or 
a concept which could have power imbued or expelled from it. But death is 
change itself and proceeds in modes of infection, intensity and speed which 
have no cOtmterparts in the realm of representation which is regulated by a 
notional structural inadequacy. Even the 'failure' of metaphysics is only 
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relevant in that it liberates its ideas, projects them contagiously as 
accelerating and intensifying quanta into change and death. In these essays 
Bataille is perhaps too ready to emphasise the resistance posed by the spirals 
of profane time in the general movement of 'sacred' or annihilatory time, but 
the direction and inevitability of the affectivity of that general time cannot 
be in doubt; and we thereby only feel the rush and terror of reason's 
haemorrhage more. As we shall see with the early texts on annihilatory time, 
no conceptual grasp on this general time is possible, or rather its 
devastating effects on the projects of profane time are the only clues to its 
behaviour. It is the impossibility of accounting for Time or death itself 
(as an object for the rational subject) that draws Bataille elsewhere to 
accounts of the processes of dissipative structures which are traversed by the 
energetic flows of Time. [54] In these essays Bataille doggedly remains 
within the arena of the cautionary example of Hegelianism and the 'Hegelian 
Totality' which has the status of an extreme example of the tendency of 
Idealist philosophy to spatialise Time. Hegelianism is an extreme enterprise 
and an extreme failure which has only a negative pedagogical value for the 
human annihilated by time. It is a mistake to conclude (as Derrida does) from 
the subject matter of these two essays that Bataille extends the values of 
Hegelian discourse to discourses in general. The spatialisation of Time as a 
rational operation occurs to different intensive degrees in different texts 
and experiences; and the question whether this rational operation is a general 
condition of discourse or culture is irrelevant when the different degrees of 
the emulation or restriction of the flows of time and energy are the foremost 
empirical attributes of many texts and experiences. 
Bataille's readings of Kojeve emphasise his own lack of involvement in the 
Hegelian project. I have shown that even when interpreting Kojeve's account 
of Hegel, Bataille's concerns are almost wholly with an energetic reappraisal 
of the Kantian terrain of transcendental philosophy. He only crosses Hegel's 
path insofar as Hegel shares in this Kantian terminology, or else in so far as 
Bataille finds the dialectic of the master and slave useful for his own 
accounts of the energetic genealogy of cultures, a genealogy which is itself 
based on the the energetic conditions of critique. Derrida' s concern with 
the simulating function of Bataille's concepts blinds him to the double sense 
of those concepts, their idealis t and energetic deployment. In order to 
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canprehend the exten t to which general economy and its connected tenns respond 
to (both perpetuate and dissolve) the problems of transcendental philosophy it 
is essential to analyse the stake and result of Kant's critical philosophy, 
the tenns and terrains which Bataille comes to transfonn, disperse and 
reconfigure. Only then can we piece together an account of Bataille's work 
which can challenge with its consistency Derrida' s general, 
unsubstantiated and phenomenologically bullying interpretation of these texts. 
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Coda: Transgression and the novtnll of infection 
Before entering the critical theatre I would like to emphasise the 
paradigmatic sense of the concept of transgression for comprehending the novel 
function of all Bataille's major concepts. It is this function which Derrida 
ignores when he reduces these 'concepts' to a simulation and inflection of the 
concepts proper to the Hegelian system. I want to argue that Bataille' s 
concepts - transgression, limit, excess, communication, restricted and general 
economy - all function similarly in relation to similar tenns in Kant's 
transcendental philosophy, exacerbating the idea of influence which is central 
to critical philosophy, but which in Kant's hands is itself the object of a 
massive rational domestication; exacerbating this idea and thereby 
transfonning the Kantian rational schema into the passage of an infectious 
intensive quantity. This exacerbation is due to the radical independence of 
one sense of each term from the other more traditional sense, and its 
designation of energetic. quanta as the viral agents of the influence or 
infec tion which wracks cri tical reason. We have already seen an example of 
this with the notion of a point of saturation. [55] I have chosen the 
concept of transgression to exemplify this general function because it can be 
conceived as functioning as a meta-concept which designates the general and 
rationally limiting operation of the understanding! reason in both Kant and 
Hegel's work, as well as having the disjunct sense and infectious intensive 
designation of Bataille's tenn. In Kant, the understanding transgresses the 
limits given its empirical employment, and thus the act of transgression is 
corrected by the regulative idea of the limit of that employment. For 
Bataille, as respondent to Kant, the notion of transgression in part 
designates the illegitimacy and inevitable exceeding of the Kantian rational 
schemas in extreme experience. But, I will argue that this function is itself 
irreducible to the Hegelian function of transgression, to which Derrida 
relates Bataille's notion of transgression, arguing, as we have noted, [56] 
that it is an inflected Hegelian concept. For Hegel attempted to bridge the 
abyss between law and transgression implicit in the Kantian rational schema 
(the relative lack of enforcement of the rule of the legitimate employment of 
the understanding) by positing transgression as the logical negation of law 
and as thereby inscribed in (or simply related to in Derrida' s case) the 
cycles of the sublating motion of the 'Aufhebung'. 
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For Bataille, transgression has an empirical sense, as is demonstrated in his 
accounts of institutionalised sacrifice and religion [57]. Here the act of 
transgression tends to consolidate the institution involved (although it can 
also exceed its social utility and threaten to destabilize that social 
institution). According to Bataille, this act has an albeit compromised 
sovereign value, insofar as the institution of sacrifice has domesticated the 
will to expenditure which characterises formations at every level of energetic 
matter. Thus even the mos t empirical even t of transgression has a free 
energetic sense, that is an abstract sense of quantities and values which 
relates it to the energetics of the topographies of rational and utile schemas 
- and the exceeding of their lLmits by certain elements which are supposed to 
be contained within them. It is this sense of transgression - of values and 
quanta which challenge and contaminate reason irrecuperably - which seems to 
me to be proper to Bataille's texts. He develops this sense of transgression 
in his texts On Nietzsche and Literature and Evil [58]. In both texts 
transgression is associated with what Bataille calls the 'sovereign value of 
evil' • Bataille qualifies Nietzsche's fonnulation: beyond good and bad -
terms which regulate the utile physiological health of the hunan organism -
lies the energetic summit and condition which can only be valued as evil, 
because it cannot be regulated within the organism. It is not simply pain -
the opposite of pleasure - but the virulent surges and influences of immense 
quanta of an indifferent, Lmpersonal energy which inevitably comes to place 
the physiological economy of pain and pleasure in abeyance: (OC6 42) 
"The summit entails excess, the exuberance of forces •• the violation of 
the integrity of beings". 
The evil value of this summit attests to the uselessness and inevitability of 
the condition it imposes. This sense of transgression as evil (i.e as 
inmense expenditure, irrmense energetic quanta) is fonnulated most fully in 
Literature and Evil. Here, Evil and its excessive value is seen as 
irreducible to the economy of utile pain and pleasure; it must be considered 
in terms of the general economy of intensity and the will to expenditure which 
characterises energetic matter in general: (OC9 219) 
'\rumanity pursues two goals - one, the negative is to preserve.life ~to 
avoid death), and the other, the positive, is to increase the 1ntens1ty 
of life". 
Intensity and Evil are therefore inextricably bound together; the quanta of 
intensity endow evil with its positive value and allow for the critical 
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revaluation of the rational moral and utile schemas which orient themselves 
around the concepts of the good and the pleasurable (and the bad and the 
painful) in the hope of thereby deferring the disorienting power of intensity: 
'~e mainspring of human activity is generally the desire to reach the 
~1nt furthe~t f:om th~ f~ere~l d~in, which is dirty, rotten, 
1II1pure... This d1stress1ng 1nc11nat10n plays a greater part in our 
assertion of moral principles than in our reflexes. Our assertions are 
no doubt veiled. Great words give a positive sense to a negative 
attitude... All we can propose is the good of all •• legitimate rut 
purely negative aims, which are really ways of banishing death. Our 
~eneral concepts of life can always be reduced to the desire to survive" (OC9 212-3). 
This critical revaluation entails a rigourous account of its own condition in 
intensity (the energetic quanta of the will to expenditure) and the value of 
evil proper to its process of the continual exceeding or transgression of 
rational economies: (OC9 219) 
'''!he notion of intensity cannot be reduced to that of pleasure 
because ••• the quest for intensity leads us.. to the limits of 
consciousness •• The desire for Good limits the instinct which induces us 
to seek a value, whereas liberty towards Evil gives access to the 
excessive forms of value [and] ••• the very principle of value wants us to 
go 'as far as possible'''. 
The law is good, but value is evil. Thus intensity, transgression and the 
critical revaluation of rational utile moral schemas are themselves 
inextricably bound together and yet remain in a state of disjunction from 
those schemas. This disjunction does not simply designate the critical 
distance between critique and its object; for the revaluation or 
intensification of the critical object, (that is the utile and rational 
schemas which are applied to human life) entails the dissolution of that 
object's independent status. Rational schemas are translated into the quanta 
proper to intensive critique, but critique itself is thereby influenced, 
intensified and its rational groundlessness exacerbated in a contagious flurry 
of energetic activity; its rational control is lost. Bataille calls this 
fluctuating state in which the transcendental positions of subject and object 
are lost to thought 'communication', in a perverse and thermodynamic reprisal 
of the Kantian schema of sovereign human freedom. [59] 
The paradigmatic concept of transgression supplies us with the schema which 
will inform our reading of Kant's first and third critiques. The notion of 
transgression designates the exceeding of rational schemas, their description 
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and revaluation as intensive quantities, (that is the influence of these 
intensive quantities on reason, an influence which is itself preempted by the 
Kantian fear of influence); but also the resulting blurring of the critical 
disjunction between reason and intensity, i.e the loss of the clarity which 
distinguishes the critical position. Critique as the unilateral influence of 
intensity into reason thus collapses into the post-critical state of intensive 
conmunication, that is of thought as virulent infection. Critique is not 
self-evident, not stmply the designation of conditions and the operation of 
revaluations, but also the groundless speeds, intensifications and movements 
of a thought which is dissolving itself and goaded to destruction by the 
energies surging through it. The Kantian texts are explicit witness to this 
trajectory in which critique transgresses rational idealist schemas and 
designates itself as intensity only thereby to lose its critical status, 
because the measurement of its own magnitude is subject to the infective mode 
of its influence, so that: (OC9 249) 
"after a point exce~s can no longer be gauged". 
The fate of critique is to be infected by an energetic immensity which cannot 
be rationalised. 
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Chapter Three: KANT - 'mE CATASTROPHE OF CRITIQUE 
Kant and Bataille on critique 
Kant's notion of critique inhabits the space created by transcendental 
philosophy, a space still characteristic of modern continental philosophy and 
its interface with the occidental culture of capital [1]. Bataille's work is 
symptomatic of the gradual deregulation of the movements of the elements and 
local terrains within this space, a deregulation effected by the passage of 
time on the restrictions imposed by the entrepeneurial developers of that 
space to facilitate the growth of their Kantian culture of capital. The 
elements of this space are acceding to a molecular brownian motion in which 
all trace of their origins in the limiting conditions of individualism, 
phenomenalism and their moral justification of the accumulation of wealth, is 
eradicated. Bataille' s work is part of this culture - and the philosophy 
which legitimated it and thereby described the impossibility of moral 
certainty (the death of God), if only to staunch the resulting moral bloodflow 
with the groundless, unconvincing and unfelt substitution of moral feeling. 
Bataille's reading of the 'traditions' of modern philosophy is selective and 
superficial, but this only affinns his concern with the wider culture of 
occidental capital. His contestation of the explicitly Kantian attributes of 
this culture is fragmented, epigranmatic, banal but essential. A passage from 
the novel L' Abbe' C is symptomatic in this regard: 
The pious Robert has become a huniliated and self-hating debauchee. In the 
middle of a violent storm he dreams of meeting his disintegrating ego-ideal, 
!rrmanuel Kant: 
"A night as interminable as feverish dreams. A storm began when I got 
home, a storm of frightening violence. Never have I felt smaller. 
Sometimes the thunder rolled crashing in from all sides, sometimes it 
bolted straight down; a flickering of lights bursting into blinding 
bites of white. I was so sick that I trembled, thinking that I was no 
longer on earth but in the terrible sky itself... Liquefaction, ~he 
crashing of the water from the sky.. no more earth, only an ech01ng 
space, overwhelmed and drowned in rage. The storm was illimitab~e: I 
had been tired but a dazzling lightning flash intensified my V1S10n, 
energised me, and as the thunderbolt hit my alertness became a kind of 
sacred terror... I saw a wedge of light shining under the d?Or... Above 
the roaring of the sky I heard a sneeze •• I got up to sW1tch off the 
light. I was naked and hesitated before opening the d?Or ••• I was 
certain that I would find Immanuel Kant waiting for me beh1nd the door. 
He would not look like a corpse, filmy and translucent. He would be a 
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shaggy and messy haired young man wearing a tricorn hat. I opened the 
door and to my surprise found myself looking into empty space. I was 
alone. I was naked in the middle of the greatest rolls of thunder I 
have ever heard. 
I said to myself gently, 'You are a clown'" (0C3 343). 
Bataille correctly represents the results of the Kantian notion of critique: 
piety reduced to the rabid terror of the howling beast, the diminishing of the 
relevance of the human scale of the perception of phenomena, the dissolution 
of the rational poles of subject and object in the overpowering energy of 
storms, the dissipation of spaces and entities into raging intensities, the 
destruction of resistances and equilibriums by immense forces of heat, light 
and sound. The exactitude of this description of the endpoint of critique 
will become apparent when I turn to the Critique of Judgement [2] and Kant's 
attempted rationalisation of the Sublime; but the relation between the 
catastrophic disintegration of reason in such events and the power of critique 
is central to Kant's account of the pre-emptive defence mechanisms of the 
hierarchy of the faculties in the Critique of Pure Reason [3]. 
Kant differentiates the power of critique and the functioning of thought 
through the hierarchy of the faculties and the transcendent operation of the 
movement of necessary illusion. For Bataille, the general trajectory of 
thought - which is' how he designates critique - must dissolve any such 
hierarchy of the faculties. This trajectory does not correct or justify an 
intellectual movement of sensibility-driven expansionism, but is itself the 
accelerating drive of thinking to its own incandescent ~lation. 
Kant's notion of critique is inseparable from a topography suggested by the a 
priori forms of intuition, space and tLme. The introduction of the forms of 
intuition in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' [4] in the first critique gives us 
the syntax with which a peculiarly Kantian strategy of containment will be 
deployed. This is the s tra tegy of the con tairunen t of the unders tanding's 
movement of extension within a movement proper to reason, i.e critique. Kant 
states (A7G1 8789) that the critique of reason examines "reason itself in the 
whole extent of its powers and as regards its aptitude for pure a priori modes 
of knowledge ••• [Reason's] determinate and necessary ILmits •• are demonstrated 
from principles". Critique has, for Kant, a positive and a negative sense: a 
positive sense for the practical or moral employment of pure reason, and a 
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negative sense when applied to the sensibility's reorientation of the 
understanding [5]. I will argue that in the course of his explication of the 
notion of critique, the two values of critique (positive and negative) are 
related to a value of critique which cannot safeguard the positive moral sense 
and which reveals the negative sense to be the site of a displacement and 
subs ti tu tion of values. This revaluation of cri tique threatens Kan t ' s 
strategy of containment and all its constitutive functions, that is all the 
operations of the intellect which congeal into compositions which Kant would 
wish to see unified in a single limited spatio-temporal domain. 
The very concept of the limit (and therefore the concepts of limited space and 
time, and critique as limitation) is in danger of conflicting with the 
processive nature of these different mental operations or functions. Thus in 
the first critique a tension arises between these mental processes and the 
'tribunal' which attempts to enforce their characteristic limitation. Kant 
attempts to identify critique with this tribunal, and spells out the moral and 
juridico-political resonances of both. With the articulation of a critique 
Lmmanent to it, the process of reason becomes self-regulating - critique and 
reason form a tribunal: 
"a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss 
all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance 
with its own eternal and unalterable laws." 
Such a critical tribunal limits mental processes and acts as a 'propadeutic' 
to an (Preface A xxi) "inventory" or systematic arrangement of the possessions 
of pure reason. Critique is thus linked to the system or inventory of 
rational accllllUlated wealth, in the form of an ideal composite unity or 
saturated field of the principles of knowledge and their legitimate and 
illegitimate employment: 
"Pure reason so far as the principles of its knowledge are concerned, 
is a quite s~parate self-subsistent unity, in which, as in an organised 
body, every member exists for every other and all ~or the sake of ;ach 
other, so that no principle can safely be taken 1n any on: relat10n, 
unless it has been investigated in the entirety of its relat10ns to the 
whole employment of pure reason" (Preface B xxiii-iv). 
On the other hand, critique is necessarily involved in the 'warfare' of 
metaphysics (Preface A viii), in the endless struggles between dogmatists and 
sceptics. It is this association of critique with warfare which comes to 
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overwheLm the sense of critique as a disinterested tribunal. The essential 
difference is not that between the positive and negative senses which Kant 
attaches to critique (in which the negative sense 'makes room for' the 
positive moral sense, for an extension of practical reason into the super-
sensible (Preface B xxii [6]) by subtracting the illegitimate employment of 
the understanding from the 'fullness' of the idealist spatial unity of 
composition, thereby requiring the 'refill' of the practical moral ideas of 
reason); but rather between those two senses and the rationally disorienting 
positive sense of critique as the continual opposition and differentiation of 
ideas, which is first noticeable in critique's intervention into the 'futile' 
struggle of the dogmatists and sceptics, and more generally in the critical 
strategy which when unleashed as the pure pulses of unrestrained and total 
warfare is suicidal for reason. 
Kant attempts, at the end of the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason' section from the 
first edition to define restrained, limited and negative critique (A395). 
Only, states Kant: 
"the sobriety of a critique at once strict and just can free us from •• 
dogmatic illusion •••• Such a critique confines all our speculative claims 
rigidly to the field of possible experience •• by an effective determining 
of these limits in accordance with established principles, inscribing 
its nihil ulterius on those Pillars of Hercules which Nature herself has 
erected in order that the voyage of our reason may be extended no 
further than the continuous coastline of experience itself reaches, a 
coast we cannot leave without venturing upon a shoreless ocean which 
after alluring us with ever deceptive prospects compels us to abandon as 
hopeless all this vexatious and tedious endeavour". 
Kant attempts to identify critique with a single movement of expansionist 
thought and its two modes: extension/possession followed by limitation 
/justification. This expansionist thought is conderrmed to the vulgar 
psychology of a damage-limitation exercise proper to the occidental psyche, 
which Kant describes as fleeing the despair of frustrated possession to hide 
behind the stockades of property and territory claims [7]. In fact Kant goes 
on to reveal that this restriction of the sense of critique is untenable; the 
libidinal flows of critique are themselves the limits which provoke the 
reactions of consolidation and justification proper to reason, the limits 
which mark the insurgence of noumenal intensive energies into the extensive 
movement of reason. It is Bataille who registers this fact most succinctly 
in regard to the terrains of thought and their solar condition; in Bataille's 
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account of thought it wills the hopeless, thirsts after the intensity of 
despair, and the ruination of intentional and limited thinking in the 
intensity of an impersonal energetic radiation: 
"Despair is simple: it is the absence of hope and allure. It is the 
state of deserted expanses and - I imagine - the Stm." (OC5 51) 
Kant's most concerted attempt to keep critique within the botmds of reason 
occurs in a section of the 'The Discipline of Pure Reason' (A739ff B767ff). 
Yet here, despite all Kant's disavowals, the two Kantian senses of critique 
collapse in the fever pitch critical strategy of a more general positive sense 
of critique. Kant again attempts to link the power of critique to a 
"judicial" reason (A739 B767) which is itself analagous to a 'democratic' 
civil power; the power of critique is supposed to be the proof that Reason is 
not a "dictatorial authority", and yet Kant is also adamant that the outcome 
of the war waged by critique on the polemicists suggests that Reason "knows no 
respect for persons". Kant distinguishes the metaphysical warfare of the 
polemicists and "the critical scrutiny of a higher judicial reason", whose 
judicial verdicts attest to the agreements between "free citizens". Yet as the 
account of critique progresses the distinction between critique as it is 
deployed as warfare or military strategy, and critique as a correction proper 
and limited to reason and its correlative rational body politic, increases. 
Critique even lessens the distance between the state of warfare and the state 
of the rational 'community', for even within this democratic community, the 
necessary possibility of an individual veto qualifies the tmity of reason's 
judicial verdict; in the "agreement of free citizens •• each one must be 
permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objections or even his 
veto." 
Kant inverts and attempts to positivise the threat posed by critique, 
transforming it into a tonic for reason. He states that should reason limit 
the "freedom" of criticism by any prohibition it must ''harm itself", and that 
further "reason can never refuse to su1:Jnit to criticism". Kant's texts are 
full of such perverse inversions, denials and substitutions of the damage 
caused by critique, the noumenal and the pathological, to reason. This 
danger and threat is often minimised by the introduction of a secondary use, 
purpose or transcendence. [8] Thus Kant posits purpose as an attribute of 
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the entities of the natural world insofar as they are, as representations, 
part of the "nature of reason itself" (A743 B771). Just as, Kant contends, 
"everythin~ which nature. has itself instituted is good for some purpose 
- even po1sons have the1r use, they serve to counteract other poisons 
generated in our bodily humours - ", 
so the polemical alternative to Reason's judicial verdict, the dissension of 
citizens, and critique itself "arise from the very nature of reason itself and 
must therefore have their own good use and purpose". This is an unconvincing 
analogy but is exemplary of Kant's oft-used second order rationalisation of a 
primary affect. [9] Kant only equates the physiological equilibrium-seeking 
life-system and the transcendental operation of a subsuming higher purposive 
rational unity as a last resort, to designate the most general form of 
rational unity and thereby to lessen the possibility of conceiving of any 
"outside influences" (A744 B772). More often it is the difference between 
the pathological and the higher faculties which Kant stresses. Kant attempts 
to make all such disruptions internal and proper to reason. Even the circuit 
breakers of sensibility are in part included in a hierarchisation which makes 
good use of them. He is more concerned with the mechanics of limitation than 
with the inconceivable quantities that this limitation is supposed to repress. 
But this concern can itself be inverted to the detriment of its second order 
rationalisation: Kant does not have to conceive of outside influences because 
critique effects the same disruption from within reason's enclosure. 
At the heart of Kant's account of the minimal danger of both critique and 
necessary illusion to reason lies the perception that both are concerned with 
the merely specUlative employment of reason. Neither critique nor polemics 
threatens reason's practical moral interests; and thus, states Kant, there is 
no reason to "raise the cry of high treason" (A747 B775). The critical 
position is itself distanced from any real practical effects; and to enter the 
practical realm of (llOrality is to leave both metaphysical speculation and 
critique behind: 
"the question at issue is not what •• is beneficial or detrimental to the 
best interests of mankind but only how far reason can advance by means 
of speculation that abstracts from all interests and wh~ther su<:h 
speculation can count for anything or must not rather be g1ven up 1n 
exchange for the practical. Instead of rushing into the fight sword in 
hand we should rather play the part of the peaceable onl~ker from the 
safe seat of the critic. The struggle is indeed t01lsome to tI:te 
combatants but for us it can be entertaining; and its outcome - certa1n 
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to ~ quite bloodless • • •• Besides reason is already of itself so 
conf1ned and held within limits by reason that we have no need to call 
out the guard with a view to bringing the civil power to bear up,on that 
party whose alarming superiority may seem to us to be dangerous '. 
However, as we have seen, the moral sense of reason is a product of its most 
general spatial form, and it is precisely this space which critique comes to 
contest. Thus, in the interests of universal hunan morality, which is 
witness to the 'necessary' form of reason, critique and the internecine 
quarrels of the polemicists must be ultimately restricted to that form too. 
It does not suffice that from its 'safe seat' the critic only witnesses the 
safe fight in which reason escapes the danger of its own internal relations; 
this war must be stopped so that critique can be reduced to the status of the 
tribunal of reason. Kant realises that critique is complicated at the level 
of its strategic deployment or tmleashing, and attempts to reorient it to 
reason by means of morality, arguing that the spectator's laissez-faire 
attitude and assumption of the tmiversal form of the rational and the good in 
the polemicists' argunents can - on the analogy of moral sublimation - only be 
considered (A748 B776) a "provisional arrangement". If the critic does not 
eventually turn from this assumption of the good, it will be transformed into 
an injurious duplicity. The spectator's 'laissez faire' attitude is 
replaced by a sterner judgement on the spectacle. Kant goes on to state that 
critique is the termination of the polemic of pure reason: (A751-2 B779-80) 
"[ Critique], arriving at all its decisions in the light of ftmdamental 
principles of its own institution •• secure[s] us the peace of a legal 
order in which disputes •• have to be conducted by the recognised methods 
of legal action". 
It is now critique which is identified with reason itself which imposes a 
"judicial sentence which strikes at the very root of conflicts" securing the 
destruction of conflicts and "an eternal peace". Kant identifies critique 
with reason thereby transforming the intensive disruption of thought into a 
legislative procedure. 
This judicial sentence and the tennination of polemical struggle is only the 
intended and anticipated horizon of critique. Kant goes on to contradict 
himself by suggesting that the moral justification of critique can be 
discotmted and the critical warring strategy upheld for as long as the 
polemical struggle persists and disrupts reason. The danger of this strategy 
remains that it campotmds the disturbance of reason: (A756-7 B784-5) 
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''To se~ reason at variance with itself and, to supply it with weapons on 
both s1des and then to ~ook. on quietly and scoffingly at the fierce 
struggle •• suggests a m1schievous and malevolent disJ>Osition. If we 
consider the invincible obstinacy [of the polemicistsJ there really is 
no other available course of action". 
This warlike tone and the actual substance of the critical strategy is 
developed in the 'Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to Hypotheses' section. 
Hypotheses are strategic and thus critical concepts, compromises that make 
possible an aggressive 'defensive' attitude in the polemical war, by 
countering the force of a given argument (A777-8 B805-6): 
'~ypotheses are •• permissible only as weapons of war, for the purpose of 
defending a right, not in order to establish it". 
However, blocking the enemy's argument with an equal quantity of force cannot 
be sufficient, given that the ultimate goal of the mobilization of critique is 
war and the annihilation of the era of polemical argument. Critical 
principles must seek out the stunned polemical arguments, trace them to their 
conditions and terminate their validity with extreme prejudice, for the sake 
of the tranquil functioning of reason and its legitimate judgements: 
"in order that by annulling [polemical arguments] we may establish a 
permanent peace. External quiescence is merely specious. The root of 
these disturbances which lies deep in the nature of human reason must be 
removed". 
Yet how can Kant avoid' the possibility that critique is not suited to reason, 
and that this all-out mobilization of critique threatens to destroy the 
rational power base. Kant's fantasy consists in believing that the maximal 
unleashing of critique will strengthen the hold of the intended pro-rational 
strategy, and that the critical tracing of conditions of possibility is the 
same as the (A794 B822) "rational justification" which each participant in 
transcendental philosophy indulges in: 
"Everyone must defend his position directly, by a legitimate proo~ tru:tt 
carries with it a transcendental deduction of the grounds upon which 1t 
is itself made to rest." 
This is a fantasy of suicidal faith in reason; for Kant the unleashing of 
critique remains a controlled part of reason, which yet results in the 
definitive annihilation of the polemical disturbance: 
"By giving hunan reason the freedom to send out shoots so. that [the root 
disturbance] may discover itself to our eyes and that 1t may then be 
entirely destroyed". 
The rational strategy consists of surrendering its own weapons and positions 
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to the polemical and critical disturbances which wrack it; given Kant's blind 
faith in the minimal difference between reason and its critical interruption, 
he states: 
''W~ have nothing to fear in all this but much to hope for.. that we may 
gal.n for ourselves a possession which can never again be contested". 
This suicidal rational strategy yields a martyr's death for reason and its 
blind faith in the orientation of critique to reason. [10] It is thus the 
defeat of critique considered as a strategy which necessarily consolidates 
the status of the Kantian subject, and the end of the necessity of considering 
critique as reducible to a rational project. Critique itself spins out of the 
orbit of reason, away from the tribunal ruled over by critical principles and 
into the flows of t~e which Bataille will call the death of god. 
It is Bataille who most succinctly summarises the movement and fate of Kantian 
critique, and rises to-the challenge posed by the liberation of critique from 
the intentions of reason. Bataille describes h~self as "speaking after a 
catastrophe of the intelligence" (OC5 40). He is certain that the unmitigated 
and irmnense disaster of critical rigour has struck down reason, flayed 
metaphysics and morals down to their conditions of possibility and that now 
the body-parts are dissolving in an acid bath of 'non-savoir'. Critique is 
the fulfillment of thought in so far as reason sought, in a rigourously 
Kantian fashion, to discover the unconditioned unity of every conditioned 
knowledge. What reason found through critique was its own inevitable 
groundlessness, its own intense disorientation. Bataille tends not to 
differentiate the extensive processes of thought and natural illusion in his 
epigrarrmatic remarks on the subject. Such a distinction is un~portant in 
relation to the critical point both are brought to. For Bataille, thought, by 
which he means critical thought, only poses the problem of what is legitimate 
on the way to its own inevitable exhaustion. It is pointless to call this 
exhaustion illegitimate, although reason would want it so; it would only be 
illegitimate if reason still applied. Instead, this exhaustion is inevitable 
in the irnnanent processes of thought, and is marked by an exceeding of the 
limits proper to thought, an exceeding which cannot be reduced to an instance 
of the illegit~ate employment of the sensibility: 
'~ought driven to the l~it of thought necessitates the sacrifice or 
dea th of thought" (OC8 460) 
''We only reach the ultimate object of knowledge when knowledge is 
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dissolved" (OC7 76) 
''Thought has as its goal its own derailing" (OC8 259) 
''Reason alone has the power to undo its work to throw down what it has 
built up" (OC5 60). ' 
Knowledge dissolves at a critical point. Although Bataille sometimes refers 
to a resultant 'non-savoir' (and it is these resonances of logical opposition 
which attract the phenomenologist Derrida), it would be irresponsible to 
suggest that he stresses anything except the intensive pitch of the 
dissolution itself: 
"For a long time I have sought not knowledge •• but its opposite non-
knowledge. I do not await the moment when I shall be rewarded for my 
effort and finally 'know', but the moment when I will no longer know, 
when my expectations are resolved into NamING" (OC8 258). 
Bataille will often describe the effects of this non-logical 'nothing' in 
Kantian topographical terms, and when he does so the 'nothing' has the 
~licit sense of an evaluative principle which registers the impoverishment 
of that framework and the utile values which underscore it; but the 'nothing' 
is first and foremost an intense sensation which overwhelms intelligence and 
thus rubs out a certain form and line of rational philosophical conduct which 
is oriented by the model of the Kantian subject/citizen and the objects which 
are its proper possessions: 
"All that could be seen [of philosophical problems] was their 
dissolution into movement, their rebirth in other shapes, their 
acceleration to catastrophic speeds" (OC 6 198) 
"There is a shuddering moment when everything blows out, everything 
strobes: the deep solid reality of a person disappears and all that 
remains are charged, mobile, violent, inexorable presences •• all that 
remains are forces possessing the violence of an unleashed storm" (OCZ 
245-6). 
In bursts of misguided enthusiasm, Bataille recuperates reason in relation to 
this sensation, littering his texts with impossible and abortive projects such 
as: 
"A philosophy of pure sensibility opposed to the intelligible" (OC8 601) 
This particular issueless manifesto emphasises the difficulty facing whoever 
would remain true to the pitch of intensive zero and its holocaust of reason. 
The jargon of sensation itself tends to be sucked up into the rationalised 
realms of existential psychology or 'aesthetics', as in one discursive mode in 
Inner Experience [11] and formulae such as: 
"Intelligence survives the death of ethics and finds itself in the realm 
of the aesthetic" (OC8 646). 
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However, despite all these qualifications, Bataille is adamant that in the 
face of the Kantian culture of capital "Intensity alone matters" (OCS 29). 
The general tenor of his texts lies with his emphasis on the excessive nature 
of intensity in relation to the closed conceptual topography of Kantianism; 
implicit in this account is the notion of intensity as a scale of energetic 
quantities. 
Throughout Inner Experience the critical point of the overwhelming of reason 
is described as 'the extreme limit of the possible', a Kantian tag which 
stresses the unrepresentability of the overwhelming fluxes of intensity which 
occur at that point. The limit of the possible was for Kant the limit of 
intentionality, the limits of the utile machine of consciousness which 
included the hypothesis of noumena. But in the blurs of intensity the 
difference between the rigours of a power which traverses and overwhelms the 
machine and threatening external stimuli is lost. The limits of the possible 
are washed away by the tides those limits excluded, the tides which were 
rationalised as impossible, the tides which suddenly become real.[12] 
The extent to which this simple if catastrophic picture overturns the Kantian 
topography henmed in by limits and maximums, the extent to which every major 
strut supporting the transcendental idealist edifice is countered by a 
catastrophic definition of the same, including a definition of a generalised 
intensity bound not only to sensation, remains to be shown. 
The control of critique by the forms and maximums of the faculties 
The power of critique attests to tensions within the operations of the 
faculties and between faculties as they lie in the hierarchy of the faculties. 
At this latter level, the lower faculties are represented, in general, in 
terms of processes and quanta whereas the higher faculties are represented in 
terms of rules, principles, limitation- and container- fWlCtions. We have 
already seen how critique itself splits between process and limitation, and 
how Kant uses the practical employment of reason to reorient the power of 
critique around rational limitation enacted at the level of conmonsense 
civilities; critique as democratic civil power, as judiciary or tribunal 
acting with strict method to pronounce 'judicial sentences' on polemicists and 
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their idle chatter and create 'eternal peace'. But this is only the most 
practical strategy of rationalisation which Kant uses on critique as an 
example of mental processes in general. The hierarchisation of the faculties 
is the major strategy of containment deployed in the course of the first 
critique, even if Kant conditions it in the pure a priori forms of intuition 
and the transcendental unity of apperception. We will see that Kant uses 
three sub-strategies with regard to the hierarchy of the faculties and its 
rational reorientation of critique: 1) he mobilises pure forms against the 
quanta-flow of affects, 2) he emphasises the affects of a transcendent 
influence in the hierarchy of the faculties, and 3) he transfers the 
transcendent functions associated with the transcendent illusions of thought 
onto a transcendental plane, thereby abstracting the transcendental ideas as 
exceptions from the critical rule. 
How can we call Reason a 'container' when it is simply the faculty of 
principles? Because of the necessity of the relations between these 
principles and the rules of the understanding, and the shape of reason which 
all these forms describe. [13] In knowledge from a principle, Kant states 
(A300 B357) "I apprehend the particular in the universal through concepts" i.e 
reason infers the truth of the relation of rule to judgement (where the rule 
is the condition of the judgement). In so doing reason seeks the universal 
condition of each judgement, thus bringing the multiple rules of the 
understanding under the smallest possible number of universals/principles. 
Reason seeks the unconditioned as a limit endowing unity for every conditioned 
knowledge, through the process of the understanding. Thus Kant presents the 
process of understanding as derivative and regulated by reason and its 
transcendental ideas; at the same time reason is described as transcendent 
with regard to the irrmanent processes of the understanding. 
Kant's telling analogy for the necessity of the idea of the totality of 
conditions for any given knowledge concerns time (A410-4 8437-441). A given 
moment of time depends, states Kant, on the entirety of the regressive series 
of past times. Space relies on the same idea, although it is an aggregate of 
coexistent parts; for any given space is measured by or limited by all other 
parts of space. The identification of time and space emphasises that their 
respective parts are measures or units related to a base unity/totality. I 
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will argue that this analogy refers to a primary spatialisation of t~e which 
itself orients the thought processes around the unity of apperception.[14] 
Kant determines influence in terms of inner processes (rather than external 
influences) and primarily in terms of the highest faculty, reason rather than 
pathological sensibility. He connects influence to the status of the l~it 
i.e the idea of the unconditioned as a unifying force (and later to the idea 
of the noumenon [15] ) ; the unquantif iable influence of these ideas relates 
them, and the understanding they influence, Kant argues, to morality. Thus 
the transcendent employment of the transcendental idea of the unconditioned 
unity of any conditioned knowledge - which consists in the idea of its 
totality being illegitimately used as a concept - is itself fostered by the 
influence of the idea, and through this influence reason directs the 
employment of the understanding towards the purposive unity of the moral 
ideas, a unity of which the understanding has no concept. Such transcendental 
ideas have no object in experience: "being simply the concept of a maxirrrum" 
(A327 B384) they do not affect the understanding in so far as it contains the 
ground of possible experience. But the mere idea of a maximum is itself 
enough to unite all the acts of the understanding into an "absolute whole". 
[16] The practical employment of the understanding is always under the 
influence of such transcenden tal ideas, which are always ideas of "the 
necessary unity of all possible ends" (A328 B 385); thus the idea and its 
influence is designates as an original condition of the practical employment 
of the understanding, and a catalyst for the influence and extension of the 
"moral ideas" (A329 B386). 
It is critique which exposes the transcendental illusions, showing that they 
arise because we treat such transcendental ideas as objects or their concepts, 
as contents and manifolds and actual absolutes. However, Kant argues that 
critique does not apply to the orientation of the faculties to the moral ideas 
because these ideas have only a general influence and form. This status of 
the moral ideas also applies to the general influence and minimal form of the 
subject as Kant examines it in the course of the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason'. 
Kant argues that the I is a s~le and empty representation which accompanies 
all concepts, a form of representation in general, a transcendental subject 
whose representation' is s~le only because there is nothing determinate in 
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it. The four paralogisms consist in treating this I as substantial, as 
simple (in itself), as a unity throughout time and as a principle of life in 
matter. They arise as responses to the intense disjtn1ction between the 'I 
think' and self-consciousness [17]; responses wherein self-consciousness 
represents the I to itself as that which is the tn1conditioned condition of all 
unity and yet which can be also (and paradoxically) be known through 
categories. Kant simply retorts: "I cannot know as an object that which I 
must presuppose in order to know any object" (A346 B404). This is a simple 
and devastating argument, the effects of which I will spell out later. [18] 
Critique stresses the radicality of the minimal form and lack of content 
associated with the 'I think': 
'~e identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is only 
a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence and in no way 
proves the numerical identity of any subject" (A363). 
Unfortunately Kant goe$ on to bring the very form of personality which he is 
cri ticising back from the minimal form of the 'I think', which he now calls 
the 'logical identity' of the I. Kant suggests that the logical identity of 
the I might contain a function which "retains the thought" of preceding 
subjects and passes them onto subsequent subjects. Thus Kant halts the 
extreme possibility that the logical identity of the I distributes a veritable 
'tsunami' of contents, with the concept of the necessity of the form of the 
series of those contents. He organises the memory ftmction of the logical 
identity of the I arotmd a traditional time series structure, imagines this 
function working cunulatively through (A365) a series of states and states 
that the last state will be conscious of all the previous states (A364n). 
Kant transforms the transcendent concept of the person into impersonal and 
abstract quanta, only to reiterate the retentive, abstract and thus 
transcendent function in relation to these quanta. His emphasis on the I as 
a process of abstract quantities distributed according to the time-series 
assimilates the logical identity of the I to the rest of the mind processes, 
or at least minimises the distinction. The problem with this as far as Kant 
is concerned is that 1) the distinction between the logical identity of the I 
and the flux of subject-contents is threatened, 2) the distinction between 
faculties and the ability of higher faculties to direct lower faculties is 
also called into question, and 3) the reduction of the difference between the 
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general fonn of the transcendental realm and irrmanent mental processes 
threatens the control-function of the former. 
In order to combat the critical dissolution of a few too many metaphysical 
illusions Kant sets about emphasising the influence of the similarity between 
the fonnal s~licities of the transcendental subject and the transcendental 
object qua noumenon (A358) - between both of them and in their relations to 
the forms of intuition. Both the transcendental subject and object are formal 
unities which function as syntheses and limitations. Both are construed over 
and against a matter of outer appearances which are subject to sensibility and 
its intuitions, affects and influences. At the same time, both resemble and 
depend on the empty forms of intuition which are also limit-containers of 
representations. We might imagine Kant's picture of self-consciousness as a 
loop of these four empty fOnDS which functions to regulate and process 
external stimuli and create the transcendental illusions. The empty ciphers 
preside over an inner extension, an interiorisation of space as extension and 
synthesis and which is itself limited and mapped out in relation to the (A381) 
"fixed and abiding substratum" of the concept of the transcendental object and 
its necessary relation to the transcendental subject. 
As we have seen Kant attempts to reorient critique with the analogies of the 
practical employment of reason. He argues that the critique of the 
transcendent employment of reason does not affect the practical employment of 
reason B424: 
''Yet nothing is thereby lost as regards the right of postulating a 
future life in accordance with the principles of the practical 
employment of reason". 
In fact mumbles Kant unconvincingly the 'proofs' which necessitate such a 
postulate are clarified in the process of critique, for the limitation of 
reason which critique carries through confines reason to its proper sphere -
A425 "the order of ends" - which Kant will argue is approached by behaviour 
in accordance with moral laws. The order of ends is characterised as 
exceeding or transcending nature, which Kant conceives as working on 
principles of utility and proportionate function. Thus the order of ends is 
characterised as useless and disproportionate, involved in an excessive and 
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virulent movement, (a virulence which we have associated with general 
critique,) which is also a resumption of the type of movement which is the 
object of critique within the bounds of reason, i.e "extending the order of 
ends ••• beyond the limits of experience and life". Kant cannot associate 
rational critique with the search for moral ends without suggesting that 
morality itself can be seen as an extension of the Lnpulse to extend, conquer, 
and possess illegitimately; whilst the general sense of critique escapes these 
rational impulses because it is not involved in an extensive process of 
legitimation, but a process of virulent differentiation. [19] 
Kant goes so far as to state that the excessive in nature is itself only proof 
of the illimitable extension of human knowledge and the illimitable avidity of 
the human will: (B426) 
''This powerful and incontrovertible proof is reinforced by our ever 
increasing knowledge of purposiveness in all that we can see around us 
and by the contemplation of the immensity of creation and therefore also 
by the consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the possible 
extension of our knowledge and of a striving coomensurate with it." 
The perversity and anti-intuitive nature of transcendental idealism is 
overwhelmingly obvious in passages such as this. The representation of the 
abstract relations between components in the mind machine of apperception may 
designate assimilations and internalisations as the a priori conditions of 
that representation, but the heights of self-deceit are reached when for the 
same reason the representation of stunning external stimuli is described as 
affirming teleological human-centred goals. [20] 
In the 'Antinomy of Pure Reason' critique shows that the two conceptions of 
the unconditioned sought by reason for every conditioned knowledge are 
illusory because they presuppose that a manifold objective totality 
corresponds to the problematic concept of the absolute totality of the series 
of conditions. The critical dissolution of the antinomy emphasises reason's 
error in assuming that if the conditioned knowledge was given in an empirical 
synthesis, then so was the complete series of its conditions. The series is 
neither an infinite nor a finite whole, because the max:irm.m proper to it 
occurs at the transcendental level. I will argue that the general sense of 
critique itself does not recognise the idea of a maximum (which is proper to 
reason and its unities); it thereby does not differentiate between the 
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concepts of the transcendent and the transcendental which is central to Kant's 
rationalisation of the ~anent mental processes. 
For Kant the affects of transcendental pure reason are essentially 
distinguished from the illusions created by the different transcendent 
operations. The transcendental pure reason supplies a regulative rather than 
a constitutive principle (the latter characterises the transcendent illusions) 
for the empirical regress of conditions in appearances, a rule 
"prescribing a regress in the series of conditions of given appearances 
and .forb~dding [its closure] •• a principle of the greatest possible 
cont1nuat1on and extension of experience, allowing no empirical limit to 
hold as absolute". (AS09 B537) 
Yet reason also seeks its own absolute unity of synthesis via the synthesis of 
the understanding according to rules, ignoring the fact that the conditions of 
the two faculties are mutually exclusive. To fulfill the conditions of one 
faculty is to fail the conditions of the other: (A422 B450) 
"the conditions of this unity are such that when it is adequate to 
reason it is too great for the understanding; and when suited to the 
understanding, too small for reason". 
The importance of this passage in suggesting 1) that the differences between 
the faculties rests solely on the magnitudes of the quanta which occupy them, 
and that 2) these faculties have thresholds and limits, maximums and minimums 
beyond which they relay into other faculties, is lost amidst the argument for 
the critical dissolution of the antinomy. Again this dissolution includes 
the reprise of the transcendent function and its spatio-temporal coordinates -
the demand for 'absolute totality' within space and time - at the 
transcendental level. [21] The general sense of critique would surely examine 
the distinction between the concepts totality/infinity (Kant argues AS13 B541 
that infinity designates the infinite divisibility of a given whole or 
totality in space) and the indefinite/unlimited (which he associates with the 
trajectory of an element which extends "indefinitely far" because it does not 
entail any absolute 1xxly). Critique beyond the influence of reason queries 
the possibility of the 'absolute totality' which lies at the base of the 
transcendent illusions and which reason replicates at the transcendental 
level. Rather than replicating infinity and totality at the transcendental 
level, as rational ideas, critique prioritises the processive quanta which are 
indefinite and unlimited, and which Kant associates either with the 
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divisibility of a whole body or with the impossibilities or zeroes of empty 
time and space.[22] 
We have seen that Kant attempts to revise the power of critique by relating it 
to the values of hunan moral freedom, that is to the rational idea of an 
empirically unconditioned non-sensible condition for knowledge (A528 8556). 
It seems to me that the general sense of critique must include even this idea 
in the same limit-container of the forms of space and time regulated by reason 
which produces the transcendent illusions. Kant argues that causality can 
exist independently of time (symptomatically, Kant does not suggest that this 
causality can exist outside the real condition of idealist schemas - space) 
through the self-acting freedom of hunan will, which opposes the 'tyrannical' 
direction of time and natural influences (A534 8562). This ht.nnan will is 
shown to be 'independent of coercion through sensuous impulses' in that it can 
instigate series of events separate from those of natural causality. Kant 
disavows the untenability of this conception by equating the failures of this 
causality with its necessity. Kant argues that man is the emblem of this free 
causality insofar as the relation between the faculties of reason and the 
understanding is ruled by the virtual ought proper to reason which is 
superimposed over sensuous influences: (A547 8575) 
"'Ought' expresses a kind of necessity and of connection with grounds 
found nowhere else in nature". 
This is no necessity at all; for this 'ought' is added to given sensuous 
influences, as an exercise in rational damage limitation. The moral 
evaluation of stimuli is first and foremost utilitarian, that is concerned 
with the protection of the mental mechanisms from those stimuli. Kant 
relates the 'ought' to the very structure of mental representation, but 
thereby gives both the status of reactive resistors: (A802 8830) 
''we have the power to overcome the impressions on our faculty of 
sensuous desire by calling up representations ••• of what is useful or 
injurious •• These considerations as to what is desirable in respect of 
our whole state i.e as to what is good and useful, are based on 
reason". 
Kant does not complete the critical movement here, but rather rejects it; in 
the face of the fact that reason and the hunan sense of time are reactive 
second order effects of energies and time which condition the hunan mental 
processes, (knowledge which might be the basis of a revaluation of those 
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processes) he writes of the blatant lie of the "power of origination" (A552 
8580) inherent in the causality of human freedom and its independence fran 
'phenomenal time'. However, the general sense of critique revalues all 
thought in the light of the discovery of its conditions in the affects of 
physiological stimuli and dissipative time. It is the effects of such 
powerful stimuli and this time which pulse to the rhythms of the unbridled 
destruction and chaos wrought by critique. 
Kant goes on to posit the idea of a being correlative to rational causality; 
this idea of an intelligible being can itself become the object of a 
transcendent illusion in which the principle of the intelligible being or ens 
realiss~ which applies to ideas and their relation to concepts is applied 
to objects of experience and is transfonned into the 'personality' of a 
canpletely detennined (A576 8 604) "omnitudo realitas" or "transcendental 
substrate" of phenomena. Kant wants to save the 'authority' of the ens 
realiss~ from critical dissolution and have it as a regulator of our 
obligation to practical moral laws, (A589 8617) 
"obligations to which there would be no motive save on the assunption 
that there exists a supreme being to give effect and confirmation to the 
practical laws". 
Kant attempts to argue that it is precisely the minimal difference between the 
transcendental and the transcendent employments of the idea of the 
intelligible being which inclines us towards the moral laws, because this 
minimal difference focuses our attention on the danger facing reason and 
reason's own specific demands. Kant argues that our perception is so 
oriented arm,md the higher faculty of reason, and its formal, qualitative 
problems that the problems posed by immense quantative external stimuli are 
irrelevant; for Kant these quanta can always be registered as rational 
magnitlXies of measurement and thereby 'decathected' [23] This underplays the 
impact of those quanta on the supposedly enclosed structures of reason: (A613 
8641) 
"Unconditioned necessity •• is for hunan reason the veritable. abyss. 
Eternity itself in all its terrible sublimity •• is far from making the 
same overwhelming impression on the mind; for it only measures the 
duration of things. We cannot put aside and yet also cannot endure 
the thought of a being which we represent to ourselves as supreme 
amongst all possible beings". 
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We saw above that Kant conceived of the natural order as evidence of an order 
of ends. The idea of the intelligible being is consolidated in a similar 
manner; Kant sees natural content and change as indicators of purposiveness 
and adaptability which suggest the possibility of a form-giver (rather than 
creator of the world), an architect who is '~red by the adaptability of 
the material in which he works" (A627 B655). Such an idea cannot be the 
determinate concept of a thing, Kant states; it can only be determined in 
indefinite judgements which use superlatives to describe excessive magnitudes 
(A628 B656): 
"the predicates 'very great', 'astOtmding', 'irrmeasurable' in power and 
excellence give no determinate concept at all and do not really tell us 
what the thing is in itself. They are only relative representations of 
the magnitude of the object which the observer in contemplating the 
world compares with himself and with his capacity of comprehension and 
which are equally terms of eulogy whether we be magnifying the object or 
be depreciating the observing subject in relation to that object". 
Kant is correct to suggest the possibility of magnitudes which are excessive 
relative to the human [24]. He however denies the relevance of the sensible 
impact of magnitudes; for him they are first and foremost rational 
comparisons, in which magnitudes are measured rela ti ve to the ' originary 
power' of reason and its influencing ideas. This is strictly untenable given 
that the generality of the predicates suggests that the 'measurement' might in 
fact simply be a physiological sensible 'registering' of impact. 
Kant's attempts to restrict critique are driven by the desire to effect a 
rationally influenced regulative employment of the understanding, which can be 
directed to the "focus imaginarius" (A644 B672) which gives concepts their 
greatest extension and unity in a system of deteminate knowledge. The 
systematic unity of reason is a maximal formal unity which is analogous to the 
purposive unity of things (A686 B715); thus Kant goads thought to a state of 
maximal knowledge and morality. This regulative employment operates by 
reducing the diversity of appearances to a ''hidden identity" (A649 8677) by 
comparison, using laws of the homogeneity, specification and continuity of 
fonms. Kant deploys the notion of continuity amongst appearances considered 
as degrees, in tandem with a law of specification which turns diversities into 
subspecies and subgenres. For Kant each magnitude as degree is related to a 
ceiling or max:irm.nn magnitude of its own genus or degree as well as being 
involved in its own infinitesimal division. Thus for Kant the horizon of 
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continuity lies in the convergence of continuous genera on one base genus or 
base unit.[25] The regulative principle of the maximal unity of reason (A665 
8693) is itself the form of the series of regulative assllDptions we have 
looked at which limit critique and thereby secure the maximal possible 
systematic unity in the empirical and practical employment of reason (A671 
B699). Thus Kant justifies reproducing the illusions of psychology, cosmology 
and theology at a transcendental level of assumption in the name of the system 
of pure reason: (A832 B860) 
"By system I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge 
under one idea. This idea is the concept provided by reason of the 
whole insofar as the concept determines a priori not only the scope of 
its manifold content but also the positions which the parts occupy 
relatively to each other". 
Reason mobilises critique in order to destroy the polemical arguments; but 
unleashed critique threatens to destroy the minimal remainders of the 
transcendent arguments which constitute reason itself. Critique liberates the 
processes of thought and thus reason attempts to curtail critique through the 
replication of transcendent functions at the transcedental level of 
hypothetical reason and morality; through the rigour of the hierarchy of the 
faculties (as we shall see below) and by the simple but insubstantial 
identification of critique with reason. Critique is neither extension nor 
legitimation of knowledge; it is the intensification of knowledge and 
liberates the processes of thought in a headless loop of accelerations and 
intensities. 
The containers and contaminants of time and subjectivity 
We do not have to make do with a negative definition of the general sense of 
critique; we can infer more than strategies of the topographical containment 
of critique from the first critique. However we can only infer this general 
sense of critique after examining these strategies and discovering, under the 
ordering of the faculties by reason, an account of the immanent processes of 
thought. More specific strategies of containment than I have considered 
hereto are oriented around the key concepts of Kant's idealist edifice: time, 
subjectivity and the transcendental unity of apperception. 
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I have already noted that there is a tendency in Kant's text for time to be 
subject to a spatial overcoding, to the extent of being defined in terms of 
extensive spatial metaphors. However, it is also certain that his conception 
of time feeds into Kant's radical conception of subjectivity. I will attempt 
- over the next two chapters - to deduce a revalued fusion of space and time 
from a general critical reading of the restrictions which Kant's concepts of 
time and subjectivity place on each other. 
The implications of Kant's accotmt of time for his notion of SUbjectivity are 
succinctly expressed by Deleuze in Kant's critical philosophy and What is 
Philosophy[26]. For Deleuze, the Kantian novum consists in the introduction 
of a new conception of time into the Cartesian cogito. The' I' of the 'I 
think' is a spontaneous mechanism which simply performs a synthesis of time -
i.e a demarcation of present, past and future in every instant - whilst the 'I 
am' implied by this 'I think' is a passive, changing, phenomenal ego which is 
affected or changed by the activity of its thought in time. Deleuze' s 
academic formulation does not quite convey the terror this contemporary 
conception has provoked in a long list of the suicided and insane; 
"I am separated from myself by the form of time yet the 'I' affects this 
form by ~ing out its synthesis: thus the ego is affected as content 
in this form' [27]. 
Deleuze's formulation at least abstracts the grotmds for a vertiginous panic 
from the dense and obfuscating pages of the first critique; a panic which Kant 
avoids at all costs. It is up to others to invoke the suffering implied by 
this axiom and to give us grounds for suspecting that Kant simply hides his 
madness well (Kleist, Rimbaud, Artaud, Bataille •••• ): 
"I suffer from a fearful mental disease. My thought abandons me at 
every stage. From the mere fact of thought itself to the external fact 
of its materialization in words •••• I am in constant pursuit of my 
intellectual being. Thus when I am able to grasp a form, however 
imperfect, I hold on to it, afraid to lose all thought. As I know I do 
not do myself justice, I suffer from it, but I accept it in fear of 
complete death" [28] • 
Perhaps it is fear which drives Kant to his most unconvincing and' imperfect' 
conceptions too. But where the madman embraces the "deep insecurity" of his 
thought and is only too happy that "this insecurity is not replaced by the 
complete non-existence I sometimes suffer", the philosopher attempts to cover 
over the traces of insecurity and illegitimate judgement with the force of a 
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prolix prose and a system of rational operations which overcodes a more 
prLmary machinic madness. The madman whose personality dissolves at the zero 
of 'complete non-existence' is irrmersed in "total abstraction" which is the 
same as the "pure wastage" of unleashed thought. This is an encounter which 
Kant takes every opportunity to avoid. 
In Kant's account time is the irrmutable form of interiority in which the I 
affects the ego - i.e in which a succession of changes take place - and it 
must therefore have three modes; the mode of succesion of those changes in 
various times, the mode of simultaneity of those changes and those various 
times in the form of time itself, and the mode of permanence proper to the 
~table form of time and its infinite possible contents or possible 
limitations. It is the superimposition of these modes of time which suggests 
that time is subject to space and that the forms of intuition can be 
considered the spatial containers of manifold representations, just as 
representations are the signs of intensive quanta. It is the tension between 
the two senses of the 'forms' of intuition - forms as conditions and 
containers or sets - which I want to go on to examine now, and show how they 
arise from the overcoding of time by space. Ultimately a proper fusion of 
space and time can be conceived from a critical reading of the first 
critique. [29] In the. section on time in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' time 
is described as a pure form of sensible intuition in which inner sense deploys 
the representations of outer sense according to the three possible modes of 
relation in time. Kant states that no content of representations is given in 
the pure forms of intuition nor in pure intuitions themselves [30]. However, 
the form of intuition itself becomes a content when it is represented in inner 
sense; that is, it is shown to be a container whilst itself contained in the 
receiving inner sense. This representation represents: (868) 
"nothing but the mode in which the mind is affected by its own activity 
(thro~h this positing of its representation), and so is affected by 
itself • 
The representation of the form of intuition resembles the representation of 
the ego to the 'I think' in the self-consciousness of apperception. Ccmnon to 
both representations within inner sense (of the form of intuition, of the 
subject as it affects itself) is the relay structure by which form is 
converted into content within another form, and the resulting minimal 
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difference between fonns and representations considered as quanta. All of 
Kant's mental mechanisms can be interpreted using this paradigm of the relay 
which serially contains sets of repre~entations as quanta. Thus Kant's 
description of mental processes and faculties can be seen as liberating the 
currency of representations as quanta to the detriment of the formal 
differences between the faculties and their orientation to reason. So Kant 
continually reminds the reader of the original and a priori status of the 
different container-fonns, their immutable totality and necessary effects and 
relations. Thus he defines time as an infinite and necessary "original 
representation" tmderlying all intuitions: 
"In it alone is actuality of appearances possible at all. Appearances 
may one and all vanish; but time (as the universal condition of their 
possibility) cannot itself be removed," (A31 846) 
and continues by stressing that every determinate magnitude of time is a 
'limitation' of this o~iginal 'total' representation. My reading of Kant's 
account of mental processes will highlight the seminal tension between 
representations considered as quanta & magnitudes and the limited container-
fonns associated with the hierarchy of the faculties, and thereby draw out the 
powers proper to a post-critical accolt of intensive space-time and its 
events. 
Kant divorces this 'original representation' of time from the change and 
alteration which characterise its determinate magnitudes. 'Thus time is 
infected by the simultaneity and permanence proper to idealist space. For 
different times can only succeed, be simultaneous or coexist within the 
infinitude of time, which is the set of those different times, and is thus a 
container form like the simultaneity and permanence of idealist enclosed 
space. [31] Kant is at pains to suggest that the spatial interferences of 
time are solely analogous; but then representations are themselves only 
analogies of objects and yet still essential. For Kant time (A33 B50) has 
shape only by analogy: 
''We represent the time-sequence by a line progr~ss~ to infinity in 
which the manifold constitutes a series of one dlJDens10n only; and we 
reason from the properties of this line to all the properties ~f time, 
with this one exception that while the parts of the l1ne are 
, . " 
simultaneous the parts of time are always succeSS1ve • 
The mode of succession is itself a further example of the superimposition of 
the properties of space on time; the length of the line of time is schematised 
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in space, by the succession and s:imultaneity of space. This spatialisation 
accords with Kant's general schema in which fonns (faculties and functions) 
confine the (the radical import of) basic quantative processes of the mind. 
These quanta originate outside the mental schema, and intrude only to be 
processed and relayed; thus they are essentially affects. In the course of 
their subjection to the functions of the hierarchy of the faculties all 
resonances of the primary power of the affect are replaced by the 
equilibrations internal to the faculties, and the affect becomes a content of 
consciousness which has the sole function of being a raw material for the 
trans fonna t ions , overcodings and categorisations of those faculties. This 
damping down of the affect is not surprising given Kant's attitude to the 
noumenal, i.e his inability to consider an affect as primary (and the mental 
as a reactive response) which might also be too powerful for the 
overdetennined and restricted mechanisms of the mind. The rational defence 
mechanisms which react at such a preposterously massive level of overkill, 
internally producing an environment to swamp the complexities of the 
environment of the initial external stimulus are so detailed that Kant can go 
so far as to emphasise the 'objective reality' of the object, thereby 
designating only its measurement and control by the understanding and reason. 
Kant' s fear should be bulimic - the fear of incorporating more affective 
quanta than one can transfonn and reduce - but Kant shows little explicit 
unease about what the mental operation might come into contact with. There 
is, however in this still an implicit awareness of the threat posed by the 
affect: 
"It is only if we ascribe objective reality to these fonns of 
representation, that it becomes impossible for us to prevent everything 
being thereby transformed into mere illusion". (870-1) 
The 'Transcendental Deduction A' section suggests that the influence of 
spatialisation extends far beyond the account of the pure forms of intuition 
to the functions of the imagination, the understanding and the transcendental 
unity of apperception. At the same time the status of the transcendental 
unity of apperception calls into question the validity of the model of the 
container sets and unities of the faculties, not because of any transcendence 
or detachment from the general mental move towards the unity of judgement and 
reason, but because of the immanence of the transcendental unity of 
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apperception to the field of consciousness, and thus its redtmdancy. This 
qualification allows for a reading of the operations of the faculties without 
the defence mechanisms of the container sets of unity. 
In the imagination and tmderstanding representations are linked to the 
functions of concepts of the tmderstanding oriented towards the unity of 
judgements. Where intuitions rested on affections, concepts rest on 
functions, and are identified as sUbsumptions of manifolds under a coomon 
representation, as "the tmity of the act of bringing various representations 
under one conmon representation" (A68 893). Kant calls judgements - the goal 
of these functions - "functions of unity among our representations", which 
seems to suggest that the difference between a concept and a judgement is only 
a quantative one, a question of sets and container sets. Kant attempts to 
complicate the issue by designating the ftmctions in judgement as 
'categories', and by emphasising the connections between the general function 
of synthetic tmity and the operations of the higher faculties. In general he 
is quick to COtmter the suggestion that the difference between 
representations, ftmctions, concepts and judgements is purely quantative; it 
is certainly true that it becomes more difficult to account for the higher 
faculties in terms of the machinic base economy of quanta/flows which are also 
fonns, i.e degrees, which constitute the processes of the pathological 
faculties - but this is simply the product of an increasing rationalisation. 
For Kant, the abstract mental sequences (of for instance: intuitions > 
concepts > judgements, relations > ftmctions > unities, representations > 
relations > syntheses) all tend towards tmity via the category of community, 
not because of their base currency of representations but because of their 
shared regulated end-point of synthetic tmity. The free sequences and flows 
of representations are increasingly supplanted by the machines of composition 
and reciprocal determination, to the point where the idea that time and quanta 
have a privileged relation to the flux and influence of affectivity is 
irrelevant. 
The spatial container mechanism associated with the hierarchy of the faculties 
reaches a new level of complexity with the disjunctive mode of the relations 
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of thought within judgement. Kant creates a structure at the level of 
propositions and judgement, i e at a macro or logically 'substantial' level, 
which allows for the containment of divisions and differences within 
knowledge, and which retroactively affects the orientation of the base 
machinic level of sensations, intuitions and concepts which lead up to 
judgement. Kant's account of the disjunctive mode of the relations of 
representations in judgement gives us a first full image of the terminal point 
which he would have for the sequences of representations. The disjtmctive 
logical function of judgement entails the pure concept of a tmity of knowledge 
which is created by the division of its parts, be they representations, 
concepts or propositions. The concept of this disjtmctive tmity allows us to 
understand the similarity of the structures involved in the relay of 
representations into concepts and judgements. Kant states that the 
disjunctive mode in judgement is the site of the community of propositions in 
the unity of the knowledge at stake: "a certain community of the known 
constituents" which mutually exclude each other and thus determine the 
"totality", the ''whole content" of a given knowledge. (A74 B99) 
The sequence of representations is synthesised into the sphere of a judgement 
or knowledge which is represented as a whole divided into parts, the 
multiplicity of subordinate concepts coordinated with each other, reciprocally 
determining each other as excluded. A coordinated space results, and thus a 
spatial composition replaces the sequences which had at least the minimal 
temporal resonance of succession. 
The understanding's logical category of community entailed in the form of the 
disjunctive judgement extends towards objects in general; thus we can see that 
'community' is the horizon-event for representations at all levels of thought 
and not simply the base machinic level of sensations and intuitions. This 
disjunctive 'camrunity of things' (Bl12) is both the ultimate concretion of 
transcendental containment and as will slowly become apparent in the next 
chapter, the site of a new space-time fusion. 
The container and contaminant of transcendental apperception 
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The Transcendental Deduction A and B detail the spontaneous synthetic 
operations of the base machinic levels of intuition, imagination and 
understanding, operations which can be read as producing the penultimate 
spatial containment of the flows of time and as helping to liberate a radical 
new conception of space-time. Kant's text emphasises the necessity of a 
relation between the synthetic operations and the transcendental unity of 
apperception, a relation which also both constitutes the last containment of 
space by time, and can be read - given a certain reading of the status of the 
transcendental unity of apperception - as the point at which the hierarchy of 
the sequence of receptors and transformers internal to the faculties, rather 
than being necessitated by any necessary terminal point, is transformed into a 
self-affecting loop of ~anent processes. 
Kant defines synthesis as a power of combination, a further quanta or 
representation ensconced within the qualitatively interior activity of the 
mind: (B131) 
"the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold ••• within the 
self-activity of the subject' • 
This is the first time that mental processes have explicitly been identified 
with the activity of the formal subject, and thereby involved in the 
integrated structure of the hierarchy of the faculties. Kant maintains that 
the a priori faculty of combination is proper to the understanding but is only 
effected in synthesis in relation to the imagination, so the synthetic 
operation proper to intuition appears to be only indirectly regulated i.e 
regulated only in so far as it is necessarily drawn up into the synthetic 
operation proper to the imagination. Kant attempts to achieve similar 
necessary inclusions of the representations of base faculties in 'high' 
faculties throughout the first critique with the use of what I would call a 
'recursive transcendent operation'. Each of the base faculties has both an 
empirical employment/contents and a pure or intellectual fonn/employment which 
connects it with the understanding, in which the pure forms can themselves 
become contents or representations as concepts. Each base faculty thus 
transcends itself in so far as it has a pure fonn/employment and connects 
necessarily with a higher faculty.[32] Thus the empirical element of the 
faculty can be described as conditioned by the transcendental element - pure 
form - of that faculty as well as by the form of the operations of the faculty 
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above it. Kant's general strategy here is to posit the p.n-e fonns of the 
base faculties as necessary links of dependency from the lower faculties and 
their manifold content to the regulating functions of the higher faculties. 
This 'transcendent operation' can be said to create the hierarchy of the 
faculties in so far as its effect is to connect pure fonns and intellectual 
employment (i.e include pure forms in the understanding), and inversely 
exclude direct connection between the quanta of representations as sensations 
and the understanding. Yet this operation consists solely of repeating the 
minimal distinctions already manifest in the base faculties between form and 
content. Can this simple recursive distinction necessarily effect the 
hierarchisation of the faculties which is set as its task? 
This operation is aided by the concept of transcendental unities in general 
(which I would argue is in its deployment little different from a 
transcendental idea ot reason). We have noted above [33] that Kant states 
that the unity of the form of intuition (time) and its minimally 
differentiated content - formal intuition (space) - presupposed the forms of 
the transcendental subject and object. Kant now argues that the unity of 
fonnal intuition thereby depends on the syntheses of the understanding and 
thus on the understanding's spontaneous act of transcendental imagination; 
which itself is evidence of a transcendental unity of apperception. The 
relations between intuitions and the transcendental unity of apperception and 
between appearances and a transcendental object, are necessitated, Kant 
argues, by the transcendental law that representations obey the 
understanding's a priori rules of synthetical unity. 
Transcendental unities would escape this problem of the circularity of their 
own presuppositions if they were properly transcendent and detached from the 
operations they performed; but the distinction between the transcendent and 
the transcendental emphasises that transcendental unities are inmanent to the 
field of possible experience, thus only further sequences within the 
understanding's "synthetic unity of appearances in accordance with concepts". 
This furnishes us with a definition of a 'transcendental ground'; it is a 
transcendent operation drawn back into the inmanent processes of thought. The 
circularity of their presuppositions damages the (transcendental) status of 
these unities, concepts and the understanding; accordance is impossible when 
-104-
each is only arbitrarily distinguished from the circular processes of 
representations as quanta. Even Kant admits that the transcendental unities 
do presuppose a loop or circularity of presuppositions; but for him this does 
not affect the unilateral dependences of the base faculties on them, because 
the loop is necessary - all possible appearances relate to an original 
apperception in which, Kant states, everything must confonn to the unity of 
self-consciousness. (Al12) Kant does not ask whether his unities and 
operations are necessary; for him a function or a process that does not zoom 
in on the base unit of One would be simply inconceivable, a zero or type of 
nothing [34]. 
Thus, for Kant, inner sense and empirical apperception are connected to 
'original apperception' and its transcendental unity of apperception. Such a 
connection encloses the mind-machine within itself, between empirical and 
transcendental apperception. Kant can argue for the existence of an 'original 
apperception' and a transcendental unity of apperception, despite the almost 
viral growth of the number of relations between faculties, because of the 
general perceived unilateral orientation amidst these relations. For the 
same reason, however, we can state that original apperception and the 
transcendental unity of apperception must be included in the immanent 
processes of the mind-machine. The term 'original' is to be understood in 
terms of the definition of unity Lmplied by Kant's deduction of transcendental 
apperception: 
"All necessity without exception is grounded in a transcendental 
condi tion. There mus t be a transcendental ground of the unity of 
consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions •• of 
the concepts of objects in general •• of all objects of experience, a 
ground without which it would be impossible to think any object for our 
intuitions; for this object is no more than that something, the concept 
of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis" • (Al06-7) 
Kant calls this original and transcendental condition "numerically 
identical ••• pure, original, unchangeable consciousness •• transcendental 
apperception", and opposes its nunerical identity and unity to the manifold 
representations to be found in the flux of inner sense, which includes the 
unity of pure apperception i.e the spontaneous act of self-consciousness, the 
representation 'I think'. (Al16-7) Thus even the unity of pure apperception 
depends on a transcendental unity of apperception and its power of (B133) 
"original combination". Transcendental apperception is less an act than a 
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representation; from this we can infer that the transcendental tmity of 
apperception is, as a representation, s~ly another quantum, but a quantity 
which is also a numerical identity or unity. The term 'origin' here denotes 
the unity of the One, the unity of the tmit; the unit which measures 
quantities or the number which constitutes numbers. The problem with the 
container-set theory of representations, syntheses and tmities is that the 
unit is not a set of manifold representations, but the unit of their 
measurement. Thus original apperception and transcendental tmity can be 
conceived as irrmanent to the mind-machine, as its measuring tmits. 
Kant conceals the import of this definition and presents the transcendental 
affinity of representations to this tmit as the influence of that tmit, from 
the point in space at which sequences of representations stop. The tmit is 
also the measure of a complete sequence, that is it is also a totality and a 
maximum. Kant describes all possible representations as 'belonging' to the 
totality of a possible self-consciousness (A113-4), yet presents this 
transcendental affinity as if it were not already immanent to those processes 
of synthesis and representations; it has to be conferred by the tmderstanding 
[35]. The tmderstanding is the regulator of the law of the transcendental 
tmity of apperception, a law which Kant imposes needlessly (in terms of the 
description of mental processes as Lmmanent) , and thereby creates a spurious 
hierarchical order in mental processes. In the Lmmanent processes of thought, 
convergence is not the product of the order of the faculties, but is simply a 
further episode of the recursive operation immanent in representations as 
quanta and the effect of their interaction. In the Lmmanent processes of 
thought, representations and their forms are quanta, and the differences 
between operations within and across faculties is purely quantative or scalar 
the same operation replicates itself at different magnitooes of 
representation. We could even describe 'tmities' and forms as residual or 
redundant aggregates' or composites, crystallisations within the fluxes of 
representations, effects of the habitual movement of representations - but 
certainly neither lawgivers nor regulators of those flows. Such 
crystallisations are themselves inherently open to change as the affective 
representations change, and as the energetic environment of their stimuli 
changes. The tmities and their transcendental orientations are merely second 
order descriptions of the recursive sequences of representations as quanta. 
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If transcendental unity can be conceived as immanent to intellectual processes 
we must differentiate it from Kant's designation of the transcendental. I 
suggest referring to it as a transcendental operation. This also marks its 
minimal difference from the transcendent operations which the rational sense 
of critique exposes. Deleuze and Guattari's What is Philosophy succinctly 
defines the complexities of Kant's attempt to utilise critique and preserve 
transcendence with his notion of the transcendental: [36] 
"Kant ca~ls. the subj~t transcend~tal and not transcendent, precisely 
because l.t l.S the subject of the fl.eld of all possible experience which 
nothing can escape, the exterior as much as the interior.' Kant 
challenges all transcendent use of the syntheses but he adds immanence 
to the subject of synthesis as a new unity, a subjective tmity. He even 
allows himself the luxury of denouncing Transcendent Ideas in order to 
make of them the 'horizon' of the inmanent field of the subject. In 
doing this Kant discovers the modern way of saving transcendence: it is 
no longer the transcendence of Something or of a One superior to all 
things (contemplation) but that of a Subject to which the field of 
immanence cannot be attributed without also belonging to an ego which 
necessarily represents to itself such a subject (reflection)." 
Our critical reading which seeks to expose the strategies of containment which 
are applied to the flows of time by the superimposi tion of a 
characteristically Idealist sense of space must take account of the processes 
of the transcendental synthesis of imagination, by which the passive subject 
is represented to the spontaneous 'I' of the understanding. This pulsing 'I' 
produces a series of representations of the ' I' (which is a content of 
intuition), in confonnity with time as the form of inner sense. (B159) In 
this synthesis time as succession is inscribed within motion in space, and 
time's continuity - that is, its spatial divisibility - helps produce the 
requisite representation of the subject as a manifold of intuition. Kant 
identifies the necessity of the transcendental synthesis of imagination with 
the necessary inscriptive nature of all representations of change and process, 
in which successions in time are necessarily represented as motions in space: 
(B155) 
''We cannot think a line without drawing it in thought ••• Even time itself 
we cannot represent save in so far as we attend in the drawing of a 
straight line (which has to serve as the outer figurative representation 
of time), merely to the act of the synthesis of the ~ifold whereby we 
successively determine inner sense, and in so do~ attend to the 
succession of this determination in inner sense. Motl.on, as an act of 
the subject •• and therefore the synthesis of the manifold in space, ~irst 
produces the concept of succession - if we abstract from this manl.fold 
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and at~end so~ely to the act through which we determine the inner sense 
~ccord~ng to 1t
h
s form.
b
" The understanding does not, therefore, find in 
7nner sense suc a com 1nation of the manifold, but produces it, in that 
1t affects that sense". 
Kant extends the necessity of the spatialisation of time for all 
representations of alteration or change, not just the alterations of 
subjectivity. (8156) He does not consider the necessary analogy of time as 
space to be restrictive; he is more concerned with the fact that an emphasis 
on outer sense and space defends him from the charge of idealism. Kant 
argues this in the section on the refutation of the charge of idealism (8275-
279) and in the 'Postulates of Empirical Thought section' (A227-235 8279-294). 
For Kant, time is as we have noted [37] the permanent form of inner intuition; 
the concept of permanence is exclusively linked to the concept of substance, 
which itself depends on the form of outer intuition in space. Thus he cannot 
be accused of idealism, when he is so wantonly engaged in 'transcendental 
empiricism'! Permanence is an attribute of space not time: 
"For space alone is determined as permanent while time and therefore 
everything that is in inner sense is in constant flux" (8291). 
Kant even domesticates the flux of time by associating it with alteration 
rather than change - because alteration like motion is a rearrangement of 
permanent space (B292) rather than a dissolution of entities or energies. 
This notion of alteration is expanded in Kant's work on Physics, which is 
Newtonian in orientation.[38] Kant uses the notion of spatial alteration in 
relation to time as a foil to the dissipative chaos of time's flux; by 
extension the concepts of unity and community - as they are applied to time -
are also part of this domestication. [39] 
Kant's account of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is a good 
example of the extent to which mental processes characterised by time are 
subjected to a spatial overcoding. This account is as close to describing the 
pure processes of representation-as-quanta as Kant gets. It is interesting to 
note that the Kantian revisionists, Deleuze and Guattari, use a revaluation of 
the three modes of this synthesis as a framework for their critique of Kantian 
culture. It is certainly true that the operations of this synthesis do not 
require the hierarchy of the faculties to which Kant restricts them in order 
to flow and operate (A97-Al04). 
The first synthetic operation is the connective synthesis of apprehension in 
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intuition, in which a series of impressions is intuited in sequence. This 
synthetic operation distinguishes the "absolute unity" (A99) of each 
impression in the series of impressions, given that "it is contained in a 
single moment". This equation of a unit of time and a unit of space (1=1) is 
a radical element in Kant's account, with its suggestion that unity itself is 
simply a coordination of units of space and time, the full import of which 
will only become apparent in Bataille's work on the planes of transcendence 1n 
relation to the zero of irnmanence.[40] 
The second synthetic operation rescues unity from this simple dependence on 
coordinates of space and time, and returns it to the idealist idiom of 
transcendent spatial containers or unities. The sequence of impressions is 
"run through and held together" in a single representation of the manifold of 
intuition. This synthesis acts as a kind of memory which renders minimal 
the difference between the coexistence and the sequence of representations. 
It connects one representation with another in a reserve in which the 
preceding representations are reproduced as the mind advances to the next 
representation. 
The third synthetic operation is essentially rational (Al03-4) and fulfills 
the requirement that the manifold of the representation be transformed from a 
succession/sequence into an addition, a total or concept. The concept then 
functions as the consciousness of the unity of the complete synthesis. 
Deleuze and Guattari' s account in Anti-Oedipus[41] of the syntheses of 
desiring production inflects this Kantian schema of synthesis; they generalise 
the model of desire, as Kant defines it, and interpret it as primary to the 
self-affecting loops of desire- (rather than mind-) machines. They do not 
think that the machinics of process need be defined in terms of htnnan 
knowledge processes. Thus they can be said to liberate powers of synthesis 
from the restrictions placed on them by the mind-machine and its hierarchies, 
and might be said to liberate the free flows of time from their spatial 
containers. However they approach their task as an extension of the critical 
enterprise and sLmply seek to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate uses of 
those powers of synthesis. This critical endeavour, although central to the 
form of the Critiques, remains foreign to the Kantian general idealist 
topography which Bataille employs and which snags on the 'general economy' 
which shares attributes with Deleuze and Guattari's legitimated energetics. 
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Bataille would surely consider the critical designation of legitimate and 
illegitimate uses of powers to be a rationalisation of energy which has one 
mode only, although this is not to say that this critical distinction is not 
implicit in everything he wrote, if one wishes to interpret it fran the 
perspective of a second order servile consciousness. 
Deleuze and Guattari are useful Kantian revisionists; we could use them to 
define the transcendent operation which we have noted so often in the 
preceding pages [42]; we could even follow their extrapolation of the use of 
the transcendent operation in the Kantian culture of capital. [43] But 
Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with an intensification of the Kantian 
notion of critique; by which I mean that they re-run the critical mechanism in 
the light of the l~itlessness proper to the scale of intensive degrees and 
attenuate the transcendent resonances which stick to Kant's use of 
transcendental tenns such as 'transcendental' and 'unity'. They redraw the 
critical machine as distributed in an unhierarchised space, a space proper to 
the distribution of intensive quanta. This is still transcendental philosophy 
- even if it is called 'transcendental empiricism'. Compared to the 
iconoclastic jargon debauches of Bataille, who thereby distances ~self fran 
philosophy as such, Deleuze and Guattari' s attempts to innervate Kantianism 
are the acts of scholastics seducing schoolboys with smutty readings of 
classic texts. Deleuze and Guattari' s revaluation of critique is very 
different in tone from Bataille' s post-critical interest in the effects of 
such a revaluation (the critical basis of which remains implicit in his work). 
Bataille can still articulate general thetic schemas or charts - including the 
space-t~e fusion of intensive or energetic differentiation in general 
economy; it is just that he also admits to the exceeding and ruination of such 
schemas in the very extreme sensations which are thereby charted. 
Deleuze and Guattari 'hope to bring a corrective balance into the traditional 
Idealist picture with considerations of intensity, scale and improbability. 
This is still philosophy, and must end up privileging one redundant degree 
(the human) out of all proportion to its status on the scale of intensive 
quantities. They open up philosophical economies through the reappraisal of 
intensive scales of differentiation and thereby interface philosophy and the 
hereto repressed sense of time as uni-directional. But the latter is still 
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articulated in terms of its rationalisation, in terms of philosophy. Perhaps 
philosophy is incapable of not reducing time, putting it to work to its own 
constructive or intensive purposes (although intensity has a privileged 
attributive relation to time at a physiological and psychological level). 
This is true for Deleuze and Guattari as much as Kant; it takes a non-
philosopher to panic at time and feel its intensity. At least Oeleuze and 
Guattari are adamant about the interests they serve. In What is Philosophy 
they admit to chasing a definition of philosophical time and identify it with 
a time of layers and co-existence which is excessively Kantian, stretching and 
complicating the sense of topography which he originated: (QP58) 
'This is a stratigraphical time where the before and the after only 
indicate an order of superimpositions ••••• philosophical time is a 
grandiose time of coexistence which does not exclude the before and the 
after but superimposes them in a stratographic order •• Philosophy is 
becoming not history: it is the coexistence of planes rather than the 
succession of systems". 
Let us now turn our attention to the claims of intensity, as they appear in 
Kant and are given centre stage in Oeleuze and Guattari. Can philosophy even 
turn intensity into one of its territories and render Bataille's scream that 
"Intensity alone matters" OCS, conceptually valid? 
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Chapter Four: KANT - SENSATIONS AND INTENSITIES 
Time and magnitudes 
The difference between Bataille' s and Kant's conceptions of time and the 
effects of time is linked to a series of Kantian terms which Bataille also 
deploys in an altered state: space and unity, but also limit, continuity, 
intensity, infinity/the indefinite. As we have seen with regard to time, 
Kant's definitions of such terms is marked by a restriction of their sense to 
a specific application; thereby Kant delimits a rational realm of the mind and 
its relaying hierarchical processes. We have already noted the primary 
functions imported from the attributes of a specific notion of space in this 
delimitation of the processes of the mind. I now want to account for these 
terms which challenge the orientation of time to this conception of spatial 
unity. It is the nature of the map of processes of 'becoming' in general 
which changes when these terms are liberated by the explosion of the mindscape 
of their Kantian context. 
It is in the • Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' section 
that Kant first discusses intensity. Kant has already shown that time is a 
condition of the manifold of inner sense and itself transcendentally 
determined as an a priori manifold of pure intuition by the concepts of the 
Wlderstanding. Now that sensibility's necessary relation to the pure 
imagination and the higher faculty of the understanding has been shown, Kant 
can formulate this relation as reciprocal by emphasising the integration of 
the understanding in the formal conditions of sensibility. He argues that 
every concept entails a 'schema', that is an image (A140 6180) of its formal 
condition in sensibility. The schemata of the categories include the schema 
of magnittxie or nllDber, which Kant defines as "the successive addition of 
homogeneous units" (A142 8182). It is no surprise to find Kant orienting 
number around the restricted value of time i.e around the synthetic unity of 
time, rather than stressing numerical and temporal multiplicity. Kant argues 
that nunber is necessarily linked to the synthetic unity of time because a 
given number is generated through the successive addition of a unit-number in 
intuition: "due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of the 
intuition" of the successive addition of a unit-nunber. For Kant then, a 
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number is a succession or series of degrees attesting to the unity of a unit-
number; a given number correlates with the degree of an intentional act within 
the synthetic unity of the time of intuition. I will argue that the 
identification of magnitude with the idea of a unit-number, and the relation 
of both to the synthetic unity of the time of intuition is problematic; an 
alternative approach is identifiable from Kant's remarks on intensive 
magnitude, from which we can only conclude that neither number nor time are 
exclusively tied to the time of intuition. Kant will continually attempt to 
disavow the diSjunction between magnitude and the unit-number of a time proper 
to intuition and the hierarchy of the faculties. 
The difference between the two conceptions of number can usefully be related 
to the transcendent and immanent descriptions of the Kantian mental processes 
which I have already considered. I argued above [1] that Kant's text applied 
a transcendent operation to the mental processes as even when unities were 
called transcendental Kant wanted them to appear qualitatively different from 
the quanta which they regulated. I associated this transcendence with the 
unity of apperception, which is itself simply a transcendent base number, the 
One which is associated with both unity and unit. The lDlit functions as a 
unit of measurement and produces measurements which are degrees in relation to 
this presupposed number. The unit thus presupposes the difference between one 
given dimension of the enumeration of quanta as units and the transcendent and 
unconditioned dimension of the unit, unity or principle which perfonns this 
enumeration. For Kant time is denumerable in such a manner; he will go on to 
suggest that intensity and continuity are too. 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest an alternative to this transcendent orientation 
of numbers.[2] This involves conceiving numbers themselves as substantives, 
as l1lJltiplicities which are distributed in a movement of "autOIlOOIOUS 
ari~tic organisation" (TP389) in a space of n dimensions, i.e in a space in 
which changes in nunbers or degrees (or ' events' ) equal changes in the 
directions of motion of 'events', because numbers are less measurements 
(magnitudes as units) than the distances and duration across which numbers as 
degrees or 'events' are transformed into other numbers. As Deleuze and 
Guattari put it: 'The number is no longer a means of counting or measuring but 
of moving" (TP389). 
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For Deleuze and Guattari the nunber as rultiplicity is related to the image of 
thought as nultiplicity which they call the rhizome and in which unity, the 
unique uni t of One, is transfonned into one nunber among many such virtual 
nultiplicities, rather than being subtracted as a precondition of units of 
measurement. The rhizome lacks the supplementary dimension needed for 
transcendent overcoding because it is not composed of units and their 
necessary unity, wt of differentiating "directions in motion" (TP21) which 
are themselves "varieties of measureoent": 
'~e nunber is no longer a universal concept measuring elements 
according to their emplacement in a given division, but has itself 
become a multiplicity that varies according to the dimensions considered 
(the primacy of the domain over a complex of nunbers attached to that 
domain.) We do not have units of measure, only rultiplicities or 
varieties of measurement. The notion of unity appears only when there 
is a power takeover in the multiplicity •••• Unity always operates in an 
empty dimension supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding)tt(TP8-9). 
Number as degree is an event in the fusional space-time proper to the mapping 
of intensive energetic movements. We will see later how such movements 
interrupt Kant's account of intensity and how they ultimately inform 
Bataille's account of the temporal energetic differentiations of general 
economy. [3] 
For Kant, the schema of reality of every represented object which has a 
determinate place in time entails a given degree of sensation; thus the quanta 
of every sensation is a magnitooe. Magnitlkies' fill' a specific time to a 
specific degree - that is their event - and time in general to different 
degrees; but thereby they are degrees related to the base unit of One. Kant 
can only conceive of changes of degree (and time) in relation to that base 
unit. He concentrates on the restricted change brought about by the 
continuity - or infinite divisibility - of every degree and of the 'whole' of 
time in general. He is unwilling to consider a form of mlDber or degree which 
threatens the Wlity of apperception: 
''Now every sensation has a degree or magnitooe whereby in re~pect of ~ts 
representation of an object otherwise remaining the same, lt can flll 
out one and the same time, that is, occupy inner sense ~re or less 
canpletely, down to its cessation in nothingness (-<>-negatlo). There 
therefore exists a relation and connection between reality and negation, 
or rather a transition from the one to the other which makes every 
reality representable as a quantum" (A143 8182-3). 
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Kant countenances zero only to defer it with the notion of the continuity of 
time and magnitude in a given reality - of the "continuous and tmiform 
production" of that reality; and with the notion of the continuity or infinite 
divisibility of that reality as a degree in the 'full time' proper to it. 
The transformation of reality into negation pranised in the passage is a 
horizon event the import of which Kant cannot cotmtenance because of the form 
of the unit which proceeds fran One. The approach of zero is indefinitely 
rerouted through the division of each given degree of reality into further 
degrees which are themselves oriented to the base unit One. (4] This 
operation is possible - as are all other Kantian mind-operations - because of 
the difference between the quantities proper to sensation and the qualitative 
nature of apperception. This difference is thematised by Kant's distinction 
between the schemata of magnitude and quality: magnitude is "the generation of 
time itself in the successive apprehension of an object" whereas quality is 
"the synthesis of sensation or perception with the representation of time 
(i.e] the filling of time." Kant's distinction between quantity and quality 
is typically perverse; as both appear as looping presuppositions of each other 
one is tempted to state that their qualitative opposition must be false. We 
have noted the way that the operations of the mind-mechanism can be reduced to 
the level of the recursive fluctuations of representations as quanta. 'Thus 
the difference between quantity and quality - that is between sensation and 
apperception - can be called internal to the 'problematic' of quantity i.e to 
the problem of how quanta can be described as changing in time. This is a 
problem which the alternative notion of number-as-nJJltiplicity hegins to 
tmravel. [5] Kant, of course, is adamant that quantity and quality are 
distinct in the synthetic generation of time in subjective experience. This 
allows him to render magnitude or quantity dependent on the quality of the 
coding maher, the original unit, One, and its simple numbering operation. 
Thus magnitude is related to the professedly qualitative processes of 
synthetic subjective 'experience and numbers or manifold units are related to 
the qualitative unity or One of apperception. 
Kant argues that magnitudes are implicated by their structure in the a priori 
fOIm of inner sense - time - and thus necessarily in the process and 
anticipated unity of synthetic judgement, with its necessary unity of 
apperception. (A154 B193) He defines the concept of a magnitude in general as 
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(A162 8203) 
"consciousness of the synthetic unity of the manifold and hanogeneous in 
intuition in general [br. means of which] the representation of an object 
first becomes possible. ' 
Every appearance is, - if it depends on intuition - an extensive magnitlXie 
because appearances are intuited as the successive syntheses of magnitudes i.e 
because in every intuition space and time are the magnitlXies - the line of 
successive points and the sequence of the series of moments - which are 
overcoded by the exclusive synthetic unity of the original unit of One. 
In the 'Anticipations of Perception' section Kant distinguishes extensive and 
intensive magnitlXies. Intensive magnitudes are so-called because they are 
quantities unrelated to the extensive intuitions of space or time, but sLnply 
mark the registering of a sensational affect in consciousness. Kant states 
(A166 8207-8) that the real - insofar as it 1s an object of sensation - has a 
degree or intensive magnitude; that is, all appearances have intensive 
magnitudes and a corresponding effect on the faculty of sensation. Intensive 
magnitudes are the product of the affecting of sensation by intense 
appearances. Kant argues, unconvincingly, that intensive magnitudes 
anticipate perception and the operations effected by the hierarchy of the 
faculties, even though sensations are merely "subjective representations" 
which "give us only the consciousness that the subject is affected and which 
we relate to an object in general." Here, Kant is arguing that in sensations 
without intuition, the notion of an object in general is still incurred; and 
it is this notion which drags sensation into the hierarchy of the faculties. 
The "real in sensation" (which as the 'real' is, for Kant, already opposed to 
negation-O and therefore oriented around a base unit) presupposes the figure 
of the a priori schema of reality (the transcendental object which fUB:.tions 
as the boundary or base unit of experience in the same way as the 
transcendental subject does [6]). Thus the intensive magnitude of sensation 
is implicated in the extensive synthesis of perception. But the relation of 
sensation to the transcendental object occurs in intuition and independently 
of sensation; Kant's description of its action as an anticipation of 
perception is purely hypothetical. Kant even admits this, in stating that 
sensation is independent of a priori knowledge; (A167 8209) 
"sensation is just that element which cannot be anticipated". 
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Sensation is both excluded from and included in the faculties, and thus Kant 
cannot account for the difference between extensive and intensive magnitudes 
or between the higher faculties and sensation without exacerbating the affect 
of sensation and its intensities on the hierarchy of the faculties.[7] Given 
its problematic epistemological status, might sensation not be capable of a 
redrawing of the complete hierarchy and its operations? It is possible that 
extensive degrees are simply intensive degrees overcoded by the base unit 
associated with the unity of apperception. It is possible that this account 
of the sensational intensive degrees of intellectual events would account for 
fluctuations of degree and change in general in a more precise manner. It 
is possible that the noumenon (with which sensation shares its epistemological 
status), rather than the transcendental object, is the object proper to 
sensation; that is, an object which is the massive radiation of intensive 
energies which come to affect the subject as sensation. [8] 
The notion of intensive magnitude affords insight into the changes wrought by 
time, which the Kantian schema itself cannot supply. Ultimately, Bataille's 
account of annihilatory time can - as we shall see - be rationalised as 
providing such information.[9] Intensity also reconfigures the Kantian idea 
of community as the distribution of intensities on the grid supplied by the 
fusion of time and space.[10] Kant, however, is intent on reducing the impact 
of intensity on his rational schema. He achieves this by associating it with 
restricted - enclosed spatial - notions of alteration and continuity. 
For Kant, extensive magnitudes are the units of measurement (of space and time 
as points and lines) proper to intuition. Intensive magnitudes are the 
degrees of sensation, which is characterised by its fluctuations and changes. 
Yet Kant can only describe these changes in terms of the alteration and 
divisibility proper to spatial enclosures, in which divisions are smaller 
units which are still related to their specific magnitude as its fractions, 
and thus to the One as their ordinal nunber. Thus intensi ve magnitudes 
analogically share the dependence of extensive magnitudes on the base unit of 
the ordinal transition or moment of pure consciousness in which the difference 
between zero and one is elided. Kant states that sensation can fluctuate to 
zero, but gives us no account of how that is possible. He ignores the impact 
of the intensive nature of change in sensation - after designating it - and 
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attempts to use sensation to consolidate the hold of a pure consciousness on 
given magnitooes of representation. He does not infer the full effect of his 
own notion of the difference between positive magnitlkies as units issuing from 
the zero (-1) of pure consciousness and positive magnitudes of an intensive 
zero. [11] His emphasis reduces the values of degree in general to the fixed 
value of a unit of measurement (even of sensation), a unit overc.oded 
(Lnplicitly) by the moment of pure consciousness.[12] 
Kant attenpts what is merely hypothetical - the implication of intensity in 
the time and space foreign to sensation - by introducing the concept of the 
quality of continuity. Kant demands that there be continuity of degrees and 
continuity of the fractions of those degrees in intensive magnitudes. On the 
one hand this adds to the "profoundly schizoid" (A019) picture of intensities 
as seething positive quanta (AlG8 8210); on the other hand Kant's agenda in 
outlawing any absence of sensation is to outlaw the possible threat of 
interference to his procedures posed by the 'emptiness' which he associates 
with the zero intensity of noumenal nothingness: 
"Between reality in the field of appearance and negation there is a 
continuity of many possible intermediate sensations, the difference 
between any two of which is always smaller than the difference between 
the given sensation and zero or complete negation. In other words the 
real in the field of appearance has always a magnitude". 
This continuity is little different fran the divisibility of the units of 
measurement which we noticed in extensive magnitudes.[13] Continuity defers 
change with its orientation to the base unit of one; the value of change being 
presnt in the quote as complete negation. With regard to intensive magnitudes 
Kant's definition of continuity as (Al70 8211) "the property of magnitudes by 
which no part of them is the smallest possible •• by which no part is sLnple" 
emphasises the division of a unified measured magnitude rather than its mode 
of transition. It is no surprise to find Kant concluding that all magnitudes, 
extensive as well as intensive are continuous, and characterising continuity 
in terms of the points and instants, "positions" and limits in space and time, 
descriptions straight out of the descriptions of the forms of intuition in the 
'Transcendental Aesthetic.' At the same time Kant has the gall to call 
continuous magnitudes 'flowing magnitudes' since all such magnitudes are 
intuited in time: 
-118-" 
"and the continuity of time is ordinarily designated by the tenn flowing 
or flowing away". 
Thus Kant presents us with 'flowing magnitudes' of intensity, but only as 
supplements to the pennanence of the extensive. From this Kant concludes 
that even at the level of the universe there is no diminution or fluctuation 
in extensive magnitude. He argues that alteration or difference only occur at 
the level of degree, at the level of the fluctuations and gradations of 
intensive magnitude. From this passage: 
"Intensive magnitude can in different appearances be smaller or greater, 
altho~h the extensive magnitude of the intuition remains one and the 
same"(A173 8214), 
Kant extrapolates the thesis that matter in general subsists and that only 
heat and radiation fluctuate. Kant's brief flip into a personalised 
Newtonian physics is liberating because it presents us with an account of 
intensities which is untainted by the restrictions of inner sense. 
Unfortunately the rest of the critique sets about reorienting fluctuations and 
alteration around inner s~nse and the spatial constructions of ttme which we 
encountered inte~inably in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. [14] 
At the level of the physical universe as well as at the level of 
transcendental philosophy Kant divorces intensity fran matter, which is a 
mistake as common as the distinction between quantity and quality. But the 
fate of this latter distinction in the section we have been reading is 
premonitory of the abortion of transcendental philosophy to come: quality 
melted down into the intensive quanta (the fluctuating degrees) inmanent to 
the extensive quanta of a representational matter which fills and intensifies 
its given space. We should not be surprised if this intensification of the 
Kantian topography inevitably leads to its explosion. Bataille will 
conclude this era of philosophy by fusing intensity with matter in general and 
allowing it to diminish to zero in the energetic dispersal of space-time. 
A revisionist Kant 
We have seen that Kant orients conceptions of intensity and continuity around 
his notion of time as inner sense i.e around Wlits of inherently spatial 
measurement, around nunbers coded by One. Given Kant' s strategy we have 
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inferred that at a textual level intensity and continuity are only defined 
negatively, i.e in terms of what they are not and against what they are not. 
So what are they and how do these positive definitions relate to the post-
critical attributes of Bataille' thought? These problems can best be 
approached through an analysis of the revisionist Kantian Idealist energetic 
schemas of Deleuze and Guattari. They best define the terms which the novum 
of Bataille's thought uses and dissolves in its direct revaluation of critical 
philosophy through the values of energetic sensation. This critical meltdown 
occurs in Kant's critical project itself - in the Critique of Judgement; and 
Bataille's accounts of impersonal energy and intensive sensation owe more to 
the Kant of hysterical aesthetic judgement than to the Idealist principles of 
space-time, intensity and continuity - the rational 'principles' which 
'condition' his accounts - as Deleuze and Guattari calmly articulate them. 
We saw above [15] that unities themselves can be considered as parts which do 
not unify or overcode other parts but exist with those parts in a spatium of n 
dimensions. [16] We saw how a nunber itself might be considered as a 
multiplicity, as a substantive variety of measurement rather than as a unit of 
measurement. Now we shall see how these notions might feed into more positive 
notions of both continuity and intensity, definitions which tackle the central 
question of the transition between degrees or change in general. 
In his brief excursus into physics at the end of the 'Anticipations of 
Perception' section Kant posited a theory of intense matter as that which 
always fills space to given degrees of intensity. Kant is wrong to suggest 
that this theory emphasises the difference between matter as extension in 
space and intensity. It is rather a question of 'matter-energy'; or a system 
in which space is only occupied to an intensive degree. This links up with 
our earlier questions as to what 'realm' or 'coomunity' was proper to nunbers 
considered as multiplicities, and what principle was proper to their 
distribution. Not that intensities are nllDbers per se but that both nunbers 
and intensities share the attributes of substantive multiplicities; not that 
nunbers and intensive matter are distributed together, but that their 
different distributions can be mapped out using a single matrix. 
Deleuze and Guattari call this intense matter, in so far as it is perceived 
pulsing in the Schizophrenic's desiring-production, 'the body without organs' 
(BwO) : 
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'The BwO causes intensities to pass: it produces and distributes then in 
a 'spatiuu' that is itself intensive, lacking extension. It [M] is 
n~t space, nor is it in space: it is matter that occupies space to a 
g1v7n deg;ee - to the degree corresponding to the intensities produced. 
It 1.S ••• 1ntense matter, the matrix of intensity, intensity=O" (TP153) 
Throughout Anti-Oedipus and Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari supertmpose 
the distributions of varieties of multiplicities on this basic map of an 
intensive spatium. These varieties of mUltiplicities share certain 
attributes that the authors associate with intensity rather than extension, 
which is linked to units of measurement. The most important and novel 
attribute of the varieties of multiplicities they choose is that of continuous 
variation, or the continuity proper to multiplicities. One problem with zero 
as matrix of intensity - rather than One as unit of measurement - is that 
magnitudes are not fixed in relation to their base unit, but relative to other 
magnitudes; they are all differences above zero. Thus Deleuze and Guattari 
reanimate Meinong and Russell's distinction between constant magnitudes and 
fuzzy or "anexact yet rigourous" distances, the former relating to fixed 
magnitudes (magnitudes fixed in their dependence on a base unit) and the 
latter to intensive degrees in multiplicitous space (TP483): 
"[Distances] cannot divide without changing in nature each time: An 
intensity •• is not canposed of addable and displaceable magnitudes: a 
temperature is not the sun of two smaller temperatures, a speed is not 
the sum of 2 smaller speeds. Since each intensity is itself a 
difference, it divides according to an order in which each term of the 
division differs in nature from the others. Distance is a set of 
•• differences that are enveloped in one another in such a way that it is 
possible to judge which is larger or smaller but not their exact 
magnitudes ••• these multiplicities of 'distance' are inseparable from a 
process of continuous variation, whereas multiplicities of 'magnitude' 
distribute constants and variables." 
The principle of intensive continuity is not simply: "everything divides, bJt 
into itself" (A076) in an indefinite scalar involute. It is also a principle 
of continuous variation in which each intensity is "relatively indivisible" 
(TP30) i.e indivisible above or below a certain threshold (relative to other 
degrees into which above or below that threshold it is transformed). Where 
Kant's magnitudes were indivisible by other degrees yet fixed in relation to 
the base unit-1, intensive multiplicities divide into one another and thus 
change their dimensions and yet remain indivisible despite their tendential 
move towards intensive zero, which is not itself a base-unit of measurement. 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that the divisibility of units is proper to 
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discreet multiplicities or extensive magnitudes whereas continuous or 
intensive multiplicities contain magnitudes and dimensions which increase and 
thus change the nature of those multiplicities, adding dimensions and new 
possible canbinations of dimensions. Inevitably the question of the IOOst 
adequate mode of description of these multiplicities is posed and a change of 
scale deemed necessary - from the reflexi ve, philosophical and hunan to the 
level of the base communication of atomic particles. These continuous 
multiplicities are: 
"composed of particles that do not divide without changing in nature and 
distances that do not vary without entering another multiplicity and 
that constantly construct and dismantle themselves in the course of 
their communications, as they cross over into each other at, beyond or 
before a certain threshold. The elements of this kind of multiplicity 
are particles; their relations are distances; their movements are 
Brownian; their quantities are intensities." (TP33) 
The multi-dimensionality of intensive multiplicities presents us with a 
representational problem because its complexities are figuratively resolved in 
two distinct ways. Deleuze and Guattari continue to insist on presenting a 
spatial matrix or grid on which the movements and communications of particles/ 
multiplicities occur. They call it a 'plane of consistency' because even 
though its dLmensions proliferate as the connections between multiplicities on 
it increase, both plane and multiplicities occupy all of their dimensions, and 
Deleuze and Guattari argue, n dimensions is as good as flat! (TP9) 
They oppose this plane of consistency to the transcendent plane or dimension 
of overcoding, organization and development which was implicit in their 
account of transcendent operations. The plane of consistency on the other 
hand is: 
"a plane of proliferation, peopling, contagion; but this proliferation 
of material has nothing to do with an evolution, the development of a 
fo~ or the filiation of forms ••• It is on the contrary an involution, in 
which form is constantly being dissolved, freeing times and speeds ••• It 
is the absolute state of movement as well as of rest, from which all 
relative speeds and slownesses spring" (TP267). 
It might be argued that the difference between the matrix of the plane and its 
IlRJltiplicities cannot be simply quantative; thus this picture could be said to 
reintroduce the transcendent distinction between quantity and quality as 
content and structure. But the matrix is only a condition imnanent to the 
compositions and modifications which traverse it. Deleuze and Guattari are 
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the first to concede the difficulty of thinking the plane of consistency, but 
this difficulty is not due to any problematic difference between the two kinds 
of planes: 
"It is a question not of organisation but of cOOlpOsition: not of 
developnet}t or differentiation but of movement and rest speed and 
slowness [of elements and particles] •••• We must try to co~ive of this 
world in which a single fixed plane - a plane •• of absolute movement - is 
traversed by non-formal elements of relative speed that enter this or 
that individuated [composition] •• depending on their degrees of speed or 
slowness" (TP255). 
At this far side of transcendental philosophy notions of intensity and 
continuity which have been reoriented around their physical/biological 
origins, change the subject of stuiy. Principles of differentiation are no 
longer of any concern, and are relegated to the pile of enlightened idealist 
ideas. What is now of concern are speeds. Deleuze and Gua t tari def ine 
movement as motion of an object relative to two points, i.e as extensive, and 
define speed as intensive because it gives us the "absolute character" of a 
body for a period until that speed and body change. Thus the term 'absolute 
movement' in the passage above designates a consistency of speeds in terms of 
which speeds relative to each other are perceived (TP381). Speeds are 
perceived relative to other speeds only inso far as their limits are 
perceived, only insofar as the composition of speeds serving as the limit of 
that relation is perceived i.e only insofar as speeds or their elements are 
composed and changed on a plane of speed rather than movement We shall see 
that the relation between plane and speeds is best described as 'fractal', in 
the sense ~t they share compositional recursive formulae and only differ in 
terms of periods. Composition and speed are the two characteristics of the 
fuzzy aggregate 'intense matter'. Their fusion collapses two distinct 
effects: changes of state which arise on the 'spacetime' plane and intensive 
quanta as affects/ states. Thus intense matter can be seen as a fuzzy 
aggregate reorienting the traditional schema of fom and matter, as 
"a zone of medillD and intermediary dimension, of energetic, roolecular 
dimension - a space unto itself which deploys its materiality through 
matter" (TP409). 
It is worth considering the extent to which this conception reformulates or 
answers the manifold problems which we have associated with Kant's mechanisms 
of perception and apperception in the first critique. 
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My acccx.mt of those mechanisms emphasised the role of container sets and 
recursions and argued that Kant could not convincingly substantiate the claim 
that the faculties were qualitatively different from each other. I juxtaposed 
the explicit intentions of Kant's hierarchical map of the mind with a 
reorientation of that map around representations as quanta which I perceived 
as being channelled into several restrictive 'containers' in the course of 
their processing by the faculties. These containers are constructed in the 
presuppositions which are inherent in the forms of intuition: time and space 
qua forms are necessarily represented in spatial terms, the internalisation of 
time and space en tails a configuration of them as inner spaces. Thus it can 
be said that representations occupy space at the expense of any conception of 
time other than that of an adjunct to space, as that which can only be 
represented in space. 
I want to stress the fact that Deleuze and Guattari are involved in 'loosening 
up' these structures, intensifying and stretching them to the limits of their 
conception rather than destroying them; and that this preciousness 
distinguishes their work from Bataille's. In all the literature which I have 
researched Bataille's conception of time stands out as the foremost expression 
of the alternative to philosophical time (even if philosophical time - Deleuze 
and Guattari's 'stratigraphical time' distributing singularities and affects). 
This alternative is the apocalyptic and dissipative structure of time, time as 
energetic matter and its tendential dissolution. For Bataille, time IS the 
differentiation and destruction of intensive matter.[17] It is also true that 
Bataille prefigures many of the models and conclusions at which Deleuze and 
Guattari arrive i.e transcendent and inmanent planes of events in Inner 
Experience and Theory of religion, a concern with biology and physics in The 
accursed share and the College of Sociology papers, a concern with speeds and 
intensities in many literary and philosophical styles. [18] In all these 
cases the point of contact between writers is their Kantian terminology 
(linked to a Nietzschean sensibility [19]). Bataille's distinction remains 
his ability to escape academicization in the insanity of his picture of time 
and through the proliferation of fragmenting literary forms which he uses.[20] 
Deleuze and Guattari call their intensification and extension of the idea of 
the community of events traversing intensive space an involution, and we can 
trace the way this idea arises out of the mind machine models of the first 
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critique. At the same time this account of 'liberated' Kantianism is also 
informed by the basic arguments of meta-mathematics; thus we have an example 
which is symptomatic of the replacement of philosophical by mathematical logic 
in post-phenanenological philosophy. However, the implicit anthropocentric 
formalism of even such mathematical logic - that is, its rigour - can be 
distinguished from the hysterical value with which thennodynamics infonns 
Bataille's work. 
I argued before that recursions aoo container sets constituted the major 
functional forms of the mind machine in the first critique. Kant's object of 
critique is certain inferences from the Transcendental Ideas which assign a 
substantiality or content to the unity of the unconditioned which is 
presupposed by the series of conditions for any given knowledge. But the 
power of critique can be applied to the absolute unity which I have associated 
with those container sets. The critical point will not be, as Kant would have 
it, that this unity is purely formal (in the same way as is the unity of 
apperception) - we have exposed the invalidity of the distinction between form 
and content [21] - but that the inadequate size of this unity cannot but be 
felt. Any presupposed unconditioned unity is not big enough for the possible 
representations qua quanta and multiplicities which it is supposedly added to 
or contains. In other words the virtual influx of sensations is greater than 
the rational or possible series of representations which are processed in the 
hierarchy of the faculties. 
Our moves in this direction are similar to those of the meta-mathematical set 
theory oriented around the paradoxes of the Cantor set. The problems in set 
theory, like those in philosophy, occur at the extremes or limits of 
proposable sets where the forms of sets are themselves questioned, i.e where 
the possibility of self-referential sets poses questions about how sets work. 
It is here then that in set theory as in transcendental idealism machinics are 
reduced to one operation: the scalar replication of recursive sequences.[22] 
Recursion in meta-mathernatics entails the infinite proliferation of 
replications of a simple informational sequence (the form of the set) in the 
( " f . enunera tion of inf ini te numbers. AI though more a propos or our concerns 1S 
the biological or viral sense that such recursions occur within a unilateral 
flow of time.) Recursion in the enuneration of the infinite nunbers 
necessarily entails the set of transfinite numbers which constitute the Cantor 
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set.[23] In general the sequences of any base values or formulae may follow 
the same recursive rules and the skeleton of those base values be found nested 
in each section of a graphed account of that sequence. Thus replication 
necessarily involves canplexity. A graph of these base values and their 
recursive sequences would be made up of discontinuous bands of rational 
numbers and an infinity of sparsely distributed points or continued fractions 
which are the irrational nunbers of the Cantor set. The Cantor set is an open 
set of nunbers which are transfinite rather than infinite i.e inferred from 
but never included in the tabulation or enuneration of infinite numbers. In 
some ways this distinction can be associated with Kant's distinction between 
the indefinite and the infinite, although Kant will associate the indefinite 
with the impossibility of a series of conditions which has no unconditioned as 
a given member: "such an experience would have to contain a limitation of 
appearances by nothing, or by the void •• which is impossible" (AS17 8545).[24] 
There are more real and irrational nunbers than can be enunerated in the set 
of units or rational nunbers. Likewise there are more multiplicities than can 
be accanodated in the units of the container sets of unity in the first 
critique, and these excesses can be designated by the tenns 'void' and 
'nothing' • It is not only in a nunerical and virtual sense that continued 
fractions or Ollltiplicities are bigger than units and their divisions; or 
rather this virtual sense is designated by the energetic intensities 
associated with the 'negative' status of sensation and the nounenon, virtual 
intensities which Kant will not recognise. Just as continuous fractions are 
virtual and have a 'fuzzy' effect on the processes perceived in tenns of 
integers and units within which they are implied yet distinct, so sensation 
and the nounenon rwst be conceived as affecting the operations of the 
faculties. [25] What the Cantor set allows us to perceive is the possibility 
of 'objects' as ITllltiplicities of n dimensions, (although in fact these 
objects must remain intenneciiary and their dimensionality less than that of 
the phase-space which they occupy [26]) and the effects of these nounenal 
objects on the integrated enumerations of consciousness. 
It is important to demonstrate the connections between Deleuze and Guattari's 
work, meta-mathematics and science in order to distinguish it fran both Kant's 
architectonic idealist schemas and Bataille' s fragmented work in a similar 
physical science direction. 
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Kant restricts processes in terms of specific applications i.e to the mind and 
its relaying hierarchical processes. We have seen a revisionist Kantianism 
which calls itself transcendental empiricism open up these processes, inflect 
and reorient Kantian schema without explicitly attacking Kant's notion of 
threefold time. I argued that recursions and container sets constituted the 
major functional forms of the mind machine in the first critique and that the 
ability of these sets to function was called in question by a critical angle 
on the unity which they presuppose which cannot be big enough for the quanta 
traversing it. I have shown that Kant's text depends on a transcendent base 
counting/measuring nunber, the One of both unity and unit, which makes time 
and space dem .. merable. But the application of this schema to intensity 
suggests an alternative to this use of numbers, an alternative which involves 
conceiving numbers as substantives and multiplicities, and as inhabiting an 
intensive space. We have seen how Deleuze and Guattari's strategy here is 
to liberate the intensive zero from Kantian space-time. Where Kant 
emphasises the difference between matter as extension in space and intensity, 
they stress the equivalence of matter and energy which is distributed as 
singularities in this intensive space or community. I have now to show that 
the differences between transcendental empiricism and Bataille's base 
materialism are linked to his radical foregrounding of a conception of time as 
influence and infection, and as the virulent differentiation of matter, as 
announced by the harbinger of intensity - the noumenon - at the intensive 
limits of sensation; a conception of time altogether more aesthetic, 
'sensible' (and less reasonable) than Deleuze and Guattari's. Bataille thinks 
time as both an 'emotional subway' [27] (to use Ce1..ine's phrase) and as a 
thennodynamic element, and this time is an antidote to every philosophical 
(even stratigraphical) conception of time. 
Noumenon - the intensive limit 
We have seen that sensation and its intensive quanta are both included in and 
excluded by the hierarchy of the faculties [28]. Thus the possibility of 
their affecting that hierarchy must be given, and the exclusive sense which 
Kant gives the operations of the higher faculties must be attenuated. The 
implications of the leaking of sensation into the faculties will beccxne 
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apparent in the Critique of Judgement. However, I want to pre-erupt Kant's 
argument that in that text the influence of sensation is permissible because 
of the status of aesthetic judgement as inessential to the basic functions of 
the understanding; by showing that Kant has already not only accepted the 
necessary possibility of the affective object external to the faculties, but 
has given it pride of place within his rational schema. 
Kant counters the paradox of the limit - that the limit borders on an exterior 
- and the question it raises - of possible external influence - with the 
notion of limits internal to reason. He presents us with the image of an 
extensive field of measured knowledges which are constituted and united by the 
limit of the possible extent of knowledge based on One. We have already seen 
that Kant deploys limiting and limited processes in order to curb the 
pretensions of the understanding and construct the hierarchy of the faculties, 
and how this allows him to curb the power of critique and flirt wi th 
transcendent ideas. But .the essential limit-position in his rational schema 
is given to the negative aspect of the concept of the noumenon. The noumenon 
allows Kant to ask what the limits of thinking in general are; it should also 
allow him to register what sensational affects are problematically excluded 
and included as thinking approaches its limits. But Kant will only argue that 
the concept of the noumenon (A236-244 B295-302) determines the limit of the 
empirical employment of the understanding. Rather than allowing the noumenon 
its affective value as the quanta of sensation, Kant uses it as proof that 
A255 B310 "knowledge cannot extend its domain over everything which the 
understanding thinks. It This double delimitation of sensibility and the 
tmderstanding is supposed to cut them off from all possibility of external 
affection; these limits are exclusive, and thus the faculties are hermetically 
sealed from external influence: (A256 B312) 
'\hat our understanding acquires through this concept of a noumen~n~ is 
a negative extension; that is to say, understanding is not lllDl.ted 
through sensibility; on the contrary it itself limits sensibil~ty by 
applying the term noumena to things in themselves •••• But in so dOl.ng it 
at the same time sets limits to itself, recognising that it cannot know 
these noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore 
think them only under the title of an unknown sane thing" • 
Kant's achievement lies in turning the mutating process of the understanding 
back into a 'negative extension' of the field of knowledge. Kant is so sure 
of having consolidated the claim to the territory of knowledge that he calls 
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the dana in beyond the "limiting concept" of the nounenon, empty A255 8310-1: 
"'!he danain that lies out beyond the sphere of appearances is for us 
empty" and concludes: 
'~e concept of a noumenon is therefore a merely limiting concept the 
function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility". ' 
For Kant the concepts of empty space and time are ~ssible [29], as is all 
externality to the faculties; he thereby forgets that sensation has a 
problematic status, both within and without the faculties and their 
operations. For this reason, the quanta of sensation are the quantities of 
an impossible affectivity which flows into the operations of the faculties, 
and the noumenon is both the threshold of that affectivity and the object 
which can be seen as producing the quanta in their invasive mode. The 
noumenon designates the positive zero proper to the intensive magnitudes of 
sensation. For Kant the noumenon is a limit, a purely negative concept, that 
is one partially excluded, partially an empty space, partially impossible, 
partially nothing or zero but still a zero with a rational function. He 
designates 'Nothing' strictly, emphasising in the 'Transcendental Analytic' 
that zeroes are internal to reason (without realising that he is thereby 
inviting trouble). The four 'nothings' are only negatively inferred from the 
categories in accordance with the unity of apperception (A290 8346), as four 
impossible subtractions from one. Kant opposes the noumenal zero (the object 
of a concept without an intuition) to "the concepts of all, many and one" A290 
8347; "the concept of the absence of an object", a psychological nothing of 
deprivation or lack which is impossible given any description of the 
positivity of the operations of the faculties, but which designates the values 
associated with the transcendent application in all its forms; the zeroes of 
the mere forms of intuition; the zero Lmplied by the impossible object as an 
object which has a concept which contradicts itself. 
Bataille registers the paradoxical nature of these zeroes, the manner in which 
despite their rational and limited articulation they designate reason's 
invitation to the impossible, and precipitate the sunstorm of the excessive 
magnitudes of sensation. Bataille inflects the four zeroes so that they 
become SymptOOlS and effects of the flowing quanta of pulsing zero. He 
recognises the limits of the rational apparatus and the understanding's self-
contradictory exclusion of the impossible (4); whilst suffering the 1mpossible 
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as the invading and affective nOll1leIlon (1), the rush of intensities which 
challenge rational limits and disperse according to the principle of energetic 
matter; and which infonn the sovereign value of exuberant and explosive 
expenditure as the human counterpart of solar intensity. He represents 
intensity through time rather than space (3) whilst recognising the symptoms 
of the general and cultural transcendent application of unity in 
phenomenology, war ld religions and national/international currency economies 
(2). 
For Bataille time and sensation are the repressed quanta of philosophy and 
culture in general. In Kantianism and its sequels the extensions, maximums, 
limitations and measurements of space oriented around the unity of 
apperception deaden time and the intensive quantities associated with 
sensation. But implicitly - philosphers may be too rational to notice -
these quanta inevitably ruin their schemes. Kant's rational project of 
critique runs aground in inferring - despite itself - a philosophy of 
intensities from within its spatial schemas. The critical deduction of the 
massive liberation of intensive quantities from aesthetic judgement infects 
judgement as a whole and represents the ultimate and explosive condition of 
Bataille's thinking. 
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Olapter Five: KANT - AFFEcrs AND CCJ+tUNlCATION 
The swamping of communication 
Kant's Critique of Judgement [1] attempts to salvage the rational critical 
project from the virtual ravages of sensation and time by defining a 
peculiarly 'aesthetic' kind of judgement, ie a judgement which necessarily 
connects sensation to the higher faculties of knowledge and desire. Kant 
argues that the possibility of such an aesthetic judgement is presupposed by 
the 'simple' presupposition of transcendental philosophy (which is also, as we 
have seen, the general tenor of all its arguments) that nature is adapted to 
our cognitive faculties (Intro 25). He calls this presupposition 'necessary' 
in so far as it arrests the swamping of rules of experience by the chaos of 
empirical information; and thereby undermines his position in revealing that 
his a priori presuppositions are second-order reactive defence-mechanisms. 
For Kant, there is a harmony of natural laws and principles of mind, a hannony 
which is contingent on its own presupposition, and yet necessary for our 
understanding. It is this harmony - which suggests "a finality by which 
nature is in accord with our aim, but only so far as this is directed to 
knowledge" (Intro 26) - which is the subject of aesthetic judgement. For 
Kant, aesthetic judgement entails the sensation of pleasure associated with 
this harmony and the exercise of the higher faculties which it attests to. As 
we shall see, Kant's major problem in aesthetic judgement lies in 
distinguishing this higher sense of feeling or pleasure from the base 
sensation which he attempted to regulate so strictly in the first critique. 
He posits the exercise of the faculties involved in judgement as an a priori 
source of pleasure, yet the presupposition of harmony can be conceived as an 
attempt to block the primary energy of overwhelming quanta of sensation; 
energy which Kant will only countenance as displeasure and as a 'product' of 
the failure of judgement. He diverts our attention from his failure in this 
regard by repeating the limiting critique of the employment of such judgement 
for knowledge in relation to the possibility of a teleological principle in 
nature. This sLmple repetition of the Itmitation of the transcendent ideas 
from the first critique is as unconvincing as the positing of the a priori 
blocking of base sensation, when such a transcendent operation can be 
conceived as a secondary response to the dangerous influx of sensation. 
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Ultimately, Kant can only present us with the baselessness of the analogy of 
the hunan and the natural; he will call this 'connn.mication' and thereby 
deliver himself into Bataille's gory talons. 
According to Kan t, the unders tanding has the task of discerning the order 
Lmplicit in the commensurateness of the variety and heterogeneity of natural 
laws to mental powers, via the unity effected in jwgement. The feeling of 
pleasure arises from this operation itself: 
"The attainment of every aim is coupled with a feeling of pleasure.. the 
discovery that two or more empirical heterogeneous laws of nature are 
allied under one principle that embraces them both, is the grotmd of a 
very appreciable pleasure" (Intro 27). 
In cases where this attainment is dependent on an a priori representation, the 
feeling of pleasure can be said to be universally valid, for all members of 
the hunan species. Kan t goes on to sulxni t this pleasure, which is grotmded 
in the a priori, to a physiological principle, linking it to an intensive 
fluctuation in time, in that it both anticipates and is dissipated in the 
sLmple act of cognition. Thus pleasure is necessarily linked, Kant argues, to 
the processive continuation of judgement. New judgements attesting to the 
finality of natural, the relation of heterogeneous laws to the understanding 
are continually necessary for the production of pleasure. For Kant then, 
pleasure and the proper exertion of mental powers in judgement prolong and 
extend each other, in a sensible manner, insofar as pleasure fluctuates in 
time. And thus both pleasure and displeasure - which Kant represents as 
arising wherever the action of the understanding is impeded by the 
heterogeneity of natural laws - remain the merely 'subjective' elements of a 
representation, which are themselves incapable of becoming elements of any act 
of cognition (Intro 29). 
Kant presents pleasure (as sensation) as a product of the proper functioning 
of the operations of the Lmagination and the understanding; yet sensation is 
also supposed to be primary in the hierarchy of the faculties, the faculty in 
which affective quanta are registered and perception is anticipated. Added to 
this contradiction we might also ask how displeasure is possible if pleasure 
is linked to an a priori ground of representation; that is, how can the 
understanding be overwhelmed by quanta which are regulated by its own 
presupposition, unless these quanta are in fact prLnary and have a necessary 
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relation to displeasure, that is to the damaging of the operations of 
judgement? Kant gives displeasure a negative definition as a reject product 
and symptom of the incorrect use of the mental powers, rut this is not a 
sufficient argument, given the repressed status of sensation as is evidenced 
throughout the first critique. The impeding of the action of the 
understanding towards judgement is only possible if the influx of the quanta 
of sensation cannot be as strictly regulated as Kant would have us believe; 
and if this influx is primary and remains affective despite the rationalised 
transcendences to which it is subjected. Kant, however, merely reiterates 
that pleasure in aesthetic judgement is an expression of a specific conformity 
of the object to cognition, which he calls that object's 'subjective formal 
finality' relative to the subjective finality of reflection in aesthetic 
judgement (Intro 30). This move contains an implicit critique of the a 
priori possibility of judgements of taste. Aesthetic judgements of taste 
(and thus pleasure) are themselves a posteriori and thus depend on empirical 
representations; they cannot be united a priori to any concept, but only to 
the a priori concept of the subjective finality of reflection. This finality 
of the object is relative to the aesthetic representation of mental operations 
in general, which have their own sense of finality, hunan moral agency or 
freedom, which is also a source of pleasure. Kant will go on to argue that 
the feeling of the sublime is a source of pleasure too and designates a 
subjective finality or freedom of mental processes in relation to the 
formlessness or excessive nature of objects (relative to the imagination). 
Kant's critique of teleological judgement effects a restriction of the use in 
judgement of the concept of objective finality (lithe definite cognition of the 
object under a given concept") (Intro 34) through this analogy of subjective 
finality or beauty. Kant argues that we can call a natural object a natural 
end only by analogy: 
"we read into it our own concept of an end to assist our estimate of its 
product" (Intro 34). 
The object can be considered a natural end only so far as it is a • technic' or 
apparently self-organising organism, which thus shows signs of the form of 
finality, order, which is also found in hunan free action. The concept of 
the finality of nature is transcendental (useless) and only reflects the form 
of human subjective reflection; it can thus only be a subjective principle of 
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judgement and not an objective principle of logical estimation. 
On the other hand, although the practical rules of freedom have no effect in 
nature, the supersensible concept of free causality is the ground of the 
rational determination of the causality of things of the sensible world in 
relation to their appropriate laws (Intro 37). This ground is, as we shall 
see, purely formal and "impenetrable". This concept of htJnan freedom 
entails the idea of an ultimate or final end in hunan nature, which itself 
necessitates the a priori possibility of a similar final end in nature. This 
possibility, is, as we have noted, given only analogously in aesthetic 
jtdgement. 
Kant manages to play down the role of sensation in his accounts of the 
beautiful and the sublime because he distinguishes the aesthetic judgement on 
the beautiful which he characterises through its "disinterested delight" (pp2 
p 44) in the form rather than the existence of the object, from delight in the 
agreeable and delight in the good. Kant relegates sensation to the realm of 
the ' agreeable' which he characterises as sensation oriented around 
gratification, which has no interest in cognition or judgement of the object. 
[2] At the same time, Kant notes defensively that any faculty of knowledge 
could be described in terms of this pathological sensation oriented around the 
gratification of feelings, but that this would be to miss the point of the 
project of transcendental philosophy. Kant later makes a similar remark with 
regard to Burke's work on the Beautiful and the Sublime. He can tolerate the 
possibility of a neutral physiology of taste (Burke) but abhors the 
possibility of his transcendental schemata in general being interpreted in 
tenus of pathological sensation and the base interests of gratification. 
Thus he misses the essential point that such an account might revalue both 
base sensation and the transcendental schemata that regulate it. The 
orientation of sensation to gratification is unnecessary, and could be 
conceived as the maj'or stratagem used to hierarchize the faculties and bind 
them to reason. Sensation is, even in the Idealist reaLD, as we have seen, a 
question of intensive quantities veering towards intensive zero; Kant here, as 
in the first critique, represses the quanta which could effect massive 
reorientations of the rational topography; he continues in his account of the 
sublime, but by that tLme his counter-intuitive rationalisations have 
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accunulated to such an incredible degree that neither argunent nor entreaty 
render them convincing. 
According to Kant the aesthetic judgement of the beautiful resembles the 
judgement on the • good • which is oriented around the concepts of 'means' 
and 'ends' ( the 'useful' and the 'good in itself') and 'delights' in the 
existence of the object as a concept in that its delight is judged as 
valid for all hunans. This is an aesthetic rather than a logical judgement 
and thus cannot claim the status of universality associated with concepts and 
ideas. The aesthetic judgement is disinterested, that is, impartial as to the 
real existence of the beautiful object as an object of cognition (pp6 p50). 
Beauty is a quality of an object which is not known through concepts but in a 
judgement which merely necessarily entails a reference to the cognitive status 
of the representation of the object to the Subject. Aesthetic judgement thus 
has general rather than uni versal validi ty , obeying a series of empirical 
rules guided by a principle of "subjective finality" (6 55): 
"it does not join the predicate of beauty to the concept of the Object 
taken in its entire logical sphere, and yet does extend this predicate 
over the whole sphere of judging subjects" (8 55). 
Thus the general rules of aesthetic judgement are principles of the form of 
subjective finality -applied to 'subjects' as phenomena in general, that is as 
quanta. I would argue that Kant engages in an intensive reading of the 
beautiful, given the minimal content of what is designated through the 
beautiful, that is the form of communicability. Kant defines the subjective 
condition of aesthetic judgement, subjective finality, as simply "the 
universal capacity for being ccmmmicated" (9 57) or "subjective universal 
comnunication" (9 58). He associates this with the 'freeplay' of the 
imagination and the understanding, which is requisite for 'cognition in 
general' (9 58), but this cannot be considered a sufficient description of the 
massive expenditure of intensive communication and the freeplay of energetic 
information in general which is involved. I would argue that Kant's accoWlt 
of the beautiful designates the communicative principle of so empty a form of 
quanta as to be easily resolved into the general economy of intensive quanta 
once the transcendent project of the sublime - and thereby the limits of the 
u tile model of the • means' and • ends' of the ' good' - abort in oceanic 
intensity, allowing the models of intensive processes to feedback through the 
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rules of aesthetic judgement, intensive motors replacing those mechanisms 
oriented teleologically to reason. Kant's accotmt of the beautiful 
formulates the incessant intensive recursion of quanta which lies at the heart 
of the Kantian schema; it is simply a question of whether such 'empty' 
communicative replications or contagions are restricted in their orientation 
to practical reason or not. 
For Kant, pleasure is the necessary product of aesthetic judgement because the 
latter attests to an "inherent causality" (12 64) in any representation of an 
object. Having earlier admitted the possibility of displeasure in so far as 
the formulation of the beautiful was impossible, Kant now refers the 
fluctuations or tension of pleasure and displeasure to the emotions provoked 
by the sublime (14 68): 
"Emotion - a sensation where an agreeable feeling is produced by means 
of a momentary check followed by a more powerful outpouring of the vital 
force". 
Kant rationalises displeasure using a physiological model; displeasure is a 
deviation which propels the norm of pleasure (or its further rationalisation -
respect), even in the extreme case of the sublime. Kant's model is mundanely 
utilitarian; pleasure, delight and even the pathological agreeable are 
positivised relative to displeasure, designated as more useful than 
displeasure as means· to the end of 'subjective finality' and its moral 
analogue. To the extent that even displeasure feeds pleasure and its utile 
drive. But if subjective finality attests only to the form of communicative 
quanta (subjects and objects), the sense of this 'utility' is rather the 
virtual tendency for communication to optimalise itself, irrespective of the 
transcendent operations performed on it. The orientation of sensation or 
these quanta around pleasure is a serious handicap when it comes to decribing 
the complexities of libidinal fluxes. 
For Kant, aesthetic judgement presents us with the object's "finality of fonn" 
relative to the form of representation itself. This subjective finality is 
the a priori ground of aesthetic judgement: (15 77) 
"'lhe judgement is called aesthetic fo: the very reason. that its 
detetmining ground cannot be a concept, but 1S rather the feel1ng of the 
concert of the play of the mental powers as a thing only capable of being 
felt." 
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This 'concert' is the ideal of free beauty itself, the ideal of the universal 
cormunicability of the sensation of this final fonn, [3] which is an 
individual presentation, a quantity rather than a qualitative concept. For 
Kant, the ideal is ultimately the hlJDan figure itself as an expression and 
embodiment of the rooral (17 79); and aesthetic jtxigement is the ju:igement 
correlative to this representation of the human: (20 82) 
"they nrust have a subjective principle, and one which detennines what 
pleases or displeases, by means of feeling only and not through 
concepts, but yet with universal validity. Such a principle can only be 
regarded as a COOJDOn sense understood as the effect arising from the 
free play of our powers of cognition". 
This cOlIlDOn sense is a "fundamental feeling" (22 84) which is not private and 
personal but rather coomunicative and contagious. Of course, for Kant, conmon 
sense entails the public realm of moral duty, and thus common sense contains 
an 'ought' and has an "exemplary validity" as a regulative principle formed by 
a higher principle of reason, over and above its commmicative or contagious 
mode. But this intervention of extraneous material of the second order 
dimension of utile morality (incltxiing the representation of the human figure) 
is unnecessary and cannot be sustained given the effect of the quantative and 
sensible analysis of jtxigement with which Kant has supplied us. The quanta 
of sensation which inform mental processes in general operate at a level more 
prLnary than that of utile pleasure and can produce feelings of both pleasure 
and displeasure in their general intensification. !hese quanta are not 
inherently useful, and if Kant has shown that hunan aesthetic judgement is 
purely quantitative, and includes an image of optimal comnunication, it is his 
rationalisation of it as useful which is second-order and redundant. 
The inevitable affects of the Sublime 
For Kant, the 'delight' associated with the beautiful expresses the accord of 
the imagination (as a faculty of presentation) with the understanding and 
reason. This delight is effected as a 'higher' feeling of pleasure in the 
calm contemplation of natural or artistic forms which attest to the order and 
finality of rational mechanisms. For Kant, displeasure has no place in the 
aesthetic judgement of the beautiful; the fluctuations of pleasure and 
displeasure, or rather the unilateral mental movement from displeasure to 
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pleasure, is described in his account of the feeling of the sublime. In 
addition, Kant will still emphasise that the sublime, like the beautiful, is 
relevant only insofar as it is overcoded by judgement informed by the 
understanding and reason, rather than in relation to pathological sensation 
and its intensive magnitudes. (23 90) 
We have seen that the judgement on the beautiful relates to the limited form 
of an object, to the recognition of an order in its form analogous to the 
order of its representation in the mind. The feeling of the sublime arises 
where an object is massive or chaotic, and yet for Kant not only is a 
representation of its limitlessness and formlessness possible, but also and 
thereby a conception of its 'totality' (23 90). Kant would have it that where 
the beautiful is a presentation of an "indeterminate concept of the 
understanding", the sublime is a presentation of "an indeterminate concept of 
reason"(23 90-1). In this sense the sublime will facilitate the move of 
aesthetic judgement towards its articulation of moral freedan. 
Given Kant's continual subjugation of sensation under the mechanisms of the 
hierarchy of the faculties, none of his rationalizing moves in relation to the 
sublime can be considered surprising. However, it is worth assessing the base 
dynamic of sensation which Kant himself hints at, only then to treat it to a 
transcendent operation of the mental faculties. According to this base 
dynamic, the subject is powerfully stimulated by an external stimuli, which is 
internalised as a quantity of sensation, i.e as an intensive magnitude in an 
affective mode. Kant has argued (in the 'Anticipations of Perception' section 
of the first critique) that such a sensation is a representation of an object 
(the intensive magnitude) insofar as sensation anticipates cognition. We have 
seen that there is no necessity to this attractive power of the hierarchy of 
the faculties, and that an intensive magnitude is no simple idealist object of 
cognition. The affective mode of an intensive magnitlXie is more relevant than 
its subsequent processing by the operations of the higher faculties. 
However, in his account of the sublime, Kant identifies the formlessness of an 
object with its extreme intensive magnitude only to reduce the importance of 
the strong affective power or influence of this noumenal object. As we have 
seen, for Kant, any degree of magnitude implies a continuity of perception; 
and thus by analogy no object, however formless and limitless, is 
inconceivable - the sublime simply needs to be conceptualised in relation to a 
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higher faculty. Kant is well aware of the prejudice throughout his critical 
philosophy in favour of the phenomenal object; but the extent of his disavowal 
reaches an extreme point in the sublime. For what he attempts to deny in the 
identification of the sublime object and the continuity of its intensive 
magnitude is the very presupposition of the rationalisation of the sublime 
itself, what is presupposed by the scale of perception at which the sublime 
occurs; that the intensive magnitude of an object has, in the first place, an 
overwhelming effect on the subject. The overwhelming object is an affective 
object and not an Idealist object of cognition. In the base account of the 
subl~e, the affective or noumenal object affects the cognitive subject in the 
first place; and only then, secondarily, is this influence treated to a 
containing rationalisation by the subject on the grounds of the existence of a 
higher faculty. 
Kant hints at the affective power associated with this not..menal intensive 
object (only to treat it to a transcendent operation) in describing the 
dynamic of the emotions provoked by the object which he will rationalise as 
'sublime'. He contrasts the beautiful and the sublime: (23 91) 
"For the beautiful is directly attended with a feeling of the 
furtherance of life and, is thus compatible with charms and a playful 
imagination. On the other hand, the feeling of the sublime is a 
pleasure that only arises indirectly, being brought about by the feeling 
of a momentary check to the vital forces followed at once by a discharge 
all the more powerful." 
We should not be deluded by the emphasis on physiological quanta in this 
account of pleasure in the sublime. Kant associates pleasure with the 
furtherance of the 'vi tal forces' (an association which already links the 
sublime to the beautiful and the idea of rational finality). We must contest 
this association precisely because pleasure is second-order and 'indirect'. 
Pleasure is definitely post-traumatic; the event of shock displeasure patently 
precedes the event of its rationalisation - the designation of this 
transcendent operation as a 'discharge' alters nothing in this regard. A 
connection between pleasure and the 'vital forces' cannot be necessitated by 
the fact of a post-traumatic exacerbation of those forces. His 
identification of pleasure and the 'furtherance of the vital forces' alla..rs 
Kant to think of a certain kind of pleasure as ultimate, both in principle and 
in empirical fact after the shock-event. Such pleasure involves a return of 
-139-
subjective rational control after the shock of the powerful stiIruli. Thus 
Kant's psychodynamic account of pleasure as a discharge intensified by 
resistances remains for him a useful analogy for the rational finality of 
hunan life. Pleasure in the sublime reverts momentarily to its sensational 
conditions in a libidinal dynamic (which is itself oriented around the 
identification of reason and pleasure) only to be further designated as a 
"negative pleasure" (23 91) of ' admiration' and 'respect', as befits an 
analogy for the moral law. 
Kant argues that natural beauty allows us to perceive the 'technic' of nature, 
its system of organisation and its finality relative to the employment of 
judgement i.e to conceive of nature through the analogy of art (23 92). 
Likewise, sublime "chaos" , formlessness and "irregular disorder and 
desolation" attests to a finality proper to the hunan and its attitude of 
mind. This conclusion is only possible on condition that Kant distinguishes 
the affective object and its sensational influence from a power of 
rationalisation proper to the higher faculties. Yet in the attempt to 
distinguish these two realms Kant's starting point is the "signs of magnitude 
and power" shown by sublime objects (23 92) - the status of intensive 
magnitude itself - ,which can only be conceived as a hypothetical anticipation 
of perception leading to cognition. In other words, Kant's argument is doomed 
to prove nothing. On the other hand, it is easy to demonstrate that the 
feeling of displeasure associated with an overpowering stLmuli is undeniably 
different from the transcendent operation of the sublime. 
For Kant the concept of the sublime object is erroneous, not because the 
affective noumenal object is to be distinguished from an object of cognition, 
but because the sublime is a power of resistance of the mind: (23 92) 
"the object lends itself to the presentation of a sublimity discoverable 
in the mind.. [the sublime] cannot be contained in any sensuous form, 
rut rather concerns ideas of reason, which although no adequate 
presentation of them is possible, may be excited and called into the 
mind by that very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous 
presentation. Thus the broad ocean agitated by storms cannot be ~ll~ 
sublime. Its aspect is horrible and one must have stored one's nu.nd 1n 
advance with a rich stock of ideas, if such an intuition is to raise it 
to the pitch of a feeling which is itself sublime - sublime becau~e the 
mind has been incited to abandon sensibility and employ upon 1tself 
ideas involving higher finality." 
It seems to me that the relevance of the fact that intensive sensation can be 
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injected into the rational processes (as a 'pitch of feeling') is overwheLmed 
by the importance of the description of the generally defensive nature of 
those processes which use memory as a protective reserve to resist 
overwhelming intensive sensations. 
At the base of Kant's distinction between the mathematical and dynamic sublime 
lies the distinction between the notion of intensive magnitude as a 
measurement and affection as a mode of influence. As Kant notes (23 93-4) the 
formlessness of the sublime and its massive power of affection on the 
imagination necessitate an analysis in terms of quantities. The account of 
the mathematical mode of the sublime takes as its point of departure the 
paradox of the notion of magnitude which eventually reorients the sublime 
around the subjective finality of aesthetic judgement. The magnitude of the 
sublime appears to be impossible, given the excessive and absolute jargon in 
which it is fOI'ITlllated. Kant calls the sublime "absolutely great ••• beyond 
all comparison great" (25 94), yet intensive degrees are characterised, as we 
have seen, [4] as being necessarily relative and having no rnaximun, ceiling or 
absolute magnitude; what can absolute magnitude signify when (25 95): 
"the computation of the magnitude of phenomena is in all cases utterly 
incapable of affording us any absolute concept of a magnitude and can 
only afford one that is always based on comparison". 
For Kant absolute magnitude "a greatness comparable to itself alone" (25 97) 
attests to the subjective finality implicit in human cognitive functions and 
the sublime: (25 97-8) 
"Here we readily see that nothing can be given in nature, no matter how 
great we judge it to be, which regarded in some other relation, may not 
be degraded to the level of the infinitely little, and nothing so small 
which in comparison with some still smaller standard may not for our 
imagination be enlarged to the greatness of a world. Telescopes have 
put within our reach an abundance of material to go upon in making the 
first observation, and microscopes the same in making the second. 
Nothing, therefore, which can be an object of the senses is to be termed 
sublime when treated on this footing. But precisely because there is a 
striving in our imagination towards progress ad infinitum, while reason 
demands absolute totality, as a real idea, that some inability on the 
part of our faculty for the estimation of the magnitude of things ?f the 
world of sense to attain to this idea, is the awakening of a feeling of 
a supersensible faculty within us; and it is the use to which joogement 
naturally puts objects on behalf of this latter feeling, and not the 
object of sense, that is absolutely great and every o~her cont~as~ed 
employment small ••• The sublime is that, the mere capaCity of thinkiDR 
which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense. 
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For Kant then, the maximal possible magnitude is the unit for the mathematical 
estimation of the nrultiplicitous magnitudes of phenomena. This "fundamental 
measure" (26 98) is in turn an aesthetic estimate of what constitutes the 
'absolute measure' of subjective finality. Kant's absolute magnitude is a 
ceiling proper to the power of the subject, "an absolute measure beyond which 
no greater is possible subjectively (i.e for the judging Subject)" (26 99). 
Thus for Kant the sequence of events which he designates as 'calling forth the 
feeling of the sublime' is terminated in the aesthetic estimation of the 
sublime as a lLmit at which the magnitude of the sensation and the power of 
perception of the subject are reconciled; that is, the idea of communication 
which is the form of hunan freedexn. [5] 
According to Kant, the mathematical sublime designates the maximal unit 
corresponding to a moment of comprehension which curtails the ad infinitun 
process of the logiCal apprehension of the infinite set of possible 
magnitudes; thus an aesthetic judgement becanes possible. The infinite itself 
can be comprehended in this fashion in the idea of the nounenon (26 103) as a 
substrate or negative resource underlying the phenomenal world. Such 
ccxnprehension and the judgement it makes possible attest to a human 
supersensible faculty of reason. Thus nature is sublime in so far as its 
phenomena convey the idea of infinity, an idea which cannot be comprehended in 
the imagination which attempts to relate it to a sensible natural object; thus 
the idea of infinity (rather than the quanta of a powerful sensation) is 
relayed from the thwarted imagination to the "supersensible substrate 
(underlying both nature and our faculty of thought)" (26 104) which is proper 
to it. The course of an irritant sensation is transformed into the rutual 
presuppositions of the source and trajectory of reason: (27 106) 
"'!be feeling of the sublime is, therefore, at once a feeling ~f 
displeasure, arising from the inadequacy of imagination in the aesthet~c 
estimation of magnitude to attain to its estimation by reason, and a 
simultaneously awakened pleasure, arising fran this. verr judgement. of 
the inadequacy of the greatest faculty of s~e be1ng ~n ~rd W1th 
ideas of reason, so far as the effort to atta1n to these ~s for us a 
law". 
Kant's strategy to reduce the fact of the affective power of the sensational 
or IlOt.JDenal object to the idea of infinity is deeply unconvincing. Even Kant 
is humiliated into qualifying his position: he admits that the sublime adds a 
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new element of dynamism to the account of mental processes. Of course there 
is no chance that his account of the dynamically sublime could show that 
libidinal processes are 'set in motion' by the representation of the sublime, 
and come to overcode the transcendental account of the hierarchy of the 
faculties which the sublime is supposed to consolidate. Kant simply states 
that the sublime subjects reason to a vibration or an oscillation, "a rapidly 
alternating repulsion and attraction produced by one and the same Object" (27 
107), and thereby adds a psychodynamic edge to his account of the overwhelming 
of the imagination and the overcoding of the sensational quanta which effect 
this by the ideas of reason, such as infinity. [6] 
Kant's account of the dynamical sublime emphasises the exacerbating tension 
between the pulsional overcoding of the Kantian topography and the attractive 
power of the transcenden t operation which characterises that topography. 
Kant's major problem lies in renegotiating his rational and qualitative 
distinctions once he has presented both sensible influx and the resistance of 
the rational faculties as quanta of energy ("powers") (28 110). He even goes 
so far as to conceive of rational resistance as an increase of 'general' 
power. He weakly suggests that the sublime is a power which overcomes 
resistances, but 'does not dominate us'! Our resistances are washed away and 
yet we are safe! Kant reverts from the psychodynamic level to a hybrid 
energetic Idealist jargon to justify this peculiar statement; arguing that the 
sublime is a phenomenal object (albeit an u\Jbjpct of fear" - and one might 
argue, given its magnitude, no longer an 'object') in relation to the 'secure 
position' of the standpoint of negative critique. Kant revamps the 
platitudinous definition of critique as a 'safe seat' which we noted in the 
first critique [7]; but here it appears after the virtual haemorrhage of 
reason in critique, as a last vain attempt to staunch the overcoding flush 
(whereas in the first critique, the security of the seat was only subsequently 
called into question: (28 110-1) 
"Bold, overhanging and as it were, threatening rocks, thunderclotds 
piled up to the vault of heaven, bome along with flas?es and pea~s, 
volcanoes in all their violence of destruction, hurrlcanes leavlng 
desolation in their track, the boundless ocean rising with rebellious 
force, the high waterfall of some mighty river, ~ th~ like,.mak~ our 
power of resistance of trifling moment in camparlson Wlth thelr mlght. 
But, provided our own position is secure, theix: aspect is all the. more 
attractive for its fearfulness; and we readlly call these ?bJects 
sublime, because they raise the forces of the soul above the helght of 
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vu~gar ccmoonplac:-e, and. discover within us a power of resistance of 
qu1te another kind, wi'l1ch gives us courage to be able to measure 
ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature". 
For Kant the pulsing flows of the dynamical sublime necessarily foregrounds 
the freedom implicit in the mathematical sublime: (28 111) 
"the ~~esistibility ~f the might of nature forces upon us the 
recogn1t1on of our phys1cal helplessness as beings of nature but at the 
same time reveals a faculty of estimating ourselves as independent of 
nature". 
Kant describes this successful outcome of the shock trauna as a "self-
preservation" of kinds. Hunans are annihilated but free; external nature 
challenges us to hold wealth and life at nil and seek comfort in a 'higher 
finalty'. As in the passage on rational suicidal strategy from the first 
critique,[8] Kant elaborates on this perverse freedom, giving the example of 
the improving power of warfare for nurturing our sublime sense of morality. 
The nation which exposes itself to the 'danger' of expansionist war gains an 
increase in the 'SUblime' power of freedom: (28 112-3) 
"[War] gives nations which carry it on •• a stamp of mind only the more 
sublime the more numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and 
which they are able to meet with fortitude." 
The state of war (a state of the mobilisation of powers of influence and 
resistance) is itself conducive, according to Kant, to nurturing its 
regulating ~o or super-ego, state religion or capital, in which the human 
can recognise (28 114) "the existence in himself of a sublimity of disposition 
consonant with His will". 
communication itself. [9] 
Thus warfare attests to the moral form of 
For Kant the sublime depends on and consolidates an innate human capacity for 
moral feeling; rut this 'moral feeling' simply designates the notion of a 
maximal capacity and base unit of coomtn'li.cation itself. Moral feeling IS the 
notion of 'universal conmunicability' and thus simply a minimally fOnDal 
maximal state of communication or information or energy flow. For Kant this 
universal communicability itself presupposes the supersensible sphere of 
reason, rut I can see no reason for this. Instead, I would see this notion as 
a precedence for Bataille's notion of communication, because Kant's notion of 
'universal conmunicability' can be seen as an idea in which the difference 
between the libidinal dynamics of pathological sensation and the overcoding 
operation of reason is reduced to a point of low level content at which the 
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two notions fuse in the principle of a neutral third energetics - the 
principle of a maximal state of energetic transactions. 
After the formulation of this minimal energetic principle the critique of 
aesthetic judgement nose dives into considerations of privileged intensive 
states which are marginalised by the transcendent operations of the ideas of 
practical reason, and yet which attest to the liberated dynamic of sensational 
affects and the contagious comnunication of their energetic quanta. Kant 
finally countenances displeasure in the form of disgust, characterising it in 
terms of urgently interventive and affective quanta which disturb the 
possibility of aesthetic delight and judgement: (174 312) 
"the object is represented as insisting, as it were, upon our enjoying 
it, while we still set our face against it". 
Kant goes on to give a psychodynamic account of laughter in which the 
possibility of the reduction of the understanding to zero, in the face of 
internal affective stLmuli, is given. This is seen as effecting the relay of 
the affective quanta associated with the mental faculties to the physiological 
body in general: (199 332) 
"In jest ••• the understanding, missing what is expected, suddenly lets go 
its hold, with the result that the effect of this slackening is felt in 
the body by the oscillation of the organs ••• Laughter is an affection 
arising from a strained expectation being soodenly reduced to nothing". 
[10] 
The fulcrum notion in this respect - for the revaluation of mental processes 
in terms of affective quanta - is that of the 'genius'. Kant describes 
genius as the power of creation in a spontaneous, original and exemplary 
fashion, "a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given" 
(46 168), and a natural endowment through which "nature gives the rule to 
art". Thus, Kant's attempt to distinguish hunan art, and the subjective 
finality associated with it, from natural mechanisms ruins itself by placing 
the rule-creating capacity associated with art back in the hands of the 
spontaneous creations of nature. This is no compromise of reason and noumenal 
nature at all, but rather the inevitable 'deduction' of intensive machines of 
production of affective quanta or energies from the intensive conditions of 
the restricted mechanisms of reason. 
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The course of Kant's Critique of Judgement presents us with the slow 
haemorrhage of the power of conviction associated with the rationale of the 
critical project. Kant attempts to rationally regulate his account of 
sensation and its registering of the affective mode of stimuli by relating it 
to the rational (and subjectively final, or human) form of communication which 
is analogous to moral freedom. But the power of his account of the affective 
mode of sensational quanta overwhelms this secondary reorientation; in fact 
the form of communication becomes a description of the principle of contagious 
intensive quanta themselves. In designating a sensibility proper to the 
terror of time, Bataille will latch onto this critical description of 
communication as the state of intensive energies, will formulate its 'general 
economy' and dissolve the essential Kantian terminology of continuity, 
transcendence and immanence, and subjectivity, in the solar maelstrom of post-
critical libidinal writing. 
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Coda: Bataille - the sensibility of the sacred 
"We trembled and marvelled and after the fact [the banbing] we thought 
of the victims" (OC6 174) 
''The .Mithraic cult of the sun led to a very widespread religious 
practice: people stripped in a kind of pit that was covered with a 
wooden scaffold, on which a priest slashed the throat of a bull- thus 
they were suddenly doused with hot blood, to the accompaniment ~f the 
bull's bois terous struggle and bellowing - a simple way of reaping the 
moral benefits of the blinding sun." (OCl 232) 
For Bataille, sensation and experience are irreducible to the Kantian account 
of mental faculties. Experience is not an object for intelligence, an object 
constituted by the separated and hierarchised ftmCtions of a transcendent 
operation of discursive thought, which subtracts itself from the field of its 
objects. Sensation does not consolidate the transcendental subject; rather, 
in extreme experience the I is transformed into a site of communication, the 
site of the fusion of the quanta which are only habitually designated as 
subject and object: (OC5 485) 
"It is not a question of philosophy - it is not a question of knowledge. 
It is not the intelligible rut the sensible which is object" 
Sensibility urges extreme behaviour on the scale of the enormous expenditures 
of energy which are associated with solar radiation - rather than IOOral 
action. [11] But sensibility thereby also designates a revaluation of 
IOOrality, a translation of its terms and schemas into the terms and intensive 
attributes of sensation which becomes the basis for Bataille' s Nietzschean 
'genealogy' of religions and cultures; thus this description of the maniacal 
fusion of the worshipper with the intensive zero of the sun entails a 
revaluation of the notion of the utility of 'moral benefit'. [12] 
Intensity is proper to sensation which inevitably feels the "invading flood" 
(OCS 30) of the affective quanta of stimuli and contagiously replicates the 
psychological neutrality of these quanta, provoking maniacal behaviour at the 
macro-level of the hunan organism. The urgency of the sensible and/ or 
lUlConscious desire for intensity or solar fusion 'sacrifices' the unity and 
security of the stable ego and its moral and practical supports. The states 
of excitation into which the 'subject' is thereby dissolved are comprehensible 
as "illogical and irresistible impulses rejecting the material and moral good" 
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(OC1 319), and more fundamentally as approximations to the intensive 
communicative state of energetic matter in general. In Bataille's writing, the 
second sense consolidates the schizoid and impersonal tendency of the first, 
thus he writes: (OC1 334) 
"Despair is really only affective behaviour of the greatest dynamical 
value". 
The drive to intensity privileges change and thus emulates the waste of time. 
For the schizo supplicant 'subject' the immense spectacles of intensity are 
simply the modes of this drive, with which the subject is fused or 
communicates. Thus, for instance, warfare is simply an energetic experience 
rather than a sublime furtherance of moral freedom, as Kant would have it. 
Only wars, states Bataille (OC12 369) represent the teeming intensity of the 
universe's expenditure over and above the imperialist need that requires them, 
- waste out of all proportion to use: (OC12 369) 
''Wars are perhaps the last convulsions of a movement inclined in its 
expansion to that terminal radiation, typified by heat, which disperses 
itself in wasting itself, and where the difference and the intensity are 
was ted too". 
Bataille often calls this intensive experience which can be found at the end 
of philosophy (as. well as wi thou t philosophy •• ) the ' sacred', thereby 
suggesting a primary resonance between the will to expenditure which animates 
all energetic matter and the widest possible sense of 'religion', as the 
ecstatic tendency in human life: (OC8 371) 
tI'Ihe sacred is given in experience as a fact not as the result of a 
judgement or a rational operation", 
''This is no longer philosophy, but sacrifice (camamication)tt (OC5 65) 
According to Bataille, these energetic processes can be experienced with 
minimal effective interference from the second-order processes of self-
consciousness, which would polarise those energetic processes around the utile 
values of pain and pleasure. These utile values attest to the essentially 
discursive nature of the 'self' which formulates its nature, its needs and 
threats, as a natural organism. Sensation is non-discursive, and its analogic 
descriptions are intensive to the point of abstraction; that is, sensation is 
best described in terms of the flows and accelerations which characterise it: 
''There is an interrupted moment in which everything ~s blown away, 
everything flickers: the person's profound and SOlld reality has 
disappeared and all that remains are charged up, mobile, violent and 
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inexorable presences.. all that remains are forces possessing the 
violence of the unleashed stonn" (OC2 245-6). 
The sensibility of the sacred, of the unconscious will to expend and emulate 
the larger energetic movements of the universe (which on the grounds of this 
impossible emulation cannot be exclusively associated with a psychological 
deathwish) infonns human life at every level and time, according to Bataille. 
Thus we have noted that pre-Christian and pagan cults embrace a form of this 
sensibility which is free of the contaminations of the excessive self-hating 
rationalisation which characterises the Christian period of occidental culture 
and produces the overcoding dualist divorce of pathological or 'bodily' 
sensibility and pure mental reason. But this sensibility is also, as we have 
exhaustively shown, evidenced by the outcome of critical philosophy. 
Bataille explicitly emphasises this critical trajectory himself, when he 
designates experience as "a voyage to the end of the possible of man" (OCS 
19) • According to Ba taille , intensive experience and sensation are 
irreducible to the restricted set of logical possibilities proposed by 
rational knowledge. Intensive experience attests to energies which are 
'bigger' than those tha t traverse the space inhabi ted by the logical possible. 
However the immensity of these energies (which is sLmply designated negatively 
as 'the ~ssible' from the perspective of logic) interface with the space of 
logic at the extreme or marginal point at which intensive experience or 
sensation occurs in the rational schema. Thus the impossible (that is, these 
excessive energies) becomes real. Because the reality of sensation and these 
energies themselves are shown to be the possible conditions of the categories 
of the logically possible, it is the very improbability of the exclusive 
nature of the logically possible which is critically demonstrated by the 
influence of sensation on reason. This constitutive 'improbability' urges a 
change of scale of perception, away from the scale proper to the spatial 
awareness of the logically possible and towards a scale which describes the 
motions of its energetic conditions. Bataille will supply this scale in his 
account of 'general economy'.[13] Bataille describes the failings of reason 
with regard to sensation in a peculiar paradoxical Kantian fashion: in 
knowledge-oriented philosophy the fact of affective experience overflows these 
limi ts of reason '~y an imnense possible" in so far as "the measure given to 
experience [by these limits] is at once too much and not big enough" (OCS 20). 
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The critical moment is essential for Bataille's thought, even if it is itself 
exceeded by the fact of the affect and the scale of perception which it 
entails: (OCS 385) 
"However the limited system must be questioned once more- critique 
[also] applies to the absence of limits and the possibilities of 
infinite growth and acquisition.. critical questioning introduces a 
general critique applied to the results of successful action from the 
point of view not of production •• but of waste, sacrifice." 
For Bataille, it is the disjunct status of the affective object as approach to 
intensive noumenal zero which must be safeguarded from philosophical 
rationalisations of critique and experience: (OC8 259) 
'The NamING is given in experience ••• The metaphysician will say that 
'nothing' is reducible to the nothingness of which he speaks. The whole 
movement of my thought is opposed to his pretention, reducing it to 
NanUNG" 
The novum of this affective zero is generated through critique, only to 
dissolve critique along with the rational schema of the logical relations 
between subject and object. In this sense, subject and object (and critique 
as a groWlded knowledge) are subject to time which dissolves all stable 
grounds, and throws each into the self-perpetuating abyss of the groundless. 
Thus the dissipative object - "the NamING is the object which disappears" 
(OC8 281) - produces a "contagious subjectivity" (OCB 288) in which the form 
of subjectivity is translated into "a sensible emotional content" of energetic 
quanta which has a privileged commWlicative mode which constitutes and 
dissolves in time the provisional entities which philosophy calls 'subjects'. 
Bataille' s sensibility of the sacred is a product of the Kantian critical 
project in general as I have analysed it. His accOWlt of intense experiences 
is especially analogous to Kant's accoWlt of the sublime, although he 
distinguishes his concern with the primary shock and anguish of the sensations 
caused by affective stimuli - and the revaluation of rationalised experience 
which this shock revelation of the energetic conditions of thought makes 
possible - from the reactive operative transcendences with which Kant turns 
the sublime into a moment of rational thought, objectifying and measuring 
energetic immensity relative to the unity of apperception. Bataille describes 
the Kantian rationalisation of the sublime as first and foremost a 
domestication of the intensive zero of the nounenon, the zero which wracks 
consciousness as terrible sensations (independently of the controlled 
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operations regulated by the concept of the transcendental subject). For 
Bataille, this domestication is subsequent to the effects of this shock on 
consciousness, and constitutes a simple repetition of the principled processes 
which that shock has made the objects of a critical revaluation: (0C8 408-9) 
tt(Irrmensity] is no longer the NamING where I too was NanUNG •• 
Inmensity becomes something". 
If the sensation of shock effects a critical revaluation of rational and utile 
economies, the value of this revaluation is itself dissolved in the intensive 
neutrality of the principles of 'communication' which are supposed to 'ground' 
that revaluation. Thus it is with his thermodynamic notion of 'communication' 
that Bataille strays furthest from the realm of philosophy in its widest 
possible sense and enters a post-critical state of semantic freefall. 
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Chapter Six: BATAILLE CONTRA KANT - <n1MUNlCATION AND INFECTION 
The continuity of sensibility 
The extent of Bataille' s engagement with the Kantian critical project is 
emphasised by the fact that we have noted precedents for all his major 
concepts in the preceding pages. I now want to demonstrate the extent to 
which he transforms those concepts, of continuity, transcendence, time, 
subjectivity and communication in formulating his general economy of energetic 
matter. Yet for Bataille, the human experience of time is privileged or 
cursed in designating the infectious dissolution of thought, discourse, 
intensity and life itself. Time is the infection implicit in Bataille's 
discourse as those intensive elements which are irreducible to any 
rationalised fonnulation. It pulses and accelerates beneath the 'strict' 
(relative to the rest of his writing) conceptions of general economy, and even 
under the image of the dissolution of critique itself. It is this element and 
its infectious shock which is present in Bataille' s post-critical style - a 
style which is a fragmented differentiation of longueurs and speeds - which is 
inevitable and which attests to the dissolution of all mannered literary and 
philosophical 'styles' or energetically distributed syntaxes. 
For Kant, continuity operated as the division of a given unified space, and 
was linked to the spatialisation or enclosure of time which permitted time to 
be conceived as having three modes: succession, simultaneity and permanence. 
[1] For Bataille, continuity is inseparable from the differentiation of 
intensive events, of compositions and spaces, in an energetic and 
unidirectional time, which he calls discontinuity. Bataille's notion of 
continuity would be associable with Deleuze and Guattari's 'intensive spatium' 
[2], except that for Bataille space is subject to, and only differentiated in 
the energetic compositions and annihilations of time. For Bataille, 
continuity is a question of waves of duration, like the waves of energy which 
constitute and dissolve the energetic and social hierarchical compositions 
which Bataille analyses in the College of Sociology lectures [3]; and must 
itself be distinguished from the static discontinuities at the crystalline 
tips of its energetic matter, as different as zero from any degree. We shall 
see that continuity and discontinuity are linked to Bataille's parallel 
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conceptions of transcendence/irrmanence. These terms have definite Kantian 
resonances, but Bataille designates with them the inrnanent principle of 
differentiation of the degrees of transcendence (or transcendent matter) from 
the zero of immanence (which itself can be considered as both pure energetic 
coomunication and the zero energy of entropy) [4]. Likewise, the 
discontinuous is to be considered a degree from the zero of continuity, that 
is as an intensive degree. Whereas Bataille tends to treat irrmanence and 
transcendence as the tenns of a purely quantative description of energetic 
matter and abstract thought, he analyses the couple continuity/discontinuity 
as tenns of the sensible and psychological economy of eroticism; examining 
these notions will present us with a bridge from Kant's account of the 
invasion of sensibility by affective quanta to the abstract dimensions of 
general economy. 
Bataille defines the sensible and human sense of continuity and discontinuity 
with platitudinous precision: 
"Each being is distinct from all the others ••• Between one being and 
another, there lies an abyss, a discontinuity ••• We try to communicate, 
but no comnunication between us can suppress this primary difference" 
(OC10 18-9) 
According to Bataille (although this perception is hardly original), the 
essential pathos of the human condition is that our sense of our own 
individuality is linked to a perception of the irremediable distance between 
us and other people. We perceive our finitude and experience the 'abyss' of 
our discontinuity as our own proper death. However, Bataille argues that the 
general economy of energetic matter enables us to perceive that the intensive 
degree of each aspect of human life is involved in a multiplicity of intensive 
communications, at the level of intensive communications or continuity. This 
is no real solace since continuity is synonomous with the death of the human 
considered as an integrated organism and a rational, rooral free agent.[5]: 
''For us, as discontinuous beings, death means the continuity of being" 
(OClO 19). 
It is conceivable that through this knowledge death has an added sense and 
thereby provokes less fearful anguish, but knowledge of continuity is useless 
(negative, noumenal, and impossible in the Kantian schema); it could as easily 
provoke more panic with its revelation of the energetic conditions which must 
inevitably destroy us: (OClO 25) 
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'''!here is a horrible excess in the movement that animates us· the excess 
sheds light on the sense of the movement. But this is onl; a terrible 
sign for us, reminding us that death, the rupture of that individual 
discontinuity in which anguish encloses us, tempts us as a truth more 
primary than life". 
The unfreedom of intensity and death is neither reduced nor distanciated by 
knowledge; in fact, for Bataille, the hunan - in conmon with all energetic 
matter - 'wills' the exacerbation of intensity and the approach of death by 
its inherent energetic mode of comnunication. This' truth' is sensibly 
registered in commmication of certain consciously extreme intensive kinds, 
especially sex which Bataille describes as: (OC10 21) 
"substitut[ing] for the isolation of being, discontinuity, an action of 
profoWld continuity" (OClO 21). 
Death and eroticism are linked as approaches to intensive zero [6]; and not 
s~ly at the level of biological sexual reproduction in which, for instance, 
discontinuous sperm and ovum fuse in continuity to create a new discontinuoius 
being; or as in asexual reproduction, where a cell bifurcates and the original 
disappears. Sex is a 'little death' relative to the 'little' energetic 
liberation of the death of the organism. The human is privileged in that it 
registers the passage of continuity - the instanciation of an energetic 
communication which is tendentially 'bigger than life' - in all these intense 
instances, either as participant or victims. 
Bataille's relation to the exceeding of the Kantian schema can best be shown 
in that his terminology is indissociable from the terminology of Kant's 
account of sensibility in aesthetic judgement, especially with reference to 
the 'violence' done the imagination by the sublime or massively affective 
object. Bataille extends the scope of this violence to the status of the 
organism itself.[7] Violence, for Bataille, is an abstraction designating the 
overwhelming of physiological equilibriuns by the influx or expenditure of 
massive quanta of energy. Reason and cultures are, according to Bataille, 
simply "composite beings", having "on the plane of affectivity... continuity 
of being" (OC10 28) and are thus examples of such economies of equilibriun 
which must seek to regulate their expenditures and influences. Thus within a 
rational community, sexual love itself in which the physiological 
'integrity' of the discontinuous lovers is dissolved momentarily - becomes the 
object of social regulations. Prohibitions regulate sex as they do death, 
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and thereby point to the threat of excessive releases of energy from the 
rational body, a threat that is itself rationally registered. For Bataille, 
eroticism is disequilibriun rather than the pleasure of equilibriun. The 
violent fusion of passion is analagous to the fusion of intensive energetic 
continuity, a disorder so violent that it cannot be called pleasure: (OC10 25) 
"Its essence is the substitution of a marvellous continuity between two 
beings for their persistent discontinuity" (OC10 25) .. 
Bataille's account is at once a psychology and an energetics of eroticism: 
The abstract energetic pol es uf continuity and discontinuity are transformed 
in this account into the poles of transgression and prohibition around which 
the psychological and energetic motions of attraction and repulsion play. A 
level of energetic principle and a level of Kantian sensibility are 
superimposed, one on the other. This is a typically Bataillean form of 
bastard discourse; and precisely refers to the outcome of Kantian critique, in 
so far as sensibility was shown to be the condition of thought and culture, 
and yet attempted to critically ground itself (at the level of a general 
energetics). This perverse post-Kantianism is evident when Bataille describes 
the sensibility of infection and threat as 'moral sympathy', the properly 
human communication: (OC10 25) 
"First and forenost the passion of lovers prolongs in the domain of 
moral sympathy the fusion of their bodies" (OClO 25). 
Bataille even describes the trajectory of his account of eroticism in terms 
reminiscent of the invasion of the Kantian rational schema by sensation: (OC10 
24) 
"It is a question of introducing into the interior of a world based on 
discontinuity, all the continuity to which this world is susceptible". 
His account prioritises sensibility, sensitivity, and affectivity and can 
thereby be designated as a post-critical celebration of influence and 
infection. 
For Bataille, eroticism attests to the impersonal libidinal drive towards the 
energetic continuun, which is 'felt' at the point of violation of the 
integrity of the discontinuous being, and is felt in addition to the 
unconscious sexual urges (for control, possession, manipulation) which are 
studied by psychoanalysis. The intensive extremity of sex and death is 
relative to these second order unconscious rut therapeutically conscionable 
desires for an equilibriun of the psyche, which constitute, however sadistic, 
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the normal attitude: 
'There is in the move from the normal attitude to desire a fundamental 
fascination with death" (OCI0 24). 
This fascination with death is too fundamental to be powered by the negative 
zero of lack; it is rather a question of the energetic accord with the 
excessive energies which are perceived, at the conscious level, as wracking 
and threatening us. If Bataille is thereby distanced from the psychoanalytic 
project in general, his account of the unconscious energetic conditions of the 
sensible account of hunan life is in basic agreement with the psychodynamic 
model of unconscious processes as described by Freud in Beyond the pleasure 
principle. [8] 
It is in this text that the impersonality of the libido is emphasised, which 
would in other texts and in ego-psychology in general be a complex of 
'personal' libidinal formations, determining characteristic behaviour. 
Freud opposes the pleasure and reality principles, the flows of libidinal 
energy seeking pleasure and the constraints imposed by the super-ego. This is 
a symptomatic but secondary distinction, given that within the pleasure 
principle itself, a more radical dis tinc tion is drawn by Freud. The energy 
flows appear to have, writes Freud, two tendential motions; following an 
erotic 'instinct', libidinal energy flows towards sexual behaviour, in which 
the unpleasure of a primary excitation is regulated and transfonned into 
pleasure; another motion tends towards this primary energetic excitation, and 
Freud calls this the 'Death Intinct'. This does not mean that death or any 
other analogy for this chaotic movement becomes an object of fixation in the 
machinations of the unconscious. The 'death instinct' is as little to do with 
the behaviour of libido in relation to objects of desire as it is to do with 
the behaviour of persons. Such a libido is eminently Kantian and internal. 
In this sense the parallelism which Bataille suggests between 'sensible' human 
behaviour and its energetic conditions is meaningless. It is rather a 
question of the interruption of L~lses oriented to the erotic by the motor 
which drives them, by a greater quantity of energetic pulses which threaten to 
overcode erotic Lmpulses and return them to the maximal and chaotic behaviour 
which would damage the integrity of the psychical organism. 
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Within the Pleasure Principle, the erotic tendency composes and isolates 
libidio whilst the thanatoid tendency induces transfers and communications of 
energy which themselves tend to dissolve integrated organisms in the general 
flow of an energetic environment. Thus within the pleasure principle - were 
it not for the fact that the two tendencies are only ever mixed - the extremes 
could both be considered 'death', although the isolation of the psychical 
organism from its larger environment is impossible, whereas the eventual 
flooding of this organism by the energetic matter of the environment is simply 
a question of time. For clarity of distinction it is simplest to consider 
death as a result of the isolating tendency which occurs at the point where 
such a tendency is overcome by external excitations. 
The libidinal compositions of the Pleasure Principle are precarious 
stabilisations in which Thanatos urges the interactions and conmunications 
between elements, and between any composition and the flows of invasive energy 
around it. Any level of erotic composition is thus, at the same time, a 
degree of thanatoid fusion between the composition and its environment. 
Lrnmanent zero and its transcendent degrees 
We can extend the scope of this model to all energetic events, and thereby 
define Bataille's notions of the temporal intensive differentiations of 
transcendence/inmanence. Intensity as a degree depends on the event of 
isolation (that Bataille calls transcendence or discontinuity). All intensive 
quantities are transcendences, degrees from the intensive zero of 
communication, continuity or immanence. Intensity and extensive magnitude are 
given together in the temporal intensive differentiation of space. A proper 
extension of this principle would concern itself with degrees of composition 
(rather than beings), in which changes of degree are brought about by 
intensification, that is from the increase of transcendence or intensive 
events within integrated compositions. This can best be illustrated by 
returning to the model of the Pleasure Principle, where every intensity or 
libidinal composition can likewise be considered as a differentiation from 
intensive zero to which it returns in the trajectory of Thanatos (intensive 
zero being the transcendental principle of 'Thanatos of which Deleuze writes 
[9]). Of course the novelty of this account is that this prLmary excitation 
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can no longer be said to be internal to a composition or an organism or any 
libidinal formation. Both refer to energy in general. Thus Freud's account 
gives us three levels of description of energy distribution; the level of 
psychical investments, the economy of the invasion of massive quantities of 
excitation from outside the psychic organism, and the economy of those 
quantities themselves insofar as they can be seen as separate from the damage 
they inflict on the psychic organism. Intensification is registered at the 
negative limit of concepts or organisms; or rather the point at which they are 
overwhelmed by the energy flooding in and circulating around them, so that 
they dissolve outwards, is registered at the level of general economy (at the 
level of the most primary process) as an increase of energy circulating in a 
free and random state at the level of that primary process. Intensive 
quantities result in intensifications on the scale of the macro-environment, 
an intensification which makes the speed and intensity of local compositions 
increase. 
The most general energetic sense of transcendence and immanence which Bataille 
deploys refers to this 'plane' of temporal and energetic differentiation of 
transcendent degrees of matter from the immanent zero of entropy, which can be 
seen as replacing the Idealist plane of limitation marked out by the logical 
negative and the exclusive zones of reason. The quantitative nature of the 
intensity and intensification of quanta in this immanent differentiation of 
tLme and energetic matter emphasises the fact that all compositions or events 
tend towards an entropic intensive zero in time, and behave relative to their 
elements, environments and this irrmanent zero at a variety of continuous 
degrees and speeds of change up to the threshold at which they are 
irremediably transformed. 
Bataille uses the notions of transcendence and irrmanence to designate this 
abstract energetic model, but he also associates these notions with the 
history of the religious and moral resolutions of the problem of expenditure -
that is, the problem posed by the tendency of the energies which constitute 
social canpositions to increase, capitalise themselves and threaten the 
negentropic equilibrium of the composition - a problem which faces societies 
in general. Both deployments of the tenns feed into Bataille's account of the 
general economy of energetic matter. 
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Transcendence and genealogy 
Bataille develops both senses of the terms in Theory of religion and On 
Nietzsche. [10] In the Theory of religion Bataille presents the reader with a 
pre-history of the philosophical moves which I have associated with Kant, but 
which apply at least as much to the whole phenomenological tradition. At the 
same time, this genealogy of philosophy and culture designates the parallel 
concerns of the energetic plane which I have described above. [11] We saw 
there that the scales of transcendent energetic matter were situated relative 
to an Lmmanent intensive zero, and that the perception of these events could 
be conceived as immanent to the energetic events of the forms, movements and 
transformations which occur on these multiple scales. Bataille attempts to 
define this paradoxical immanent perception in the opening pages of Theory of 
religion, before going on to define hunan transcendent perception, which he 
conceives as founding the hunan attitude to the world. Bataille attempts to 
define inmanence in relation to animality (OC7 292-3), by imagining how the 
animal senses difference, only to give up the attempt as nonsensical. 
However, he recognises the importance of the question as to the possibility of 
a 'non-logical difference' as distinct from a logical difference which posits 
transcendent objects. In a move reminiscent of Kant's rationalisation of the 
Sublime, Bataille infers the attributes of immanent intensive differentiation 
from the very form of the failure of his original act of 'imagination' (OC7 
293-4); in which an impossible object of perception (imrnanence - one of 
Kant's zeroes) dissolved. According to Bataille, in its passage this 
'concept' was no longer an object of knowledge but rather a movement on a 
terrain or a landscape, a movement among others which all "slip toward the 
tmknowable". This concept of irnnanence is itself • a dissipative object in 
time', characterised by its fluctuating degree of reality in time. 
Bataille states that such an object cannot be described in a precise way, and 
that even a perception of its changes is problematic. Only the general 
principle of the modification and disappearance of the object in time can be 
safely assuned, and local and specific imnanent activities can only be 
formulated as also tending to randomness. The magnitude, like the animal: 
"has only diverse behaviours according to diverse situations" (OC7 295). 
Lmmanence is less a question of a principle of difference than of a process of 
temporal differentiation and dissolution of transcendent quanta. The novun of 
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chaotic behaviour is inevitable and attests to the inadequacy of principles 
and regulations in restricting and articulating this temporal differentiation: 
(OC7 295) 
''V!e cannot say concerning a wolf which eats another wolf that it 
vl.olates the law decreeing that ordinarily tNOlves do not eat one 
~other. It does not violate this law: it has simply found itself in 
Cl.rcunstances where the law no longer applies" [12]. 
Bataille opposes the intensive perception of "irnnanent animality" to the 
perception formed by the Kantian distinction of the transcendental ego and the 
form of the non-I or object in general. Bataille considers the 
transcendental ego as functioning by positing "the transcendence of things in 
relation to consciousness (or of consciousness in relation to things)" (OC7 
295-6), and thereby 'lifting up' all elements and objects of consciousness 
including the self-determining subject onto a plane of discontinuity or 
transcendence. Bataille associates this transcendent operation with hl.l11an 
utile activity and with the delimitation of the possible from the immensity of 
imnanent virtuality (which the transcendent operation designates as 
'impossible'): (0C5 207-9) 
"Activity dominates us •• making acceptable - possible - that which 
without it would be impossible", 
'~e bring possibility to existence with a stupid absentmindedness; and 
everything finally contradicts this; it is the result of the postulate 
of work ••• everything is impossible". 
For Bataille, the form of the transcendent operation is the template applied 
to human activity in order to formulate life as goal-oriented and useful. 
However, utile values are themselves only validated by a further transcendent 
operation, as relative to the furtherance of either a divine principle or to 
the principle of Kantian hunan moral freedom. Bataille treats the Kantian 
schema which I have touched on [13] as of value for culture 'in abstracto', in 
so far as cultures treat the excessive energies which traverse them as 
necessitating or provoking a useless expenditure which they value ambivalently 
as 'sacred'. The' sacred' approximates to the inmanent energetic conditions 
of life which utile action disavows, and can approach, in its expenditures, 
this zero of Lmmanence to a dangerous degree. Thus the energetic movement of 
human social life is played out around the poles of the transcendent isolation 
of the objects posited by work and their values; and the 'sacred' approach to 
intensive zero and the dissolving values of that approach. This movement and 
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its events is temporally differentiated on the plane of transcendence relative 
to the zero of irrmanence. Bataille explicitly designates this plane in On 
Nietzsche. 
This plane is a plane of interference, contamination and contagion of the 
thermic and moral values associated with the 'drives' to transcendence and 
~nence. In Theory of religion Bataille concentrates on the religious and 
moral aspect (that is, the values) of these thermic degrees and describes the 
complication of the drives which resulted in the occidental culture of 
capital. He describes the reorientation of these values - which are 
originally the degrees of events in which the higher values approach the zero 
of the sacred - around the moral dualism of transcendence and irrmanence, a 
moral dualism which is overcoded - that is, the terms distinguished - by the 
transcendent operation of the drive to transcendence itself. According to 
this analysis (OC7 324ff), the value of sacred immanence - which was initially 
the site of an ambivalence, being both beneficient and malefic, release to and 
threat of zero - is historically overcoded by the transcendence of the object 
in the profane world and its functional values which peak with the Kantian 
idea of rational morality. Thus a rational moral (divine) principle comes to 
regulate the moral world view of capital, dissolving the malefic sacred in the 
sensuous and profane world and transforming the beneficient sacred into the 
higher hunan faculties. The profane world is considered both malefic and 
beneficient in so far as it is both unpredictable (sensuous) and predictable 
(rational). Bataille is most interested in the value of violence and 
contagion which was associated with the malefic sacred: this is transformed, 
he argues into the value associated with the transcendent operation itself 
(OC7 331). The originary violence of the sacred entailed the tendency of 
sacred release to destroy utile objects and hold utile values in abeyance; 
transcendence reduces violence to good and bad influence - the influence of 
rational faculties as legitimations of the conception of phenomenal objects 
and utile projects, and the restricted, hardly countenanced influence of 
noumenal objects on those projects and faculties. The latter approximates to 
the violence and 'intimacy' of the sacred insofar as it involves a dissolution 
of the transcendence of the utile object and subject. Intimacy can only be 
considered an intensive act of violence and transgression because it is an 
approach to zero which occurs within the dualist territory lorded over by the 
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transcendent operation: (OC7 311-2) 
'.~t. is . int~te. • .is, ~t has the passion of an absence of 
1ndlvlduallty •• lnt1macy 1S v10lence •• because it is not compatible with 
the positing of the separate individual". 
The death of the Christian God is an example of the inevitability of the 
intimate sacrifice of the transcendent legitimations of the transcendent 
operation, that is the inevitable haemorrhage of the values of reason and 
morality; which is only inevitable because of the inevitable thermic death of 
all such values and degrees in the unleashed contagions of the energetic 
movements towards zero: (OC7 333) 
"In death the divinity accepts the sovereign truth of an unleashing that 
overturns the order of things, but it deflects the violence onto itself 
and thus no longer serves that order". 
Thus Bataille equates the transcendent operation with the delimitation of the 
utile and the possible, and thereby ultimately with the formation of a moral 
image of the legitimation of that delimitation. He defines God as produced 
through the operations of transcendence which characterise the Kantian mind-
picture: (OC5 207) 
"1) aspiration to the state of an object (to transcendence, to 
definitive immutability) 2) the idea of the superiority of such a state. 
The order of things ordained by God ••• sullnits to the principle of the 
possible... One says of the word God that it exceeds the limits of 
thought - but no! it allows a definition on one point, that of limits ••• 
The order of things willed by God is submitted to the principle of the 
possible". 
But God is also a symptom of the inevitable death of transcendence, its return 
as a degree to the summit of the immanence of zero thermic energy, as a result 
of its own intensification of the energies which run through it: (OC6 163) 
'~anscendence has become mortal by consolidating the idea of 
God •• Without the development of transcendence - transcendence that 
founds the Lmperative temper - human beings would have remained animals. 
Though the return to immanence takes places at the elevation at which 
humanity exists.. Imnanence signifies 'cormrunication I at that level, 
without going down or up again". 
Transcendence is the tendency of degrees of energetic matter to isolate 
themselves and become negentropic; rut isolation and negentropy can only 
culminate in a return to immanence. Lmmanence is the dissolution of values 
and degrees, and thus only transcendent events can be said to signify: 
"Only transcendences (discontinuities) are intelligible. Continuity is 
only intelligible in relation to its opposite. Pure immanence and the 
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nothingness of inmanence are equivalent and signify nothing" (OC6 176). 
However, irrmanence af f ec ts transcendence, revealing transcendences as 
dissolving degrees and values, rather than as irrm.Jtable entities. Thus the 
transcendent degrees called morals are shown to be relative to Lmmanence to , 
be dissolving degrees, in sensation. Morals are simply attempts to restrict 
this dissolution with intellectual formulations, yet still simply manifest the 
powerlessness of thought before the unconsciousness of imnediate (sensible) 
reactions to strong stirrruli (OC8 633). Inmanence is the revelation of the 
energetic condition and trajectory of transcendence in sensibility: 
'~e state of immanence signifies 'beyond good and evil'. 
It is linked to non-ascesis, to the liberty of the senses" (OC6 170) 
'~e are bound to flee the emptiness (insignificance) of infinite 
irrmanence, insanely dedicating ourselves to the lie of transcendence! 
But in its madness this lie lights up the irrmanent inmensity. An 
irrmensity now no longer a pure non-sense or a pure emptiness, it is the 
foundation of full being, a true foundation before which the vanity of 
transcendence dissipates. We would not have known transcendence ••• if we 
had not first const.ructed it and then rejected it, torn it down" (OC6 
181). 
Bataille chooses to concentrate in the Theory of Religion and On Nietzsche on 
the complexity of the plane of immanent transcendence in so far as it presents 
us with a map of the temporal differentiation of energetic matter as degrees, 
values and morals. Thus I have emphasised the sensible condition of morals as 
well as the intensive condition of sensation. An account of the intensive 
differentiation of matter can have other than a moral orientation. [14] 
Bataille consolidates his energetics of morals in his account of general 
economy, by giving it a biological and thermodynamic base. But we should not 
lose sight of the general effect of the trajectory of sensation and the 
nounenal object proper to it - "the time-object which destroys [the subject] 
whilst destroying itself" (0C6 159). Bataille replied to Sartre's 
phenomenologist's complaint (almost worthy of Derrida in its obstinate 
rejection of the possibility of the thermic contagion of thought) that 
inmanence and non-knowledge were ''hypostasies of pure nothingness" (OC6 197) 
and thereby simply articulated the phenomenological relation between subject 
and object; by relegating concerns with transcendentals and absolutes to the 
trasOCsn of "slow thought". This slow thought, writes Bataille, is itself no 
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longer possible; after the catastrophe of thought and its transformation into 
the quanta of a thermic contagion, thought is like: 
"the blurring countryside seen from a train, problems perceived 
dissolving in movement and accelerating to a calamitous speed as they 
reappear in new forms". 
The effect of sensation, of the affect of the nournenal object on the subject 
is the dissolution of thought in its intensification, in its accelerating 
incoherence, which maps out the general terrain of its own extinction. 
Intensive communications 
We saw above [15] that Kant arrived at an unconvincing conception of 
'conmunication' as the intensive quanta proper to the form of hunan moral 
freedom in the course of the Critique of Judgement. For Bataille the quanta 
of communication are the energetic events which constitute the alternative 
terrain of the 'general economy' of restricted and rationalised economies such 
as that of the Idealist schema of mental processes. This notion of 
communication is resolutely inhuman and posits a scale of perception which is 
useless for the practical tasks of a philosophy which would associate humanity 
with independence from its natural energetic conditions. At the same time 
the notion of communication cannot be reduced to this critical function. 
Bataille uses this notion in analyses which map and compare energetic events 
according to general principles of energetic distrirution (as we shall see); 
but over and above this sense of communication hangs the horrible 
senselessness of that which it designates, the dissipative nature of 
coomunication as the condition of energetic matter in time. The critical 
function of the notion of communication dissolves in the senselessness of the 
intensive zero of communication, thereby exacerbating the contagious condition 
of energetic matter at the intensive low-level of the philosopher's 
vertiginous panic. The disjunction between the will to expenditure and the 
necessarily rationalised desire for the equilibrium of sense is bridged, and 
liberates the discursive panics of thought which fluctuate in their 
accelerations towards and from the base energetic zero. This coomunicative 
behaviour of attraction and repulsion to zero is one novel characteristic of 
Bataille's texts, and drives them to their post-critical state. 
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In Inner Experience Bataille heralds the arrival of conmunication as the 
dissolution of the basic co-ordinates of Idealist philosophy: (OC5 74) 
~Abo~e all no ,more object ••• There is no longer subject=object, but a 
gaplng breach between the one and the other and in the breach the 
object and the subject are dissolved, there i~ passage, communica~ion, 
but not from the one to the other, the one and the other have lost 
distinct existence". 
The general characteristics of comnunication are described with remarkable 
similarity throughout Bataille' s work. All these accounts of coomunication 
emphasise a novel scale of perception, which does not register the scaled 
bodies of individuals or individual organisms (which Bataille calls 
'ipseities', that is, simple or essential entities); but rather a microscopic 
and macroscopic, molecular or "granular" (OC5 472) perception, which describes 
the movements and flows of particles which cannot be said to have ' ipsei ty' 
because their movements can only be perceived relative to other particles, and 
yet which constitute and deconstitute the bodies of ipseity in the flows of 
their time, in a complex manner tha t beggars hunan comprehension. 
Comnunication involves htnnan understanding in a new sublime, an irrmensity of 
the micro- and the macro-scopic. The salient points are rapidly articulated 
in one page of the 'Communication' section of Inner Experience: (OC5 110-1) 
"What one calls a 'being' is never simple •• it is undermined by its 
profound inner division, it remains poorly closed, and at certain 
points, open to attack from outside ••••• What you are is connected to the 
activity of the numberless elements which constitute you, to the intense 
communication of these elements amongst themselves. These are 
contagions of energy, of movement, of heat, and the transfers of 
elements ••• Life is never given at a particular point: it passes 
rapidly from one point to another (or from multiple points to other 
points), like a current or like an electrical circuit. Thus where you 
would like to grasp your timeless substance, you encounter onl.;.' a 
haemorrhaging and the uncoordinated play of your perishable elements'. 
This change of scale of perception refutes our basic as sllIlpt ions about 
ourselves - that we are static 'beings I, and that a privileged hunan scale 
provides us with the problems we face - , reveals the '~robability' if not 
~possibility of these habitual conceptions from the energetic perspective of 
the conditions of life: (OCS 68) 
"subject, object are perspectives of being at a rnanent of inertia". 
Our habitual conception of a human scale to the problems facing our bodies and 
property takes no account of the fusional scalar intricacies of the 
conmunication of elements, both wi thin the macro-bodies of 'ipsei ties' or 
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organisms and in the interface of these elements (which we consider 'proper' 
to us) with the energetic economies of the 'threats' posed by external 
energetic stimuli.[16] 
Given the complexity of the communications the essence of which he is trying 
to describe, it is no wonder that Bataille's accotmt favours the 
disproportionate and dissolving relation of the human scale to communication 
in general; there is a dramatic certainty to the dissolution of the hunan 
perspective: (OC5 111) 
''Your .lif~ is not limited to t~t ungraspable inner streaming [the 
coomun1cat10n of the elements]; 1t streams to the outside and opens 
itself incessantly to what flows out or surges forth towards it. The 
lasting vortex which you are runs into similar vortices, with which it 
fOnTIS a vast figure, animated by a measured agitation". 
This intermittent prejudice for the hunan sense of corrmunication waylays 
Bataille's account of communication into Kantian (and even proto-Habermasian) 
formulations, most notably in Literature and Evil, where he describes 
communication as: (OC9 312) 
"the supreme appearance of existence, which reveals itself to us in the 
multiplicity of consciousnesses and in their communicability". 
The tension between the human sense of comnunication and its impersonal 
energetic sense recurs tllroughout the analyses which Bataille gives of 
'composite beings' of'several kinds. This is unsurprising given that the 
energetic sense of communication exceeds or covers a set of events which is 
bigger than and includes the events of human comnunication. At the same time, 
this tension creates dazzling mental resonances and conceptual complexities in 
those accounts. 
The notion of communication dissolves the model of affectivity which I have 
associated with sensation in Kant's critical project. For here the difference 
between internal and external influence is negligible; all communications are 
quanta in a dissipative and contagious mode. In a sense this was also true of 
sensation - which was both inside and outside the enclosure of the faculties. 
However, with the notion of camnmication the contagious mode of energy 
transfers is seen as the primary object of description and itself the basis 
for the entities which organise themselves around a shortlived internal 
economy. The energetic notion of conmunication entails the topography of a 
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spatial dissipating differentiation relative to and veering towards a base 
zero of communication, rather than a limited spatial Idealist topography of 
enclosures and impossible excluded zones.[17] The flows of communication may 
affect the matter which congeals at the tips of their swirls and eddies 
('being'), but this is sLmply a continuation of their nature as pathways of 
energy flow, passages of heat and energetic movement. For Bataille, intensity 
is only in the second place a marker of sensibility, the sensation of anguish 
which responds to the threat of dissolution for energetically challenged human 
beings. Contagious intensity is primarily the attribute of energetic 
communication itself. 
The complexities of the compositions thrown up in the course of energetic 
communication are detailed in the section of Inner Experience entitled 'The 
Labryinth' [18] and in the College of Sociology lectures (OC2 291-363). 
In both these texts the appearance of energetic compositions other than 
organisms depends on changes of the scale of perception, changes which affect 
the status of the perceiver as well. The 'subject' of such a perspective is 
no more than an energetic superconductor itself, that is, itself has the form 
of communication; its 'perception' is therefore little more than the mapping 
of the energetic communications which constitute it and into which I it I 
dissolves. The human is only privileged in having a general awareness of - an 
ability to register - the irrmense movements which occur on the scales which 
exceed and huniliate it. The human is simply another energetic element and 
superconductor, increasing the intensity of the energetic quanta which passes 
through it [19]: (OCS 112-3) 
'~ou and me are, in the vast flux of things, only resistances favouring 
a resurgence ••••• To the extent that you are an obstacle to overflowing 
forces, you are headed for pain ••• But you are still free to perceive ~he 
sense of this anguish within you; the way in which the obstacle wh1Ch 
you are must negate itself and will itself destroyed, given that it 
originated in forces which break it". (OCS 112-3) 
It is the equation of an unconscious human will with energetic communication 
in general which effects this intensification of energy, despite all hunan 
conscious intentions; for these intentions are necessarily utile: (OC7 271) 
"Each of us is only a resistance favouring a resurgence •• our isolation 
permits a halt but this halt only increases the inten~ity of the 
movement when it is liberated. Separate existence 1S ~mly the 
condition of retarded and explosive communications ••• The halt 1S only a 
recharge" , 
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'The intensity of a contact •• is a function of a resistance" (OC5 390) 
It would be a regressive step to designate this function of resistance 
(especially in its hunan example) as 'affecting' the scales of the general 
economy of energetic communication. Intensity and intensification have local 
values for the restricted economies of compositions which appear on certain 
scales of energetic communication, as well as designating the differential 
principle which is at work across scales in relation to intensive zero. 
Intensity grows locally, to points of saturation which are themselves local 
and which dissolve into the flows of immense time; but intensity also grows 
and is dissipated universally and thereby produces these minor localities in 
the process of its intensive temporal-spatial differentiation. 
Bataille succllIlbs to the temptation of prioritising the perspective of the 
hunan organism with regard to its destruction, partly because he tends to 
treat physiology and energetic economy as indistinguishable, and partly 
because of the energetic value of the spectacle of the violent dissolution of 
human concerns in time. Given the 'neutrality' of the scientific fact of the 
pure thermic contagion of communication, Bataille's prioritisations designate 
a perspective proper to an energetics of thought or libidinal materialism. 
In 'The Labyrinth', Bataille associates the will to expenditure, which he 
argues is found at all levels of energetic matter, with the sovereign value of 
hlJIlan action which is "a tragic and incessant canbat for a satisfation which 
is almost beyond reach".(OC1 434) Only the human seeks sufficiency and thus 
finds itself insufficient. But this state is unnecessary from an energetic 
perspective; the human intensification of existence happens despite the 
utilitarian values which come to frame all human behaviour. Despite the utile 
frame, all aspects of existence at the human level (as at every other) can be 
conceived as a question of compositions of excessive (over-sufficient) energy. 
This includes the social and historical compositions which philosophers - such 
as Hegel - take as the objects of pure formulations: 
'The contradictory movements of degradation and growth atta~n, in the 
diffuse development of human existence, a bewildering Compl:X1ty. The 
fundamental separation of men into masters and slay-es. 1S only. the 
crossed threshold, the entry into the world of spec1al1sed func~lons 
where personal 'existence' empties itself ~f i~s contents: ~ man 1S no 
longer anything but a part of being, and h1S llfe, engaged 1n the game 
of creation and destruction which goes beyond it, appears as a degraded 
particle lacking reality". 
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It is the values of utile knowledge given to the hunan social fonnations of 
the indifferent energetic quanta of the universe which splits the trajectory 
of human life. Bataille continues: 
"'B' , . . 
. 71ng .1ncreases 1n the tumultuous agitation of a life that knows no tl1n7ts i 1t wastes away and ?isappear~ if he who is at the same time 
be1ng and knowledge mut11ates hllnself by reducing himself to 
knowledge. " 
But every path is only a symptom of the immensity of energetic 'being'; thus 
utile knowledge and its goals - the dream of divine sufficiency, the 
reflection of an ideal ego, simply defer the encounter with the 
'uncertainty' and improbability of energetic nature: 
"It is a clumsy man, still incapable of eluding the intrigues of nature, 
who locks being in the ego. Being in fact is found NOWHERE and it was 
easy prey for a sickly malice to discover it to be divine, at the summit 
of a pyramid fonned by the multitude of beings, which has at its base 
the irrmensity of the simplest matter." (OCl 435) 
The summit becomes for Bataille the privileged site of the displacement which 
affects all energetic elements, which is itself effected through their 
tendency to expend. The particles which constitute an entity are also 
involved in other comnunications, other complex energetic compositions on 
other scales of energetic distribution, which are themselves also subject to 
time. The summit is the threshold or point of dissolution at which these 
minor chaotic behaviours overwhelm the clear picture of an entity on a given 
scale, necessitating a change of perspective, a change of scale and the 
annihilation of that entity. Bataille discusses the impossibility of the 
independence of any level of energetic particle (the organism included) using 
the analogy of a sponge (OCl 436) [20]; the fact that simple organisms can 
constitute aggregates which function autonomously only goes to show that both 
elements and aggregates are as heterogeneous as each other, traversed by the 
same energetic flows and unbearable tensions. The stability of the organism 
is a convenient illusion for the initial registering of the thermic changes 
occurring within an energetic environment: 
"A man is only a particle inserted in unstable and entangled who~es. 
'These wholes are composed in personal life in the form of mu~ t1ple 
possibilities, starting with a knowledge that is crossed 11ke a 
threshold - and the existence of the particle can in no way ~ is~lated 
from this composition, which agitates it in the midst of a wh1rl~nd of 
ephemerids. This extreme instability of connections alone perm1ts one 
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to introduce, as a puerile but convenient illusion a representation of 
isolated existence turning in on itself" (OCI 437) , 
The summit comes to replace this convenient illusion, marking as it does the 
point at which the integrity of an entity is compromised, overcome and even 
'transcended' • It is not so much that particles exclusively enter into a 
single aggregate which 'transcends' them, but that particles and aggregates 
are only distinguished by scales, and that the surmit marks the point of 
inscrutability at which an entity is transcended by its constitutive 
communications and perception reconvenes on another scale. Transcendence is 
in this situation, simply the register of a change, a movement between scales 
of Lmmanent communication in relation to an intensive zero.[2l] 
According to Bataille, the pretence of autonomy, a deduction or subtraction of 
a base unit of One from the perception of a multiplicity of conmunications, 
which is first made as a claim proper to human rational knowledge, leads the 
human ("that unpredictable and purely improbable chance" (0C5 101)) to seek a 
total perception of "the whole of transcendence", "to complete being" (OC5 
105) that is, to delimit the base of the pyramid (the Lmmensity of energetic 
matter) with regard to the surrmit and reorient affects and energetic quanta 
within a given spatial distribution. This would be a pre-Kantian schema, from 
which Kant himself cannot be totally divorced, as we have seen. Such a 
metaphysical substantiation of the image of thermic contagion eliminates the 
basic effects of the processes of communication; that its differentiation of 
substances occurs in time and that thus substance (like being) is a spatial 
differentiation of "irreducible differences" (OC5 110) subject to time: 
''What we call 'substance' is only a provisional state of equilibriun 
between the radiation (loss) and accumulation of force •• life itself is 
no less accumulation and loss of force, a constant illicit compromise of 
this equilibrium which makes it possible" (OC5 250). 
Bataille points out in a Kantian fashion that the human is chasing the tail of 
its intelligence in seeking to substantiate the summit as a completion point 
of existence: 
''We can enclose nothing, we can only find insufficiency" (0C5 104) 
"[The summit] is only 'grasped' in error; the error is ••• the condition 
of thought". (OC5 98) 
This 'flight towards the s\Jl11li.t' is only one path in the labryinth of 
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conmunication (OCS 102). But all paths eventually lead to the truth of the 
summit as the threshold of change, states Bataille (OCS 102), because of the 
attractive power of the will to expenditure which urges energetic matter to 
conmunicative change and dissolution. The image of the pyramid and its 
sumnit, combined with the model of nuclear attraction gives us the paradigm 
for Bataille's account of the analogical behaviour of intensive entities and 
energy in general. Both are related to thresholds of change and dissolution, 
the immanent zero of communication of new thermic degrees or an entropic state 
respectively. This sense of the threshold can be distinguished (as we have 
noted [22]) from the traditional sense of measurement - typified by Kant's 
account of degree - fixated on the base unit of One. As Bataille goes on to 
describe the model of the sl.JIl11it and the pyramidal base, we see that it 
provides an exact image of the liberated critique which we attempted to define 
in Kant's 'Critiques'. In this image, the stmnit represents the attractive 
power of the immanent intensive zero and the 'base' the transcendent planes of 
energetic matter which tend to this zero. The drive to zero is exacerbated by 
the communication between degrees of transcendent matter, as critique tended 
to unconscious senselessness as it contested every single remnant of 
transcendent thought in Kant's 'Critiques'. In both transcendent matter and 
the Kantian operations of the faculties, the explicit desire for sufficiency 
is lampooned as the excessive nature of the forces traversing these 
transcendent events resonates through matter and thought: (OCS 107) 
'~e summit incessantly throws the base back into insignificance, and in 
this sense, waves of laughter traverse the pyramid, contesting degree by 
degree the pretense of sufficiency in beings of a lower level. But the 
first network of waves from the summit flows back and a second network 
traverses the network from bottom to top: the reflux contests the 
sufficiency of those beings placed higher. This contestation preserves 
the summit until the last moment: it cannot fail, however to reach it. 
In truth, nllIlberless being is in a certain sense suffocated by a 
reverberating convulsion. 1t 
Zero is inevitably reached even without the critical exposure of the laughable 
pretences of reason towards a would-be universal totality. The article 'The 
Labyrinth I finishes with a surreal image of the intense and explosive 
situation which Bataille saw as shared by the extreme nature of hunan 
endeavour and energetic matter in general. Everything rushes to zero: (OC1 
440) 
'~ UNIVERSAL resembles a bull, sometimes absorbed in the nonchalance 
of animality and abandoned to the secret paleness of death, and 
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sanetimes hurled by the rage of ruin into the void ceaselessly opened 
before it by a skeletal torerv. 13ut the void it meets is also the 
nudity it espouses". 
The 'College of Sociology' lectures (0C2 291-363) apply the notion of 
ccmnunication in studies of social formations, taking as their point of 
departure the idea that societies can be analysed as fields of unconscious 
energetic forces, as 'composite beings' traversed by 'communal movements' (0C2 
295). Bataille associates the idea of a composite social being with the 
French Sociological tradition of Durkheim, Tarde and Mauss (OC7 265ff). Such 
a composition is composed of micro-scalar and chaotic energetic communications 
which can transform the macro-composition itself. The composite form is a 
minimal 'unity' for these scales of communication, an arbitrarily totalled 
addition of the scalar forms which compose 'it', which recollects, adds to and 
differentiates them (QG2 297). It is as much a movement of transformation as 
a composition: 
"Just as in nature itself everything remains vague, composite and rich 
enough in possibilities for diverse forms that it endlessly reduces 
hunan intelligence to shame". 
The scale of composition is continuous, and thus the differences in attributes 
between the scalar forms in a composition can only be quantitative, that is, 
of degree (0C2 299). Thus for Bataille, consciousness is a degree of 
intensive matter, another cormrunication, and for instance as in death, the 
higher aggregates of energetic communication can disperse with a minimal 
effect to the micro-scale energetic communications which constitute a 
composition. Thus the comnunal movement is not proper to the composition as a 
whole - which is itself an inert negentropic coomunication relative to the 
intensive communications which constitute it - , but rather to the movement of 
the composite elements over and above it! Composite beings are radically 
open to time through this constitution and dissolution by their communicative 
elements: (OC2 305) 
"Such composite existences simply have differences of inte!lsity and 
movement which depend on the ntlllber of elements that they reun1te and on 
the concentrations of certain functions which arise in the biggest 
agglomerations". 
These differences are provoked by motor forces of attraction and repulsion, 
that is forces of attraction to intensive zero and of resistance to this 
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attraction. For Bataille the essential contagious nature of communication in 
energetic compositions is oriented around the intensive zero of the summit or 
nucleus which attracts peripheral elements towards it. (OC2 292). In 
religious societies, this zero is represented by the 'sacred nucleus' (0C2 
315ff), and the approach to it, its mode of sacred power, is given in the 
prohibitions and their transgression which regulate the movement of energetic 
elements in that society. [23] Bataille thus reduces individual and group 
psychology to elements of a communal energetic movement of communication: 
lithe active function [of the sacred nucleus] is the transformation of a 
depressive content into an object of exaltation" (0C2 316). 
Prohibition and transgression are themselves only second-order formulations of 
the powers of attraction and repulsion which characterise physical entities 
(atoms and electrons) as well as psychological economies; that is, which 
characterise communication in general. [24] 
In sacred societies, the summit or nucleus is as mobile as the communications 
which it attracts, in keeping with the tenor of its immanent process: 
liThe driven movement is more important than its occasional object" (OC2 
326). 
The values associated with the surrmit and the regulations which restrict 
access to them and it have arbitrary sites (places, rituals, objects) 
associated with them, but the movement is immanent to them in so far as they 
are considered energetic events and dependent on the transformations of time. 
Religious and social events are associated with intensities and thus a mapping 
of their energetic status is possible. These events, like all energetic 
events, are transcendent to the immanent zero which they are attracted 
towards; communication is an immanent process which has as its effect the 
transformations of the energetic differentiation tmmanent to time, 
transformations which themselves occur within time. Bataille's account of 
the energetic communication constitutive of sacred societies preempts the 
critical and genealogical trajectory of his account of general economy. [25] 
But paradoxically, it is the human psychological resonances of communication 
which attest to the vertiginous contagion of an energetic communication which 
must overwhelm and dissolve the rational uses and discourses to which we can 
restrict it. This can best be designated at the level of sensibility, in the 
fear of a contagion and infection which comes to usurp all rationalisations. 
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Bataille's notion of communication can be clarified (and rationalised further) 
by examining its thermodynamic properties. A thermodynamic system is one in 
which the energy available for the compositions and formations of life tends 
towards an intensive zero, entropy, a state of the maximal chance distribution 
of energy in a system. This movement is closely linked to the conception of a 
unidirectional or irreversible time which can be contrasted with the 
reversible time imagined by classical mechanics, and with the logics of 
mathematics which reduces time to the status of a variable element. 
Thennodynamics, like Bataille' s cormrunication sees time as the principle of 
variation or differentiation of energetic matter itself which effects the move 
from order and difference to disorder and dissolution in the maximal en tropic 
state of any system. Time effects the transition of transcendent degrees of 
matter to zero. Scales of complexity are Lmportant in analyses of 
thermodynamic as well as coomunicative structures. As we noted with 
communication, energy intensifies and degrades to entropy on the scale of the 
universe or the system; and intensifications also occur at the level of the 
intensive degrees of matter, which are themselves in a tendential negentropic 
state of disequilibrated energy flux and composition. This negentropic state 
can only be provisional, as is attested to by the intensifications which wrack 
them, and which mark a crossover between degrees and between scales of 
degrees, (and thus a growth in entropy, in so far as energy is liberated). 
Bataille's quasi-phenomenological formulae on representation as a substitution 
of appearance for intensive reality - an appearance which is conditioned by a 
disappearance [26] - has a thermodynamic interpretation and condition, in that 
intensities are positive registers of the intensive degree of an event 
hurtling towards the intensive zero of death; intensities are representations 
which occur insofar as they become entropic. 
As we have noted, there is no contradiction between the dissipation of 
differentiated entities at the macro level and the increase in thermic 
differences in a local negentropic environment. Both are symptoms of the 
increase of energy - its increasing virulent differentiation in time -
towards entropic or intensive zero. Negentropy is only the provisional 
tendency of matter to organise itself into informational redundancies, 
habitual and simple comnunications which come to be called - on the hunan 
scale self-evident truths or 'meanings'. Recent developnents in 
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thermodynamics have replaced the study of ideal closed thermodynamic systems 
with that of open systems in which the general and specific imbalances of a 
system are emphasised - that is, the way in which negentropic turoolence 
creates eddies and involutes so 'independent' from the general movement 
towards entropy that, for instance multitemporality can occur within 
irreversible time. [27] This can be considered a regressive step given that 
it makes possible the deflection of the radical import of energetic 
dissolution; en tropic zero becomes a horizon event which is simply taken into 
accotmt in articulations of the quasi-independent 'restricted economies' of 
local environments. Similarly, in Bataille's account of general economy the 
import of intensive death is decathected through the question of the relative 
status of general and restricted economies. The notion of the contagious mode 
of communication affects a critical revaluation of minor and irrelevant 
restricted economies; whereas the niceties of the principle of general economy 
posit the relative independence of general and restricted economies, only then 
to demonstrate the conditions of the latter in the former. Bataille's account 
of general economy can almost be seen as a moment of transcendental 
philosophy, except that the general movements of energy are shown to be 
~ent to the restricted energetic economies of organisms, exacerbating and 
intensifying their ,impossible equilibriuns. Bataille' s account of general 
economy is best seen in relation to the account of communication which I have 
detailed above; general economy is nothing more than the scales of energetic 
movement and temporal differentiation in relation to thermic zero. This is no 
economy at all, nor does it entail a transcendental principle, but is s~ly a 
mapping of the temporal differentiation of solar radiation, of the irradiating 
and contagious energy which creates as it dissolves. 
However the sLmple mode of energetic contagion is not only the 'principle' of 
a still rational general economy, although there it dissolves the problems of 
transcendental philosophy; it is also the infectious and virulent mode of 
energy at every level of energetic matter. Human sensation is privileged - or 
cursed - in this regard, registering contagious intensity independently of its 
subsequent relay to and effect on second-order rationalisations. [28] The 
value of these sensible episodes of contagion is that they demonstrate the 
inevitability of our dissolution in energies which overwheLm us: (OC7 276) 
'''!he accord, at the base of things, of our joy and a movement which 
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des troys us". 
For Bataille, this inevitability and accord provokes a practical irreason of 
sorts: (OC6 167) 
"If I cannot make the sunmit an object of action or intentions, I can 
make my life an ongoing evocation of possibilities". 
This glib project cannot withstand the pressure of the energetic infections or 
intensities which wrack our bodies and can as easily turn joy into pain. 
Intensity - neither pleasure nor pain - is frightening in its neutrality as 
well as in its contagious growth in time. 
The surface of Bataille' s writing registers the sensible events of these 
contagions and enthusiasms, in which thought has no resistance to the external 
affects of its energetic environment and becomes oversensitive, inmensely 
sensitive; and is thereby dissolved in the rush of sensations in time which 
overwhelm it and hurtle it on to the post-critical dissolution of sensation 
itself, according to the principle of all thermic quanta. 
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Olapter Seven: BATAILLE - RElAPSE AND (X)Ll.APSE 
The forrrulae of general econOOly 
The term 'general economy' may be particular to Bataille's work, but it does 
not therefore designate a 'philosophical project' and a solution to the 
problems of critical thought inherited from Kant. To suggest that it does 
would, be a hideous misrepresentation of the outrage presented by 'general 
economy' from the perspective of any traditional philosophical method which 
includes a notion of its own verifiable epistemological status. Bataille's 
philosophical writing can be traced to a tradition of critical thinking, but 
his writing can only be considered, at the level of philosophical analysis, as 
a series of symptoms of a massive breakdown of the rational imnune system, 
which inevitably destroys the ground of critique itself. Having said that, 
the account of 'general economy' is Bataille' s most rationally formulated 
although fragile and minimal measurement of the energies liberated by that 
critical explosion. It designates a field of quanta in a similar manner to 
that of the general rules of Kant's form of aesthetic judgement. It could 
therefore be conceived as a minimal relapse to reason on Bataille' s part. 
However, the phrase 'general economy' is neither a concept nor a schema on the 
scale of Kant's 'transcendental idealism'; not a project for philosophy, but 
- just as Kant's rules formulated, given an intensive reading, the rules of 
the form of conmunication - the general set of thermic principles by which 
philosophy, in common with all human and energetic activity, is ruined. 
In the course of the Accursed Share[1] Bataille posits a secondary level at 
which philosophy and human activity in general can contend with these 
principles, change their own behaviour and a t tempt to ' emula te ' these 
principles of energy (albeit in a necessarily restricted fashion) in order to 
avoid the unnecessary violence of the effects of utile accumulatory activity, 
such as crises of over-production, and global inequalities of wealth.[2] 
However, the basic - and still critical - trajectory of Bataille's account of 
general economy lies with the revaluation of utile products as energetic 
quanta obeying energetic principles rather than principles of utility. Most 
of the concepts and values which Bataille extracts from his Idealist heritage 
do not outlive their uses, when these are themselves related to their 
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conditions in the~c contagious communication. The levels of utility and 
energetic expenditure must conflict, and this conflict is, for Bataille, at 
the basis of all historical and cultural develo{X1lents. Those values and 
concepts which do survive, because of their relative proxtmity as degrees to 
the intensive zero, are imbued with a new sense of harshness or cruelty which 
is witness to the indifferent intensity of energetic contagion. Thus, 
although Bataille develops what might be called a I thennodynamics I of 
knowledge, history and culture, this discourse itself has a deviant status, a 
savage intensity rather than a rhetorical or reasoned power of conviction. 
It is possible to distinguish between the deployment of two senses of the term 
I general economy' in Bataille' s texts. One minor sense in which 'general 
economy' designates the set of conceptual possibilities or knowledge in 
relation to its excess (non-knvwledge) in a schematic manner, as a field, and 
maintains the philosophical jargon proper to philosophy in that field. This 
is the sense which Derrida picks up on and treats too 'seriously', identifying 
it with the deconstructive methodology. This minor sense is the less frequent 
of the two; it lessens the difference between restricted and general economy 
by construing general economy as an extension of restricted economy, arising 
from it, and remaining internal to it, insofar as one can only describe 
general economy by traversing restricted economy in each of its conceptual 
moments. This eminently philosophical sense of general economy still inhabits 
the German Idealist space of the interior experience of the transcendental ego 
and the limits of possibility proper to its understanding, albeit including at 
these limits the self-destructive 'sovereign operation' which opens this space 
to what it cannot regulate. At a philosophical level, this sense of general 
econany is simply a revisionist Kantianism, emphasising the limit of the 
no unena 1 in shifting its function as a negative limitation of the 
understanding onto the indete~nate notion of a general economy of reason, 
whilst the effects of the nounenal {and this is a radical departure for 
Kantianism - to recognise the feedback of sensation into reason} are described 
at the level of sensibility (anguish, ecstasy etc). The resonances of this 
sense of general economy with traditional philosophical schema facilitate a 
reduction of the difference of general economy from the concepts of the post-
Kantian Continental tradition. General economy is thereby implicated in the 
substitutive series of Bataillean 'concepts' whose necessary relation to 
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traditional philosophical problems is thereby consolidated. Derrida and the 
commentators who have followed his lead have forged links between this sense 
of general economy - only found explicitly in a couple of fragmented 
statements in the 'Method of Meditation' - and the schema of knowledge and 
experience found in 'Interior Experience'. This is, as we shall see, a 
reorientation and fundamental domestication of the energetic concerns of the 
major sense of general economy, around traditional static philosophical 
concepts. 
The very fact that the trajectory of philosophy or utile activity, as opposed 
simply to their limits of possibility, is of concern in the restricted sense 
of general economy, is symptomatic of the attributes of the major sense of the 
same. For this restricted and still Idealist philosophical model to be 
possible, the energetic principles which coordinate the trajectories of its 
elements must be in place. Derrida misrepresents Bataille when he extracts 
only the minor sense from the fragment in the 'Method of Meditation' in which 
both senses are given together and related to sovereign occurrences: (OC5 215-
6) 
"Sovereignty is no different from the limitless dissipation of 'riches' 
or substances; if we limit this dissipation, we are left with a reserve 
for other moments, which itself limits or annuls the sovereignty of a 
given Lmmediate moment. The science relating the objects of thought to 
sovereign moments is in fact a general economy, envisaging the sense of 
these objects in relation to each other, and ultimately in relation to 
their loss of sense... General economy foregrounds the fact that 
excesses of energy are produced which by definition cannot be used. The 
excess energy can only be lost without the least end in sight, and thus 
without the least sense. This useless, senseless loss is sovereignty. 
(The sovereign like the solid is an inevitable and constant 
experience)". 
This quote is important for several reasons; firstly, it circunvents the 
complexities of the relation of rec.uperability which Derrida draws between 
phenomenological logic and sovereignty, emphasising ins tead the 
irrec.uperability of the loss involved in expenditure. Secondly, the nature 
of this expenditure or loss is made explicit, and it has only an indirect 
relation to a loss of phenomenological sense; this loss is identified with the 
thennodynamic dissipation of substances in time. Thirdly, the basic process 
of the restriction of energy necessary for life (absorption and reserves of 
-179-
energy) is detailed; and fourthly, the basic principle of general economy is 
given ("that excesses of energy are produced which by definition cannot be 
used") • 
It is worthwhile emphasising the relation between Bataille' s account of 
general economy and the general principles of the science of thermodynamics. 
Although Bataille htmself does not use the term or those immediately 
associated with that science's field of enquiry, Georges Ambrosino 
Bataille's physicist collaborator on the ~Accursed Share' - details the 
connections between Bataille's conception of the biological necessity of 
restricted economies and the economy of negative entropy or informational 
redundancy in an essay ('The thinking machine and life') on Wiener's book 
Cybernetics. (3] His account clarifies the most difficult elements of both 
thermodynamics and Bataille' s account of energetic materialism; the parallel 
and inverse relations between energy, entropy and negentropy, or between the 
general and restricted economies of energy. 
According to Ambrosino, the universe can be considered a thermodynamic system 
in so far as the energy available for the compositions and formations of life 
tends towards a maximal entropic state, a maximal chance distribution or 
equilibriun of energy. Useful energy is degraded, in time, into useless 
entropy. The energy available for work decreases as the measure of entropy 
increases; however in any system regulated by this general principle, 
provisional orders, equilibriums and balances of real energy occur which can 
be considered 'redundant' in so far as they are no longer available for work 
in the system. The sun of these provisional orders in a system at anyone 
time is the negentropy of the system. Bataille's version of thermodynamics 
emphasises the importance of differential scales of economy in the universe or 
system as a whole. Restricted economies and general economy are simply 
different scales at which the same principle operates. At first glance it 
appears that the energy degradation (entropic increase) on the scale of the 
whole system is qualitatively different from the intensities and 
intensifications which continually occur at the level of negentropy or 
disequilibrated energy flux and compositions. But these negentropic quanta, 
are, as intensities, simply markers of a growth in entropy because energy is 
liberated in their passage, that is in their duration. As I have noted above 
(4] this conception of an irreversible and dissolving tLne proper to 
thermodynamical systems is a radical novum for knowledge; we need only remind 
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ourselves of the conceptions of time contained in the texts of German Idealism 
which are subject to the laws of the inner spaces of human intentionality, so 
that orders of time replace the unidirection of time, to register this 
'novum'. The nature of intensive quantity resolves the apparent contradiction 
between the dissipation of difference at the level of the whole system and the 
increase in difference at a local negentropic site. Intensities occur as 
energy becomes en tropic , that is as energy reaches a relative point on each 
possible scale of formation at which that scale loses its negentropic 
consistency, and is reduced to the nonsensical energy flow of irradiation. 
This consistency can be reconvened provisionally on a higher scale (of an 
organism or its elements, or an environment like the earth considered as a 
single 'biomass'). Given the cumulative effect of the intensifications and 
increases in energy at every scale of a formation it is easy to see how an 
organism's absorption of energy effects its resolution into an en tropic 
quanta, because, at every level of that formation (organism) intensification 
designates an entropic increase. 
Thus one can state that intensive quantities are registered at the point at 
which degrees and scales are enveloped in macro-scales. The cunulative 
effect of the scales of irradiation applies not only to individual organisms 
but to environments in general; all formations as such can be gridded and 
linked on the scales, of intensive magnitude (and the higher the scale of 
formation does not necessarily 
intensity can create complexity). 
all formations within the process 
mean the more extensive the formation -
The intensive and en tropic scales apply to 
of energy flows and dissipations which is 
the approach to intensive zero. Intensive zero is the zero around which 
Bataille constructs his notion of general economy. Intensive zero is implicit 
in the interval between the inmanent principles of general econany and the 
transvaluation of the objects and values circulating in restricted economies 
into intensive quanta, a transformation which these principles make possible, 
yet which is effected in the flows of intensive thought. But intensive zero 
is itself the dissolution of all thermic events, including thought, through 
their intensification. As thought dissolves it returns to its physiological 
condition in sensation, which experiences the duration of fluctuation and 
dissolution at the expense of all knowledge. This is why the general economy 
of energy - which those restricted economies obey - is constitutively 
irrational, even though it has 'strict' principles that 1. energy irradiates 
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in general and 2. thereby produces different compositions of matter which 3. 
can themselves not only absorb but also produce energy the necessary 
irradiation and en tropic loss of which (despite all the work this energy can 
be used in) 4. affects their local environment. 
General economy is general and irrational (rather than universal) and thus 
related by its status to the general rules of cOOlTJUIlication which Kant deduced 
from sensible aesthetic judgement. [5] 
Bataille complicates his notion of general economy with his constant 
examination of the intensive points of restricted economy. This is an 
understandable obsession, given Bataille' s concern with the anguish of the 
human condition, but it is precisely, to the extent that it occurs, a 
concentration on the humanism and utile values which the approach of intensive 
zero destroys. This humanism is evident at several levels; most obviously in 
the explicit aim of the Accursed Share to reveal the principles of general 
economy and thus allow humankind to regulate its own useless expenditures and 
avoid the catastrophic expenditures of war. In a more confusing and damaging 
fashion, Bataille's constant use of the Kantian jargon of excess, limits and 
extension to designate the intensive point of restricted and utile economies, 
compromises the 'independence' of the terminology of intensifications, 
expenditures and intensities which general economy attempts to elucidate. 
Bataille's account tends to extend the reach and effectivity of the human and 
restricted realm of activity (typified by the Kan t ian topography) by 
projecting its terminology onto the levels and scales of energetic matter in 
general. The overwhelming haemorrhage of sense presented by the primary 
production of solar radiation is lost. All levels of matter are identified 
with human organisation and opposed to the general movement of entropy and 
the chaos of intensive zero. The differences between those levels remain 
under-emphasised, and conversely the global human negentropic intensification 
takes on proportions which are belied by the relative size of the 'little 
heatdeath' which will end it. In this sense, Bataille's approach to general 
economy can be linked to the functioning of the closed systems of classical 
thermodynamics, rather than to the open systems and dissipative structures of 
chaotic thennodynamics because he anphasises the abstract general energetic 
principles which govern general and restricted economy, and only examines the 
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specific behaviour of open systems of expenditure - in the 'Accursed Share' _ 
at the empirical anthropological level of societies. 
Post-critical knowledge 
Bataille characterises general economy as articulating (OC7 14) "the point of 
view of excess energy" , that is the point of view of energy which is 
irreducible to the 'uses' to which it can be put in human and even biological 
activity. Energetic matter could be considered a continuum of productive 
flows in which the en tropic sum slowly increases and has as its symptom an 
increasing production of low intensity compositions. But the human 
perspective essentialises the negligible energetic difference between useful 
and useless production and projects this distinction as a regulating factor 
for every existent entity and its products. The paradox of articulating (in 
human discourse) the point of view of energy which exceeds (conditions yet is 
useless for) human activity, thus imposing human perspectival vision on pre-
organic matter, is not lost on Bataille, as is proved by the Introduction to 
the Accursed share; but this paradox lessens the value of useful discourse in 
general, by juxtaposing it with the half-glimpsed immensity in time and space 
of excess energy: (DC7 20) 
"This work tends to increase the sum of human resources, but its results 
teach me that accumulation is only a delay, a recoil in the face of an 
inevitable expiration, in which accumulated wealth only has value for an 
instant". 
This paradox opens up human perception to questions of scale; Bataille argues 
that the scale on which general economy is deployed is different enough from 
the mundane human scale of vision to elucidate certain problems which dog a 
humanity bent on useful activity to the exclusion of its energetic conditions. 
Thus the paradox of articulating the 'point of view' of excess energy results 
in one part in the usefulness of general economy, but in another part in the 
exposure of human activity to its own uselessness: (OC7 28) 
"Economic phenomena are not easy to isolate, and the,ir general 
coordination is not easy to establish. It is, howeve~ posslble to ask 
the question ••• [whether the whole of productlve actlvlty must not. be 
considered with regard to the modifications it receives from that whlch 
surrotmds it... is there not a place for the stooy of the system of 
human production and consumption as internal to a lar~er whole? •• Are 
there not in the whole of industrial development, soclal confllcc~ ~r.d 
-183-
world wars ••• causes and effects which only appear on the condition that 
we stu:ly the general facts of econany?". 
Thus the 'knowledge' which Bataille's conceptions of communication and general 
economy make possible cannot be described as a new form of intellectual 
activity; rather it charts the critical trajectory within which its own 
validity burns up. Bataille uses the terms 'comnunal' or 'coornunicative' 
knowledge to designate this evaporating movement (OC7 526). Such 'knowledge' 
has a primarily regressive effect in revaluing knowledge in relation to the 
perception of the full impact of the affectivity of the general movements of 
energy on knowledge. These general movements are given and do not themselves 
require explication; they are the empirical conditions of rational 
explication, the full sense of the flows of energetic information. The notion 
of the given-ness of energetic communication as an immanent condition 
distinguishes Bataille's thinking from the basic projects of phenomenology and 
Kantian idealism: (OC7 529) 
"(Communication] is inserted in the explicable but is not itself 
explicable... cOl1lTIunication has full sense without being subjected to 
the 'how' of the explicable". 
This 'knowledge' provides us with a chart of the trajectory of critical 
thought on one level of the visualised 'field' of the general movements of 
energy. At the level of energetic comnunication designated as philosophy, 
the modification of the philosophical subject by the object is itself modified 
and dissolved as the object is dissolved in the flows of 'noumenal' energy: 
(OC7 530) 
"Coomunal knowledge is not properly speaking objective knowledge. Like 
rational knowledge it accounts for a modification of the subject by the 
object, but where reasoned knowledge leaves this modification in or~er 
to accOlmt for the object in isolation, conmunal knowledge rema~ns 
knowledge of this modification at the same time as of the object; no 
separation of the subject and object is possible, i.t is nec:ssary to 
envisage a field of coomunication rather than an obJectal ~~n~ •• the 
modification of the subject is indistinguishable from the proJect~on (of 
such a field of comnunication]". 
This evaporating knowledge accepts the full import of its sensational and 
physiological conditions; its last intellectual gesture is to describe the 
dissolution of its own claims to validity. For this reason, it can be called 
'post-critical' • 
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Bataille argues that political economy is only concerned with particular and 
restricted economies (OC7 33), modelled on the cycle of useful demands 
(primarily to overcome scarcity, and then to exclude scarcity in the 
accumulation of wealth) and their satisfactions. According to Bataille, this 
description of a cycle of utility and wealth ignores the "unilateral 
character" (OC7 10) of the limitless play of energy in general. Bataille 
argues that we must take account of the gift of this general scale of 
perception, and recognise, beyond the minor demands of scarcity and necessity, 
the major and unavoidable problems presented by the imnensity of excess 
energy. Again, on the one hand, Bataille conceives of general economy as 
presenting us with an almost Sartrean choice to acknowledge the human need to 
expend at moments of dangerous accumulation (and to regulate that expenditure 
in as minimal a fashion as possible) or to have that accumulated energy 
explode catastrophically and generally; on the other hand Bataille's general 
economy is an act of intellectual terrorism, a bogus justification for 
exposing rational restrictions to the intense thought which is fuelled by the 
increased sensations affected by the approach of the intensive zero. 
It is essential to emphasise the difference between the scales of perception 
associated with general and restricted economies. These are all scales of 
intensive degree, as are the quanta deployed on them. The scale of general 
economy is the most distinct scale because of the tmmensity of the energetic 
behaviour it describes, and includes the behaviour of energy on the lesser 
scales which it envelops, although the specifics of that behaviour are only 
visible on those scales themselves. On this scale of the energetic universe 
dissipative energetic quanta remain positive despite the increasing en tropic 
value of the sum of this energy. Energy remains radiant and productive and 
increases because the value judgement which distinguishes useful and en tropic 
useless energy pertains to the scales of res tric ted economy. Energy in 
general is productive and excessive despite being increasingly en tropic (in 
time). Energetic production or expenditure has three minor intensive modes: 
production, accumulation and consunption. On the scale of this radiant 
movement of energy, the importance of that quantity of energy which is 
available for work is swamped by the irnnensity of its en tropic trajectory, 
which Bataille calls its growing expenditure, and which itself includes the 
negentropic compositions of life. Expenditure is the primary production of a 
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process of energetic dissipation: (DC7 9) 
"energy i~ the basis and the end of production ••• The amount of energy 
produced 1S always greater than the amount necessary to produce it". 
The restricted economies of bio-systems obey the same principle, but in these 
systems - traditionally conceived by science as organisms - the principle has 
become the site of a fundamental value-judgement, based on a fear of the 
modification of the human organism by its environment. All conceptions of 
economy acknowledge expenditure and excess energy, but use them to consolidate 
their sense of necessity and scarcity: (OC7 10) 
"We perceive at the same time the excess of production [energy] relative 
to necessary energy and the general effect of this excess". 
Expenditure is 'accursed' because it is conceived as ruining the utile 
projects with which we overkill scarcity; but in this our projects are 
themselves ultimately expenditure, because accumulations can only be 
provisional in the radiation of time. 
Such economies of life are a consequence of the solar economy which engenders 
and rules them: (DC7 10) 
"Ultimately we are nothing but an effect of the sun ••• The solar energy 
which we are is an energy which dissipates •• All it effects in us is a 
passage. We can only stop the solar rays for a time". 
The solar economy of radiation typifies the universe's general movement of 
dispersal of galaxies and stars, within which local movements of attraction 
between stars and satellites can occur (DC7 187-8). As a star and as part 
of this general movement of energetic matter in the universe, the sun's 
radiation can be thought of as a projection into space of a certain quantity 
of the star's subs tance, which has been trans formed in to great in tens i ve 
degrees of energy as heat and light. Solar substance or mass is fusional 
rather than solid, that is, the behaviour of its atoms prolongs the 
transformation of mass into heat and light, i.e into radiation or the 
expenditure of that star's energetic mass. The atoms of a radiating star 
like the sun are fused in its whole mass and in its central radiating power. 
In time, radiated atoms lose the degree of energy which bound them in a 
fusional mass; they cool in space and are randomnly attracted into local and 
specific formations. The atom found on the surface of a dead star like the 
earth exists at a much lower intensive degree of energy and is not fused in 
any central radiating energetic mass. On the earth's surface different atomic 
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formations can proliferate and their complexity and scale increase; atoms form 
molecules, molecules form crystalline and colloidal compositions which 
eventually fonn living organisms. Bataille suggests that the degree of 
composition and energetic isolation or transcendence in any formation 
increases during the evolution of the planet and its life forms; he also 
suggests that planetary life is characterised by a parallel extension or 
growth up to and then remaining constant at a state of 'full volume'. I 
shall return to this point but it suffices to say here that any increase 1n 
the degree of composition of living formations need not be dependent on the 
scale of that composition. 
For Bataille, a high degree of composition (isolation or transcendence) 
designates a state of low radiation. Canpositions are not only coagulated 
energetic matter; they are capable of developing and growing in size and/ or 
canplexity, transforming and internalising the energy in their irrmediate 
environment. As particular compositions they can be conceived as absorbing 
energy; the power of radiation is replaced by the absorption of radiation, by 
the 'ability' of the organism to accumulate energy:(OC7 188) 
"The star lavishes its powers; our earth divides itself into particles 
which crave power". 
The conception of such particular compositions as absorbing energy projects us 
into the realm of the restricted economies proper to life considered in terms 
of the porous bio-systems of organisms; such a conception ultimately entails a 
correlative intentionalist fallacy in which absorption as internalisation is 
transformed into the metapsychology of a will which is intent on overcoming 
lack and increasing power. (6] The provisionally equilibrating states of 
organisms in restricted economy foreground 2 modes of energetic activity: 
accumulation and expenditure. An organism attempts a regulation of the 
inverse relation between its accumulations and its expenditures, but external 
factors and even growth threaten this inverse relation and the organism's 
energetic equilibrium. 
The accumulative mode is perceived on condition that organisms are 
differentiated from their energetic environment, and their economies are given 
a relative autonomy. The accumulation or accretion of energy is a facet of 
the process of composition, (which is as Bataille points out also a process of 
"decomposition" OC7 510) and thus can be seen as the identifying element of 
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those improbable provisional equilibriuns which occur within the flatlining 
pulses of radiating energy. Thus within the restricted economy of an 
organism, accumulation is linked to the inevitable and total expenditure which 
is the decanposition of that organism. Thus Bataille' s emphasis on the 
perspective of restricted economy, which accentuates the autonomy of the 
organism's provisional equilibrating econany in order to explode it at a 
catastrophe point, can be seen as artificial and melodramatic. [7] 
According to Bataille, the mode of expenditure of the biological system 
emulates the expenditure of the sun in so far as its composition and 
decomposition produces more en tropic energy than it accretes, and its 
expenditure has an intensive degree albeit lower than that of solar radiation. 
Such a massive expenditure affects the local energetic environment of the 
biosystem in an intensification of the available energy, but its effect on the 
movement of energetic dispersal in general is negligible, despite adding 
minimally to it. A b~o-system - an energetic production of a lesser 
intensive degree than the fusional matter which produces it - is composed and 
decomposed in the communications of energetic matter in time towards entropic 
intensive zero. The bio-system is a symptom of the growth of entropy in the 
general energetic dispersal, and itself finally produces a SLm of entropic 
energy in the lowburn of death after using accreted radiant energy for 
sustenance and growth. 
In Bataille's text there is a level of confusion between the intensive scales 
of energy dispersal; Bataille discusses systems which he calls 'general' 
other than that of solar economy. It is important to distinguish the major 
general system of global life (which Bataille calls the 'biomass') from the 
general economy of energetic matter. For Bataille, living systems are 
characterised by their use of radiation to accumulate and grow, yet, states 
Bataille every living system and the system that is the ''biosphere'' (OC7 35) 
itself must eventually reach a limit of growth at which energy becomes 
irreducibly excessive and superfluous: (DC7 29) 
"the living organism, in its situation determined by the play of ener~y 
on the surface of the globe, receives in principle more energy than 1S 
necessary to maintain life: the excess energy (~lth~ can be used for 
the growth of the system (for instance an organ1~m); 1f the syst~ can 
no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be ent1rely absorbed 1n its 
growth, it is necessary to lose it without prof1t, to waste it, 
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voluntarily or not, gloriously or else catastrophically." 
It seems to me that these limits of growth or limiting conditions of life can 
themselves be considered provisional; the complexities of energetic formations 
must be able to circumvent them, even within the restricted economies of bio-
systems; growth can occur within an organism on infinitesimal scales, or the 
organism can change in order to accomodate energetic changes. Bataille' s 
perspective is a little too restricted. His fomulation of the laws of 
restricted economy curtails the examination of energetic complexities with a 
direct relation to the principles of general economy within organisms, and in 
so doing repeats the intentionalist anthropomorphic fallacy which I noted 
above. On the other hand, the form this fallacy takes is an extreme mutation 
of the Kantian idealist topography of limitation, an extreme mutation which 
exposes the necessary ruination of that topography on the flows of noumenal 
energy. Bataille is at his most Kantian when he states, with regard to the 
limit of growth proper to every biosystem: (OC7 11) 
"The limit of growth is the limit of the possible". 
Bataille emulates the Kantian topography in describing the biosphere as a 
'full space' and thereby a fundamental limit to life considered as a space and 
a volume. But he also admits that on the scale of the biosphere growth like 
death - which Bataille envisages in a Kantian fashion as a subtraction from 
this full space which causes a local movement of pressure to fill the 
resulting void - is secondary to the movement of expenditure which conditions 
the restricted economy of growth and pressure. The biosphere is from a more 
general perspective a constant volume of life, an equilibrium of economies of 
accumulation and expenditure, and it is precisely from this perspective ~~at 
the general character of energy as expenditure appears: (DC7 39-40) 
"if one envisages life as a whole, there is really no growth but a 
maintenance of volume in general. • possible growth is reduced to 
compensating for the destructions brought about •••• there is generally 
no growth, but only, in many ways, a luxurious wasting of e~ergy ••• The 
dominant event· is the developnent of luxury, the productlon of more 
expensive fonns of life." 
The behaviour of organisms with regard to volume, growth and extension is a 
secondary phenomena in relation to the primary production of energy which is 
the limitless condition of that behaviour. This primary energetic production 
creates increasingly expensive/ intensive energetic formations, the size and 
extent of which is irrelevant. It seems to me that Bataille emphasises the 
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use of energy for growth in restricted bio-systems to the detriment of any 
account of the micro-scales of such organisms at which intense and contagious 
energetic formations would be possible. Similiarly, his exclusive deployment 
of the Kantian term 'limit' in relation to extension conceals the possibility 
of the term having a thermodynamic and scalar sense, designating the intensive 
degree of energetic formations and the thresholds of their degrees. The limit 
would then simply designate a change of degree, an intensive or energetic 
marker rather than a negative limit. This would register an intensification, 
a new degree rather than an exclusive limitation. Bataille t s schema of 
'extension' and 'limit' arrives at the same result; the thermic events of 
intensification and expenditure, but only in relation to the macro-scale of 
the organism, to the surpassing of the organism, exceptionally if inevitably, 
at one moment and one point, ~len in fact this result is common to every scale 
of energetic matter, and to every pulse on those scales. 
Bataille allows for the intensification of the space internal to bio-systems 
only in relation to human labour - and even then only exceptionally, for 
intensification is most often associated with the haemorrhage of that space in 
death - but other organisms effect the same result i.e simple organisms and 
viral replication ~ch both proceed by a sort of intensive 'growth' which is 
negligibly extensive. To essentialise death amongst all intensive 
communications which tend to thermic zero is, paradoxically, a very 
anthropocentric prejudice when death is simply an example of expenditure -
albeit expenditure of a high degree. For growth can be considered as the 
inevitable increase or intensification of energy which occurs independently of 
any extensive growth, within bio-systems, at the interface of those systems 
and the general economy of energy, as well as in t.'1at 'econcxny' as a whole. 
Such a conception of intensive growth would be in keeping with the general 
effects of Bataille' s interpretation of the Kantian negative limit as an 
intensive degree. He interprets the limit of the extension of the 
t.mderstanding as the site of the intervention of the process of intensive 
radiation which floods and swallows up the distinctive growths and 
equilibriuns of accumulation and expenditure associated with the restricted 
economies of the rational 'organism', subjecting that organism to the 
increasing virulent differentiation and intensification of itself by intensive 
degrees. The general economy of energy formulates the true energetic 
-190-
conditions of rational and restricted 'organisms', subjects them to their 
constitutive coornunications of energetic matter; thus the nature of these 
organisms, their growths must be considered as transfonned into intensive 
growths or communications, rather than being sLnply conceived as destroyed. 
Bataille himself remarks on the link between general economy and his 
conception of the always positive quanta of communication, by remarking on the 
compositional nature of any energetic formation, and the movements proper to 
it as "a field of concentrations" (OC7 265). These concentrations are formed 
by the tendency of "circuits" of energy to stabilize themselves provisionally, 
isolate themselves from the general circuits of the communication of energy. 
From the perspective of the anthropomorphic level of bio-systems, the 
particularised circuit is continually threatened by the disequilibrating flows 
of coomunication, conmunication which it filters and restricts to sustain 
itself. This restriction channels energy but thereby subjects it to an 
intensification which becomes apparent when the degree of intensity grows to a 
degree at which the energetic equilibriums of the particularised circuit are 
upset, become chaotic and ultimately dissolve the circuit in the free flow of 
coomunication. The higher the degree of channelling (or composition in 
energetic matter) the greater is the tendency for the intensification of 
energy to increase exponentially or virulently within the restricted economy 
of a bio-system:(OC7 270) 
''Each of us, in the limitless movement of all worlds, is only a 
resistance which favours a relay. Our isolation allows the resistance 
but the resistance only means that intensity is added to the movement 
when it is relayed. Separate existence is only the condition of 
retarded but explosive coomunications." 
The tendency of energy to provisionally isolate itself occurs at every level 
of energetic matter, but arguably only with the animal kingdom do biosystems 
experience the threat of the overwhelming energetic forces which surround 
them. A few more degrees of complex energetic channelling and rational 
processes emerge which contest the sensation of threat which constitutes the 
sacrificial notion of the irrmanent provisional subject (imnanent to its 
conditioning energetic flows, consuned and transfonned by them (OC7 63)) with 
the philosophical transformation of these flows - in a restricted form - into 
transcendent (with regard to the irnnanent subject) yet utile objects. The 
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utile status of these objects reduces the influence of the energetic flows on 
the subject to relations of utility, and this in turn raises the subject to a 
level of transcendence as a meta-object which controls these objects 
considered as tools. We have already seen this energetic trajectory - fran 
the biological to the rational - spelled out in the Theory of religion [8], 
and it lies at the base of the energetic sociology which Bataille develops in 
the Accursed share. 
General economy and genealogy 
Bataille's anthropological and sociological studies take as their starting 
point the human cultural responses (conscious or not) to the problems posed by 
the general economy of energy. At the same time, Bataille sees these 
problems as culminating in (contemporaneously to the writing of the accursed 
share in 1948) a potentially catastrophic problem for global political 
economy. 
For Bataille, history recounts the changes in size and intensity of cultures 
and societies, changes brought about by the treatment of excess productive 
energies in those societies. 'The uses a society makes of its productive 
surpluses detennine that society: (OC7 105) 
'~e surplus is the cause of the agitation, of the structural changes, 
and of the entire history of a SOCiety" 
Societies are almost inevitably involved in misrepresenting the pressing ener-
getic conditions which influence them; the history of occidental culture is 
the history of a neurotic desire to accumulate wealth in order to compensate 
for the fact of scarcity and the fear of death, a fear which is irrational 
(because thermic death is the endpoint of the energetic condition of the 
universe) and dangerous because of the socially disequilibrating effects of 
excessive accumulations of wealth: (OC7 247) 
'''!he death of a galaxy or a star is the condition of its brilliance ••• 
Man's misery comes not from dying - to die.is to li~e ~loriously -.but 
to desire to escape fate. Fear of death 1S the pr1nc1ple of avar1ce. 
Man can only choose between dying gloriously or miserably." 
Bataille would prefer an empirical nihilism, a realism based on the proxLnity 
of life to expenditure and death, to the hysterical idealism which represses 
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death and buffers itself against it in a process of wealth-bulimia. Classical 
econany is the restricted econany which sets out the principles which 
rationalise this fear of scarcity and death; it is an econany of isolated 
transactions, or else of processes which have an optimal state in which 
profits increase despite production costs. In classical economy, the tenn 
general econany can only designate the sum of isolated economic transactions , 
whereas for Bataille in so far as general econany intervenes into political 
economy it attempts the integration of the global movements of capital 
'liberated' from the law of profit which characterises those isolated 
transactions (OC7 167). Classical econany can only seek to further the 
accumulation of wealth and limitless economic growth because it cannot 
conceive of any limits to the process of its specific transactions, to its 
own restricted and accumulatory growth; limits which are presented by the 
limitlessness of general econany itself. For Bataille, as we shall see, 
general econany designates the true character of capital and can be used as a 
corrective to the damage caused by a restricted classical economy fixated on 
the accumulation of wealth. However, this usefulness of general economy is a 
secondary effect of the perspective peculiar to it; growth is secondary to the 
distributions of the intensive fluctuations of energy which condition it: (OC7 
178) 
"Growth must be situated in relation to the instant in which it resolves 
into pure expenditure". 
Bataille juxtaposes capitalist society and those sacred societies in which the 
religious practice of sacrifice was a minimally regulated emulation of the 
luxurious nature of the cosmos. Of course the human attitude to the sacred 
entailed a paradox: such societies placed the ultimate value of life in the 
destruction of the servile value of possessions, but at the same time, this 
destruction was also transformed into a socially useful function, creating the 
caste hierarchies in those societies (OC7 75). The utility of sacrifice can 
be over-emphasised; in societies where the practice was not overtly 
institutionalised (exclusively associated with the mediating role of a 
priestly caste), sacrifice was the site of potential socially ruinous 
contests for power. It is also true that the production of social hierarchies 
through the practice of sacrifice is not of itself a useful hunan activity, 
but rather an energetic effect which is appropriated by human activity. 
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The sacrificial spectacle of expenditure is only minimally linked to - as a 
social instance of - the regulation of expenditure in the necessary subterfuge 
performed in the 'law' of representation. For Bataille, the specific 
cruelty of these sacrificial religions has a "demonstrative value" (OC7 511) 
for the study of occidental formations of capital; relative to these 
formations which are often accounted for in terms of restricted economies of 
utility, the excessive expenditures of cruel religions (that is the massive 
quantative difference between their accumulations and expenditures of energy, 
and the proximity of their habitual, sacrificial expenditures to a point of no 
return which would ruin those societies totally) reveal the principles and 
tendential movements and effects of energetic movement in general, in line 
with the principle that: (OC7 511) 
"an excess renders the effect of a force more visible". 
Thus these societies are remarkable to the extent that they maintain such an 
inmediate proximity to their own energetic death: such ccxmrunities live "at 
the height of death" (OC7 511), at an intensive degree which Bataille can only 
discover in occidental culture in global war and in the ravings of the 
solitary philosopher who paradoxically seeks "the intimacy of passion" (OC7 
76) and finds when faced with death that (OC7 245) "all that remains in us are 
sensations of a great intensity". 
Bataille's description of the ritual contest of wasting valuable goods which 
the North-West American Indians call 'potlatch' conforms to this general 
trajectory of sacrifice; expenditure is revealed as the source of value and of 
the movement of social differentiation. Despite the dangers of an 
unrestrained potlatch (and sacrifice), Bataille construes the practice as 
having, in a minor mode, intentionalist resonances: (OC7 72) 
"Gift-giving has the virtue of a surpassing of the subject who gives, 
rut in exchange for the object given, the subject appropriates the 
surpassing." 
This utile sense of the custom is only perceived by the contestant who fails 
to equal the expenditure of the other contestant, and who leaves the eternally 
chaotic and destructive (useless) arena of the contest in order to take a 
place in the social differentiation which it effects. Bataille suggests that 
this distinction between first and second order energetic effects is the 
historical basis for the hierarchies in all historical societies, hierarchies 
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which have ultimately produced the dangerous disequilibrium of wealth in the 
world, which he would have dissolved in the fusional mass resulting from the 
intentional structure of the Marshall Plan. Bataille conceives of the 
Marshall Plan's project for the redistribution of global wealth as a gift or a 
sacrifice (on the part of a North America which consciously recognises the 
global necessity of expenditure in the form of a gift to the under-developed 
wor ld) • He goes on to sugges t that the suspicion that such a gift is a 
further example of American imperialism would itself be swamped in the effect 
of the gift - a new world order of globally integrated energetic capital, in 
which the first order of the intensity of the potlatch arena swamps the 
secondary effect of social hierarchisation, and the intensity of potlatch 
becomes a global event. 
As we have seen above, [9] Bataille makes a fundamental distinction between 
sacred and military societies. He argues that the earliest societies 
regulated their productive surpluses of energy in ritual forms of expenditure; 
for instance the Aztecs, the North Western American Indians, or the 
sacrificial coomunity of Lamaist Tibet, which Bataille describes as 
characterised by: (OC7 101) 
Ita power that could not be exercised, that was essentially open to the 
outside and that could expect nothing from the outside except death". 
According to Bataille, later societies regulated their energetic surpluses 
with external, extensive growth through expansionist wars (Bataille's example 
in the Accursed share is Islamic culture). Thus for Bataille, the occidental 
growth of capitalism is due to the reorienting of sacred tendencies by 
military tendencies within a single culture. The Catholic Church of the 
Middle Ages placed restrictions on the developnent of productive forces; 
developnent had as its only justification the glory of God, and thus most 
surplus productive wealth was dissipated in Church procedures, ceremonies and 
festivals. With the Refonnation came the theological rationalisations for 
the accUIRllation and dynamic growth of productive apparatuses which supplanted 
the Catholic static economy of hierarchical consunption. Luther and Calvin 
were able to accuse the Catholic Church of betraying God in so far as the 
Olurch minimized the distance between the hunan and the sacred by emphasising 
the procedural dogmas of its own institutions. The individual's relation to 
God supplanted the Catholic Camrunity with God and thus the individualism 
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necessary to kickstart capitalist free enterprise came to be formulated. The 
basis of IOOral judgements was irreversibly transformed from the 'glory' 
associated with expenditures in the name of God (Bataille sees the Catholic 
Church as resolutely 'sacred') to the utile values of the acquisition and 
production of objects as commodities (OC7 198). 
The explosive liberation of capital 
For Bataille, the history of capital is the history of the overcoming of the 
restrictions placed on it by the values of utility. Bataille sees capital as 
a fusional radiating (and thereby 'capitalising') mass of seething intensive 
quanta. He describes capital as (OC7 221) "a machine condenmed to increase 
generally" in which (OC7 230) "each tmproductive expenditure augments the sun 
of produced forces" over and above the restricted economy of capitalist 
interests which attempts to restrict expenditure to the utile reinvestments of 
surplus energy in consolidating their productive forces. The limits of this 
conception of restricted, extensive growth can only be shown in the energetic 
communications which cumulatively constitute general economy itself, one level 
of which is the proliferating virulent intensifications of liberated capital. 
Bataille conceives of the Marshall Plan as an act which induces the 
haemorrhage of restricted economy into general economy, and reveals the 
explosive energetic truth of the virulence of capital, as an economy of the 
intensification of intensive quanta. For Bataille, the Marshall Plan 
designates an ultimate or "final use" (OC7 171) which will tenninate the epoch 
of economic utility. It is an intervention of the general economy of capital, 
that is capital conceived as a concentration of energetic intensities obeying 
the four principles of general economy, into restricted political economy. 
This constitutes a (OC7 171) "general operation", and a rentmciation of the 
utile principle of the growth of productive forces. It reorients political 
economy arotmd the problems posed by the necessary and inevitable increase of 
produced forces: 
"By and large there exists in the world an exces~ s~e of r~ou:ces 
that cannot contribute to a growth for which the space. (poss1biI1ty) 
is lacking. Neither the share that is necessary to sacr1f1c;e, nor ~e 
moment of sacrifice are ever given exactly. But a general po1nt of V1ew 
requires that at an ill-defined time and place growth be abandoned, 
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wealth negated" (OC7 171). 
The Marshall Plan pinpoints the contemporary tension point - the "explosive 
mass" of the American econany - caused by an excessive accunulation of wealth 
and the 'sacrifice' necessary to decathect a potentially catastrophic 
situation: (OC7 161) 
'''!he. worl~ econanic situation is in fact dominated by the developnent of 
Amer~can ~ndustry ••• by an abmdance of the means of production and of 
the means of increasing them... the economic problem is beccxning a 
problem not of outlets • • but of consunption of profits without 
compensation", 
and thus (OC7 46): 
"General economy proposes •• a transfer of American riches to India 
without reciprocation' • 
For Bataille, the Marshall Plan - were it to have occurred - would designate 
the intensive condition of capital and the general econany of energetic 
communications at every level of energetic matter. General economy itself is 
less the sum of the energetic cOlIJIlU1lications of matter in general than the 
form of ccmm.mication in general, insofar as the sum of such conmunications 
must remain indefinite. General econany states that energetic matter at every 
level and scale obeys the four general rules that I outlined above. Again, it 
is worth noting the analogy between general economy and the Kantian schema of 
the fom of connn.mication and its general rules. '!hat schema arose from the 
debris of the critical project, as a last stand against the flood of 
sensations which were infected with the notion of the inmense intensive 
degrees of noumenal objects; objects which changed in time and caused changes 
in the subject in time. Kant relegated the perception of these magnitudes to 
the minor aesthetic judgement, rut Bataille places his energetic judgement 
centre stage, as the formulation of a minimal set of general rules which is 
the ground for a critical genealogy of historical and cultural events in terms 
of their responses to their own energetic conditions. These must be 
unsatisfactory judgements because their grounds are energetic rather than 
logical. But the form of Bataille' s account of general economy still refers 
back to the (albeit ruined) Kantian form of comnunication and thereby 
indirectly to reason - although reason itself, if we are convinced by 
Bataille's account, is only a virtual restricting overcoding of the givens of 
the general econany of energetic quanta. However, Bataille is not simply 
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interested in describing the dissolution of philosophical judgement which must 
inevitably be represented in terms of the ideas or schemas of 'sensation' , 
'intensity' etc.. He is also interested in experiencing the intensive 
quanta of sensations as they are affected in the fluctuations of time and as 
they dissolve towards zero. He thirsts for the inarticulacy, senselessness, 
incoherence and unconsciousness of such sensations, in writing. This is the 
post-critical state, in which the rigour of abstract formulation is dissolved 
in the speeds and intensities of a writing which is fuelled by the fear and 
thirst for the intensity of sensations - sensations which must pulse and 
accelerate vertiginously with time. 
The collapse of time 
Bataille's resonant response to Kant peaks with the quasi-rational 
formulations of the 'rules' of general economy; general economy represents the 
fonn of Bataille' s extension and dissolution of an ' energized' Kantian 
topography. On the other hand, Bataille is never less Kantian than when he 
writes of time. Time is the fluid medium in which Bataille's revaluations of 
the Kantian topography occur. Bataille identifies time and the infection of 
communication; thus time is no longer simply the fonn of intuition proper to a 
subject, nor simply the external quanta which dissolves the subject. Time 
corresponds to the process of the communications of energy, to the pure change 
of becoming-zero in energetic matter. Time is the energetic matter which 
fonns itself around the transcendent and Lmmanent tendencies: (0Cl 96) 
''There is neither isolated being [transcendence] nor isolated 
nothingness [Lmmanence]: there is time. To affinn the existence of 
time ••• does not give the vague attribute of existence to time: it gives 
existence the nature of time ••• it empties the notion of existence of 
its vague and limitless content, it infinitely empties the notion of 
existence of all content". 
Time is the process of collapse of matter, the collapse of critique into the 
senselessness of thermic zero, the collapse of the econany of objective 
knowledge and of objects along with the foundation of the objective realm -
the subject. However its harbinger and marker is the still critical nounenal 
and feared object which infects thought and brings it to a recognition of its 
own catastrophic dissolution: (OC1 94) 
"In this position of object as catastrophe, thought lives the 
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annihilation which constitutes it as a catastrophe and vertiginous 
fall ••• ~tho~ht's] st!='llcture is the catastrophe; thought is an 
absorpt1on 1n the nothingness which supports and kills it". 
Bataille emphasises that catastrophic time can only be distinguished from the 
utile time of the punctual points of past, present and future through the 
influence of the intensive nounenal object, that is through the sensible 
intensification and dissolution of critique. For Bataille, catastrophic time 
is necessarily linked to the action of the nounenal "time-object" (OC6 159) 
which destroys the subject whilst destroying itself. The nounenal object is 
the inevitable and traumatic object of 'inner experience': (OC588) 
''1hi.s object, chaos of light and shadow, is catastrophe. I perceive it 
as object... perceiving it my thought sinks into 
annihilation ••• Something inmense and exorbitant is liberated in all 
directions with the noise of a catastrophe •• a crash of telescoping 
trains". 
This perversely Kantian nounenal object in general has as its correlate the 
improbable and dissipative subject, the subject which has been haenx>rrhaged by 
general critique and shown to be differentiated fran intensive existence in 
general only in so far as it subtracts itself through a transcendent operation 
in a rational and abstract manner (calling itself 'necessary') fran that 
matter in general. The ego is secondary and provisional in the process of 
intensive time and critique: 
"The ego is no longer a foundation but a result.. it dissolves in the 
examination of its conditions ••• The ego is not an immediate given but, 
being the movement of which I speak, is the result of complex 
conditions". (OC6 444) 
According to Bataille, the ego is energetically and temporally speaking just 
an element of individuated matter in general. In On Nietzsche Bataille 
associates the imnanent differentiations of time's energetic matter with 
chance. Individuated matter is the continually improbable result of chance-
time, and the quantative difference of the individual ego is simply another 
improbable dissolving'node in an indefinite space-time. [10] Bataille calls 
time "the duration of waste" (OC6 150) and goes on to link time and chance: 
(OC6 154) 
"Chance is the duration of the individual's wasting •• chance is a series 
of interferences between death and being". 
Bataille's attitude to chance is ambiguous: in a Nietzschean fashion, he 
posits chance as an 'object' of affirmation ('amar fati')[11]; but he also 
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sees it as s~ly effecting the energetic dissolutions of time. 
hand chance is sovereign freedan: (OC6 142) 
On the one 
"Olance occurs in us as time •• Time is freedan •• To be a bridge rut 
a goal." [12J never 
The sovereign rejects the idea of sufficiency instilled by the serial time of 
points and positions which are related to the possibilities of an enclosed 
space and the ego that regulates it, for the perception of the 'repeatedly 
broken fall' (OC5 316) of the chance play of time. This affinnation of 
chance attests to the creative energies of time in matter; thus time can be 
rationalised as analogous to Kant's ' genius' : rule-breaking, random, 
disoriented yet creative. On the other hand, this sovereign affinnation and 
perception are themselves subject to the destruction wrought by chance and 
time: (OC6 116) 
"Olance lifts us up to drop us further; we can only hope that it 
destroys us tragically rather than letting us die stunned". 
For Bataille existence in general is the improbable effect of time and this 
improbability has a fluctuating value for the hunan. It is the site of an 
affirmation and a dissolving communication: 
'''!he essential is aberration 
'The impossible is given (I am IT)" (OCS 204) 
''The individual in time is wasted, loses itself in a movement in which 
it dissolves - is 'conmunication'" (OC6 153). 
This paradox is too ephemeral to be called a 'contradiction'. Bataille, like 
Kant has a hunan figure of communication, a figure that sums up this 
paradoxical, or rather libidinal human thirst for its own energetic 
dissolution: the acephalic figure (0Cl 470), the headless hunan, heart and 
knife in hand. This is also the figure of the suiciding divinity; thus time 
is hunanised as the history of the death of god. The negentropic composition 
of the acephale attests to the tension between the minimally hunan sense of 
conmtmication and the resolutely inhuman infectious time and commmication 
which constitutes and dissolves it. '!he human figure will always remain a 
platitude which does not convey the Lmmensity of the contagious commmications 
of time. Bataille infers the attributes of time from the multiple faces of 
god and man: time is acephale, time is sadis tic rather than impera ti ve and 
moral (OCl 95)... Always the same, always too nuch god. For time is not to 
be characterised but inferred, and less from its effects than fran its 
accelerating devastations in the collapse of matter. This is the sense of the 
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early essay 'The Obelisk'. Bataille describes the way that the sacred 
conception of time - based on the terror of the changes it wrought - was 
replaced by the representations and measurements of utile time. Hours are 
limits that came to arrest and contain the sensations of time (OCl 505). Yet 
like the monuments to death - the pyramid, the obelisk, the house, the hovel _ 
built to resist and slow down the truth of time, these resistors eventually 
intensify the quanta they are intended to repress. And time is intensifying 
matter and its thermic trajectory; thus time collapses matter and is liberated 
as uncontrollable and surging speeds tracing the "immensity of an illimitable 
catastrophe": (OCl 505) 
U[ they] are no longer obstacles to the haunting sensation of 
dissappeared time, but the high places from which the accelerating speed 
of the fall [of time's "lacerating explosion"] is possible; and the high 
places themselves will collapse before the revelation is complete. The 
lands stray from their Stm, the horizon is annihilated" 
Time is sped up by the collapse of matter; its accelerations as it is 
liberated from the intensive restrictions of organisms entail a privileged 
relation to the sensations of fear and vertigo which it provokes in the human 
supplicant. This very collapse which it brings about is the source of its 
inevitable intensive mode of contagion and infection. How does Bataille 
designate this general horrific senselessness of time, beyond the all too 
rational concerns with science, sensibility and even style? Through the 
syntax of his writing rather than his style, ('style' has all the resonances 
of an opposition to content). I would argue that Bataille' s syntax is a set 
of horrifying symptoms of the inevitable infections brought in time's 
intensive matter, which wracks the human in its irrational generality and not 
simply its second-order rationalisations, the hierarchy of the mental 
faculties. Bataille' s syntax is a bursting purulent bubo, a bloodblister 
disgorging its thinned contents inflamed cellular cystic sac by sac, 
horrifying symptans of the viral mode of intensified, pressurised, erupting 
and collapsing matter. Syntax, like science and sensibility, succumbs to the 
ecstasy of illness which constitutes the duration of its waste, culminating in 
the 'nihil ulterius' of thermic zero. Bataille' s syntax tensely spatters out 
in a poor low-level replication of the 'repeatedly broken fall' of time's 
fluid intensive matter. Like time this syntax has differential speeds of 
disintegrating matter, decelerations and accelerations, resistances and 
-201-
resulting intensifications, resulting fragmentations. Time brings critique 
and senselessness, noumenal object and thirst for zero, in its trajectory to 
zero, in the 'duration of waste'; and Bataille's fissured, aborting, explosive 
and tedious texts present us with an abject and near meaningless syntax full 
of breathless arhythmias and longueurs of redtmdant philosophical complexity 
in a written replication of this intensive collapse of time. It is Bataille' s 
naked, supplicant, inordinately sensitve, intensively infected syntax which 
delivers the reader over to the vertigo of the acceleration of time and the 
contagion of sensations which it provokes, over and above any exposure to 
general energetic critique and the genealogy which it makes possible, only to 
dissolve us body-speeding in the senseless rages of thermic zero. This 
trajectory of sensation after critique must be differentiated from critique 
and thus I have called it the infectious mode and trajectory of the post-
critical process. 
-202-
Conclusion: INFECTION 
I have argued for the relevance of the Kantian notion of cri tique and the 
conceptual topography associated with it, for an tm<ierstanding of Bataille' s 
philosophical work. It would be wrong to call this relation between Bataille 
and Kan t ' rigourous', ' necessary' or ' detennining' , given tha t Ba taille ' s 
writing is characterised by the moves it makes away fran the concerns of the 
'spaces' of the Idealist topography. It would be wrong to reproduce Derrida' s 
argunent - that 'taken one by one all Bataille' s concepts are Hegelian' _ 
simply substituting the name Kant for that of Hegel. This would be to miss 
the novurn of Bataille' s treatment of such concepts: for there they and the 
restricted econany of which they are the currency are dissolved in the 
fluctuating character of their conditions, that is in the intensive realities 
of sensation. The processes of sensation tend to an exacerbated dissolution 
or becoming and so although the dissolution of those concepts entails their 
revaluation relative to the value of expenditure, this is no rational value, 
nor a rational revaluation, but rather a becaning valueless proper to the fate 
of the power of critique. I have argued that Bataille' s revaluation and 
dissolution of Kant's terminology cannot therefore be reduced to the 
'influence' of critique on reason (an influence which Kant himself formulates 
and regulates albeit in a restricted fashion), as the influence of external 
considerations or even quanta of sensation on the enclosed fields of rational 
enterprise. 'Ibis schema of influence is eminently critical. Bataille' s 
philosophical work is rather an influenzoid infection of reason, for in it 
thought is reduced to its infectious condition, not through an accanplished 
intervention into reason, but because of the relay of the scale of rational 
economy into the larger scale of sensation and intensive energetic quanta. 
Bataille provides us with a schematic description of the energetic states and 
trajectory of thought as it veers towards its inevitable intensive immolation. 
Thought is only an example of events in general, which are exacerbated and 
dissolved by their energetic fluctuations; this constitutes the incandescence 
characteristic of events in time. 
The melodramatic flavour to Bataille' s writing is peculiarly exacerbated by 
the neutrality and indifference of the quasi-scientific discourses with which 
he generalises this imnolation of thought as the thennic contagion and 
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heatdeath proper to energetic events in the universe in general. If this 
makes possible novel accounts of historical and cultural events and change 
from the perspective of the principle of solar radiation, accounts which are 
inevitably strange and unconvincing, these accounts in turn conceal, with 
their radicality, the intuitive nature of the energetic 'truths' which 
Bataille wishes to articulate. There can be no doubt that Idealist philosophy 
shuns describing change, being rather obsessed with the states of entities. , 
and yet change is the problem facing every living organism, the problem that 
our sensations, rather than our rationalisations register. Bataille' s 
writings help us think change on the model of the temporal fluctuations of 
sensation, which are also the temporal fluctuations of energetic matter in 
general. 
We have seen the way that Bataille replicates essential Kantian concepts: 
continuity, transcendence, cormrunication, the nounenal, whilst adding to their 
senses. Thus the set of general rules of the form of hunan coomt.nlication 
becomes the form and rules of intensive ccmnunication and general econany; the 
moral feeling of conmunication is translated into the sensibility of the 
sacred; the notions of 'the transcendent and the transcendental become the 
status of the temporal energetic differentiations of events from an immanent 
zero and continuity becomes the basic sensibility of the imnanence of 
energetic conmunication. The figures of time and the impossible are 
emphasised in Bataille's revaluation of the Idealist topography. Time as the 
fluctuations of change supplants the spatial considerations of time as it was 
conceived within the enclosures of reason and their unity of apperception. 
The impossible, which was one of Kant's negatives - the limit of the limited 
realm of knowledge - becomes the swamping real, that is the influx of the 
intensive real into the abstract restrictions of Idealist philosophy. Thus 
there is an extent to which Bataille's philosophical writing is concerned with 
the influence of extraneous matter on reason; but this is only the first move 
on the way to describing the infectious mode of the intensive distributions 
and fluctuations which traverse and constitute and dissolve reason. Kant 
deployed the notion of influence in a restricted manner; as the influence of 
the higher faculties rather than as the influence of the quanta of 
pathological sensibility on the higher faculties. But Kant is surely correct 
in associating influence with the dynamics of critique, that is, the 
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application of critical principles to objects of thought in the employment of 
the tmderstanding. Influence cannot escape this critical schema which 
presupposes the elements and enclosures of transcendental philosophy which it 
comes to problematize. Bataille's approach is roore than a resuscitation of 
this topography and thereby entails more than an 'extrernising' of the mode of 
influence proper to critique. This is why Derrida' s interpretation of 
Bataille as steeped in the phenomenological tradition is doubly perverse _ 
Bataille is both a post-critical thinker and thereby a post-phenomenological 
thinker. The condition of Bataille's writing is the failure of critique; 
rational logic is perceived as no longer capable of explaining the effects of 
an intensive time which is also the condition of logic. With Bataille's 
writing we are no longer in the realm of critique and affectivity, in the 
realm of the model of influence on subsistent rational entities. With 
Bataille we are rather concerned with a perception which is fused with time 
and its process of virulent intensive differentiation, that is the fusion of 
the infectious or contagious nature of perception and infectious events, and 
their continuous production of exacerbating intensive changes and further and 
intenser energetic events. This perception has the characteristic of 
fluctuating intensively and distancing itself from rational meaning in the 
exacerbation of these fluctuations. Thus it tends to becomes meaningless as 
it approaches to intensive irrmensity; yet it constitutes a minimal thennic 
charting of this trajectory of thought or life, as opposed to an explanation 
of the logical structure of its elements or events. It is as difficult to 
consciously alter this process of intensification as it is easy to sense it 
coursing through all things. 
Otange is the spiralling vortexing intensification of events in time. Our 
extreme sensations scream this at us despite the inability of our conscious 
intentions to affect this movement. We only have a power of decision or 
choice on the edge of the tips of a swirling eddy of energetic and intensively 
transforming matter. Our consciousness is a crystalline fonnation of these 
fluctuations yet our scale of infectious perception allows us to sense the 
wider scales of energetic fluctuation. We fuse with the changing movements of 
impersonal tmconscious energy and glimpse them as occurring recursively 
throughout the scales of existence. These scales are only minimally and 
inevitably decreasingly objects of perception as the process of perception 
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accelerates in its fusion with the teeming of energetic matter, as one scale 
of the general fusion which is exacerbated by the general and specific thermic 
attraction of degrees to the summit degree of their own annihilation. 
'!he term 'infection' designates the fluid vortices of becomings, the 
accelerations and intensifications of fluidic processes. Bataille charts the 
process of vertiginous time fram its almost total disavowal in the rational 
stasis which produces the mode of influence as one of its internal elements, 
as critique, to the teeming irrmensities of infectious thennic energy. Fran 
the perspective of critical thought and reason the difference between these 
two terms is minimal - influence is the state of these processes as seen fran 
without, as they affect presupposed abstract and restricted economies of 
objects and entities; whereas infection is the fusional movement of these 
processes of change themselves - but this minimal difference constitutes the 
definite liberation of perception and attests to the inevitable fate of 
critique. 
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Introduction: INFWENCE AND lNFECITON 
1. referred to in "A short history of astronomy" by Arthur Berry (Dover, New 
York 1961) p 35ff and "Cosmic Influences & Hunan Behaviour" by Michel 
Gauquelin (Garnstone, London 1977) p 25ff 
2. referred to in "Science in the nineteenth century" ed Rene Taton (1hames & 
Hudson, London 1965) p 90f f 
3. discussed in "Electricity in the 17th & 18th centuries; a study of early 
modern physics" by J L Heilbron (Univ of California 1979) p 427-8, 457 
4. The paradox inherent in the rational marginalisation of influence must 
appear to anyone versed in rhetoric: the passivity of influence is considered 
irrational and yet the desired effect of a 'good' argunent is to influence and 
persuade. 
5. referred to in "Science since 1500" by H J Pledge (HMSO 1966) P 12sff 
6. referred to in 'Doctor' xxiv by R Southey (London 1834) 
<l1apter One: DERRIDA - '!HE lANGUAGE OF <n1PLICI'IY AND mNSTRAINT 
1. 'From restricted to general economy: a Hegelianism without reserve' in 
''Writing and Difference" by Jacques Derrida (RKP 1981) 
2. 'Yale French Studies' no 78 (Yale University Press 1990) ed A Stoekl 
3. ''Modern French Philosophy" by Vincent Descombes (Cambridge Oniv Press 
1980) trans Scott Fox-Harding p 1-50 
4. 'Introduction to Transgression' by Michel Foucault in ''Language, 
Cotmtermemory, Practice" (Blackwell 1977) ed/trans D Bouchard P 29-52 
5. 'Anti-oedipus' by Gilles Deleuze/Felix Guattari (Athlone 1984) p 4 & 190 
6. 'Dialogues' by Gilles Deleuze/Claire Parnet (Athlone 1987) p 22 
7. 'Powers of Horror' by Julia Kristeva (Colunbia Univ Press 1982) 
8. Such is the retroactive power of this essay that the names of the 
hegemonic critics - interpreters of the relation between Bataille and Marx and 
Nietzsche - whan Derrida writes 'strategically' against, have thenselves been 
effaced. 
9. 'Beyond the pleasure principle' by Sigmund Freud in "On Metapsychology" 
Vol 11 Penguin Freud Library (Penguin 1991) 
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10. ''Positions'' by Jacques Derrida (Athlone 1981) trans Alan Bass p 41ff 
11. 'Fran restricted to general econany' hereafter 'WD' 
12. Derrida gives Bataille's fragmented syntactical tmits the sense of a 
systemic project at the level which transcends the texts themselves: (WD252) 
"To bear the self-evidence of Hegel, today, would mean this ••• ". The value of 
any sampling as representative of a particular writing is problematic; but 
with Bataille' s texts so 'torn apart', Derrida' s 'concretion' of the 
Bataillean project can only be a symptom of his own extreme control mania. 
13. Derrida's accounts of 'figures' and 'scenes' presents us with one example 
of deconstruction's hijacking and domestication of the syntaxes and concerns 
of the energetic tradition. The principle of differance regulates a space of 
graphemes called a 'scene' - reminiscent of the Kantian notions of space and 
representation as dramatisation - in which energetic quanta are reduced to the 
status of objects of identification, personified concepts or personae (WD253). 
Thus Hegel, caricature of metaphysical over-reaching and self-justification is 
a 'figure' in a 'scene'. ,Derrida would have it that Bataille dramatises the 
series of metaphysical moves associated with Hegel (although Derrida admits in 
"Glas" (Univ of Nebraska 1986) that this figure of Hegel is itself a cipher 
for his own concerns, and this holds true for the figure of Bataille too.) 
The 'scene' lacks the attributes of the energetic differentiation of events 
which is posited as the 'space' of the energetic tradition. Instead we have 
the tmquantifiable relations between elements which still have a human form. 
The terms Derrida uses to describe Bataille' s sirmllation of Hegelian discourse 
alert us - with their vagueness, "close •• very close" - to his suggestion 
without substantiation of the quantitative nature of events as they are 
conceived in the spatiums of the energetic tradition. 
14. ''The Phenanenology of Spirit" by GWF Hegel (Oxford Univ Pres 1977) trans A 
V Miller 
15. 'Hegel, Death and Sacrifice' and 'Hegel, Man and History' in Bataille's OC 
12 330-348, 349-366 
16. 0C5 97ff, 156ff see chapter six below 
17. see chapter seven below 
18. 0C6 1-205, DC7 284-367, 0C8 243-455 
19. see p 137-8, 145-6 below 
20. Likewise 'mettre en jeu' - risk - is irreducible to the risk of the master 
, . , !so 
and slave (as Derrida would have it). The operation mettre en Jeu a 
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relates to sovereignty, to the impersonal operation of the energetic principle 
'putting into play' quantities of free energy. 
21. 0C12 333ff 
22. OC7 284-367, 0C8 243-455, OC9135-56 
23. OC9 150, OC6 140ff 
24. Derrida distrusts history (WD269); given that Hegel demonstrated "the 
ontological unity of method and historicity", sovereignty, as an oppositional 
concept must exceed the subject and history. Non-knowledge is super-
historical for Derrida; but it is the basis for a genealogical critique 
relative to the base value of expenditure. Bataille applies his energetic 
principles to his tory, whereas Derrida is only concerned with the deep 
structures of the logic of representation. 
25. OC12 331 The similarity between the 'negative' and expenditure which 
provokes the sensations of anguish, ecstasy, fear is for Bataille only a 
second order rationalisation. 
26. ''Modem French Philosophy" by Vincent Descanbes (Cambridge Univ Press 
1980) trans L Scott Harding & JM Harding p 9-48 
27. 0C12 330-366 
28. OC6 195ff see chapters six and seven below 
29. see p 153ff below 
30. Utile values are still degrees on ceiling-less scales, which is why 
Derrida's obsession with 'full' metaphysics, with totality and presence rather 
than intensive degrees is so foreign to Batail1e's perspective. To envisage 
the endpoint or maxinn.un of metaphysics is to wallow in its detritus. 
31. see p 195 below 
32. see p 72ff below 
33. However Batai11e himself suggests the Hegelian logic of law and 
transgression, for instance in 'Eroticism' OC8 1-178 Transgression ranains 
for Batai11e a question of the designating of intensive quanta, in cultures or 
syntax; that is a mapping of the movement from the restricted sense of econany 
to the freeplay of intensive quanta. 
34. One might also ask whether phenomenological and rational are not mutually 
exclusive terns anyway, and to what extent Kantian or Hegelian discourse is 
useful? 
35. Batai11e takes critique a stage further than Derrida, who is content to 
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simply display the logic of representation. 
36. see especially the unpublished early texts of 0C2 
Chapter Two: BATAIllE - 'lliE NOVUM OF INFECITON 
1. Tenninology from Ko j eve's Kan tian reading of the 'Phenomenology' can be 
dsicovered in Bataille' s texts. Thus jargon specific to an example of 
restricted economy Hegelian phenomenology - creeps into Bataille's 
descriptions of utile and general econanies (see chapter seven). But this is 
only a minor resonance relative to the ~nsity of the energetic perspective 
which swamps the niceties of phenomenology and Kantian space. 
2. see' Autobiographical Note' OC7 459 and note that neither Kojeve nor Hegel 
are mentioned. One might extrapolate the following trajectory of Bataille's 
thought from this text: from an early encounter with Nietzsche, Bataille is 
obssessed with the genealogy of morals and the notion of the will to power; 
sociological and anthropological leanings lead him from Durkheim and Mauss to 
Kojeve; at the same time, an encounter with biology and physics allows him to 
expand on the notion of an energetics of culture and the principle of 
expendi ture. 
3. OC1 220-26, 0C2 54-69, 0C1 302-20 respectively 
4. It is no wonder that Bataille sought to repeat the adrenaline dose of the 
spectacle of reason intenninably, stating that this failure of the logic of 
representation and its expiation repeats itself 0C12 337ff. 
5. This was perhaps enough to infect a generation of thinkers with quasi-
Hegelianism, despite the fact that most of the intellectuals who attended 
'disagreed' with Hegel. Sartre is a good example of the way that the 
phenomenological tradition was revitalised despite the intentions of the 
participants at these lectures - see his remarks on 'Inner Experience' 0C6 
195ff. 
6. 0C2 291-363 see p 173ff 
7. Even the utility of the project for the Marshall Plan in the 'Accursed 
Share' (OC7) contanporary to this essay is swamped by the uselessness of the 
overwhelming energies to which it attests. 
8. see 'Critique' Tome 1 1946 91ff, 325ff, 458ff, 558ff; Tome 2 268ff; Tome 3 
1947 259ff, 546ff; Tome 6 1949-50 70ff 
9. 'First confrontations with Hegel' in 'Critique' 195-6 Aug/Sept 1963 p 695 
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10. This procedure is still too Hegelian, still too logically reflexive, 
entailing "a simple logical mockery of the inverse operation". 
11. 'Ladybird' in French is 'bete a bon dieu'. 
12. I am sure that this could be rationalised in tenns of typical pedagogical 
relations, after the intensive facts of the behaviour shown in this relation. 
13. As we shall see, the concepts of negativity and the end of history are the 
sites of Bataille's contestation of Kojeve's interpretation of Hegel. 
14. "Thus spake Zarathustra" by Friedrich Nietzsche (Penguin 1961) trans R 
Hollingdale p 46 
15. see OC9 182 and chapter seven below 
16. It is easy enough at an anecdotal and textual level to find in Bataille's 
writing explicit equal measures of celebration and rejection of Kojeve' s 
readings; that is why one must take accOlmt of those passages where 
disagreement over ftmdamental points is implicitly registered, i.e where 
Kojeve is simply ignored. 
17. In so far as the Hegelian project is described as impossible, that is 
unable to accotmt for its own status and authority, both Kojeve and Bataille 
return to Kantian problematics: For Kant, totality is impossible but given as 
a project whilst 'limited being' has a provisional sense. Bataille emphasises 
the limits of a certain philosophy and its dissolution into the sttmned 
sensational response - of sensation tmderstood as the release of libidinal 
energies - a response (which remains after the process of the invalidation of 
reason) to the non-logical differentiation which overnms reason virulently 
and is superimposed on rational projects in the descriptions of solar or 
general economy. 
18. "Critique of Pure Reason" by Inmanuel Kant (Methuen 1929) trans NK Smith 
A747 8775 see p 81-2 below 
19. Bataille calls the Hegelian Totality 'impossible' but thereby designates 
the inevitable ruination of the concepts of the transcendental/ 
phenanenological tradition and their restricted econanies by the energies 
which constitute and exceed then. The' impossible' has only a minor 
phenanenological resonance and cannot be reduced to its limited and limiting 
Kantian sense. 
20. see p 148ff below 
21. The simple but extensive effectivity of this critical move is developed 
when the historical process is revealed to be the gradual exposure of the 
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falsity of an eternal god and the correlative truth of the annihilation of 
hlInankind through time. see chapters six and seven below 
22. For instance, in passing, Bataille associates sovereignty with the state 
of ~tent beauty in the 'Phenomenology' (as opposed to the violence of the 
understanding). Impotent beauty feels the totality of natural inInanence and 
suffers its break up by the understanding. 
23. see chapters six and seven 
24. The full critical import is only registered in texts such as 'Theory of 
religion' and 'The accursed share'. Yet even here Bataille attempts to deduce 
an 'irrmanent totality' from the totality of the reserve of Nothingness, the 
reserve which Kojeve describes as founding the negativity of action. 
25. 'Independence and dependence of self-consciousness: lordship and bondage' 
in "Phenomenology of spirit" see above para 178-196 
26. Bataille was fond of allocating such fears to Hegel see OC5 56 
27. Which is only 'intentional' in that its effect, the habitual liberation of 
quanta of energy can be demonstrated as constantly orienting the coomunity 
around its repetition. 
28. Bataille prefigures Derrida in discovering the logic of representation; 
rut Bataille goes on to distinguish this logic from the perception of the 
degrees on intensity. 
29. see chapters three and four below 
30. see OC6 140ff and pages 198ff below 
31. we have seen that 'constitutive absence' was the regulatory mode of 
differance. see chapter one 
32. see p 137-8, 145-6 below 
33. One problem with Bataille' s continual use of the jargon of totalities, 
absolutes and extremes, with their senses of unity and maximun, is the 
resulting lack of differentiation between the description of the extremes of 
metaphysical subterfuge and the intensities which constitute them. Thus, for 
example Bataille can describe the fear of death, the mundane foundation of all 
activity as an extreme desire although it involves a wholly exclusive 
operation, the psychologising of raging intensities. 
34. He notes that his specific concern is the analysis of 'social and 
religious functions' of expenditure throughout history and culture in relation 
to the servile reactive model of the dialectic. 
35. OC7 50ff 
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36. 0C12 352 According to general econany, the expenditure associated wi. th 
prestige is sovereign, even if it also has a utile secondary effect. Such a 
contest of expenditure can be said to have a utile result, in the sense that 
social hierarchies are created as a result of the contest; but the nature of 
that hierarchy is evanescent and chaotic, for all such hierarchies and 
powerbases remain at the mercy of further contests of wasting. The activity 
of wasting remains sovereign and has the ultimate issue of useless expenditure 
which surpasses the result of recognition and prestige. 
37. This term differentiates the duration of expenditure from history 
coonsidered as the realm of the dialectical overcoding of expenditure. 
38. Since Marx's and Weber's exhaustive accotmts of the rise of capital such 
approaches have lost their interest, especially when they renegotiate the 
Hegelian paradigm for those accotmts. Bataille here sketches the way that the 
slave becomes "the master of nature" 0C12 354, the proponent of negativity as 
action and is differentiated from the powerless master Who has delegated work 
and falls back into the 'impotent beauty' of the religious order. The servile 
motor of action and negation starts up but is initially concealed by the 
'charisma' of the self-immolating master (this allegory refers to the growth 
of the proto-capital in the era of Catholicism). The slave overcomes his 
slavery through work. The master consumes the products of the slave whilst 
the slave represses his desire for consumption and defers the anguish of death 
(0C12 355) through work and the transformation of objects. Bataille quotes 
Koj~ve, deducing the general tenor of history from thje action of the slave 
"History is the history of the Worker-Slave ••• The fear of death embodied for 
the slave in the warlike master is the sine qua non condition of historical 
progress". 
39. For instance, the sovereign and the sacred values or degrees are 
canpranised by their implication in social ftmctions: at the heart of the prre 
religious order, Bataille suggests (0C12 357) lies an interdiction on 
consunption and sacrifice which prefigures the regulation of consunption in 
the slave's history of the Hegelian dialectic. At the same time such a 
campranise does not necessitate an empirical regress in search of an instance 
of pure wastage; it does not affect the principle of the positive value of 
expenditure as a base for critical and genealogical accotmts of morals and 
societal attitudes to expenditure. 
40. see chapters three and four 
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41. Bataille's reading of the Master is idiosyncratic - he associates 
stability with the parallel planes of time and the instability of history with 
the fixed choreographic moves of the figures of the 'Phenomenology'. 
42. see p 198ff below In the early writings it is time which is continuous 
chaos outside of the phenomenological dispersal or order of history. Time 
causes the dispersal of all themc degrees, including the irruption of 
meaning loosed by the impossibility of the 'Phenomenology' or the explosion of 
any rational project into drifts of matter, into redundant negative entropy. 
'Ibis fusional fallout of meaning is itself attested to by Hegel ''Dismemberment 
is full of meaning" (OC12 344). 
43. as well as being statistically improbable on the scale of the universe see 
p 166ff, OC5 95ff 
44. as opposed to the (OC12 358) "the possibilities generally open in the 
conduct, thought and discourse of Man" which are the concerns of 
phenomenology. 
45. Bataille's account is, insofar as it is a reading of Kojeve's text, a 
hideous Hegelian revisionism: on the strength of the view that Hegel posits 
the end of history, Kojeve and Bataille point out its impossibility and 
attenuate the claim until it becomes possible as a historical reality. 
Bataille quotes Kojeve OC12 362: after the end of history, hunans will be 
devoid of spirit, action, and profane time and spirit will be reduced to the 
stonecold history book of the 'Phenomenology', which helps the reader 
anticipate his/ her death. Bataille follows Kojeve in considering the end of 
history as a possible social and cultural event. For Bataille OC12 363 after 
the end of history comes the epoch of social homogeneity, the zeroing of 
social and cultural differences which, claims Bataille, clashes with the hunan 
individual's desire to "conserve" its difference from others. Here - unlike 
the early texts on time OCl 495ff - Bataille makes the mistake of treating 
change as a principle of differentiation which can be conserved. This notion 
is more at hane in the logic of history which inhabits a metaphysical space of 
difference, a full series of events and a completed map of spatial 
differences. Here, Bataille misconstrues the nature of the fallout from the 
holocaust of reason and history and reorients it around what he calls the 
ftmdamental value of hunan social life, "the hunan will to be endlessly 
different from what it was". However, the currency of this future hunan life 
- degrees of difference - reflects the imnense change which the fallout of 
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reason effects; and general economy will be the name f th beha . 
o e V10ur of these 
energetic degrees, despite the virtual endpoint of phenomenological logic. 
46. For this quasi-Derridean Bataille we do not even have the assurance of the 
final event 0Cl2 365 "It is certainly more captivating to represent to our 
measure a definite fatality: the anticipated contemplation from which we can 
never escape can only be knowledgeable. We nrust bear to tell ourselves the 
history of the antecedents of the event." 
47. see chapter seven 
48. It is precisely this synmetry which Kant tries to regulate in the 
'Critique of Judgement' in identifying commmication and hunan freedom cf 
chapter five below. 
49. see p 191ff 
50. see 0C2 291-363 
51. see below p 123ff 
52. Thus the restricted/general economy distinction is basically false: there 
is only one economy, and it is themc/energetic. 
53. see p 72ff 
54. see p 198ff 
55. see p 69 
56. see p 36 
57. for example 0Cl0 66ff 
58. OC6 1-206, OC9 171-314 
59. see chapters five and six below Bataille even reconvenes the Kantian 
schema by going so far as to associate conmmication, morality and freedom! 
Thus OC9 313 "powerful coorm.mication abandons the consciousnesses that reflect 
each other, to that impenetrability which they 'ultimately' are. At the same 
time we can see that powerful conmmication is primary, it is a simple given, 
the supreme appearance of appearance, which reveals itself to us in the 
multiplicity of consciousnesses and in their conmmicability". Transgression 
is associated with ccmnunication, and ccmnunication with "hypennorality" or 
"complicity in the knowledge of evil" OC9 182, as well as with intensity and 
critique. Literature reveals "the process of breaking the law - withoout 
which the law would have no end - independently of the necessity to create 
order"; rut it is also "the expression of those in whom ethical values are 
most deeply felt" as instanced in "the desire for a fundamental cOOlIllll1ication 
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with the reader". Before we interpret Bataille as a hunanist Habennasian, it 
is 'NOrth remembering that his examples include Sade! 
Olapter Three: KANI' - 'mE CATASTROPHE OF CRITIQUE 
1. One could mention any nunber of 'pos t-modern' thinkers: Lyotard, Deleuze & 
Guattari, Baudrillard, Foucault who share an avowedly Kantian heritage. 
2. "The critique of judgement" by Intnanuel Kant (Oxford Clarendon 1952) trans 
JC Meredith 
3. ''TIle critique of pure reason" by Intnanuel Kant (Methuen 1927) trans NK 
Smith 
4. A19 B34 - A49 B73 
5. Preface second edition Bxxiv - vi 
6. "It is still open to us to enquire whether in the practical knowledge of 
reason data may not be fOlmd sufficient to detennine reason's transcendent 
concept of the unconditioned, and so to enable us, in accordance with the wish 
of metaphysics ••• to pass beyond the limits of all possible experience. 
Speculative reason has at least made room for such an extension and if it must 
at least leave it empty, yet none the less we are at liberty, indeed we are 
sUIlllOned to take occupation of it, if we can by practical data of reason." 
We can note the expansionist tone to this passage and its presentation of a 
desired state of consolidated idealist space. Morality and critique are 
presented as extensive expansionist forces. 
7. See also the 'fantasy' of the Paralogisms 8410, where Kant states that if 
all thinking beings were simple substances "we should have taken a step beyond 
the world of sense and have entered into the field of the nounenon: and noone 
could then deny our right of advancing yet further in this domain, indeed of 
settling in it, and should our star prove auspicious of establishing claims of 
pennanent possession" - if this is a rational fantasy, the expansionist 
protocols of legitimation are the same as those of the inventory of the 
propadeutic of reason. 
8. see p 104 and chapter five 
9. the primary factI event/ affect of the interface and swamping of the 
phenomenal by the noumenal. 
10. Kant morbidly justifies the autonanous choice of the suicidal strategy 
using the transcendental hypothesis - that is a concept "devised merely for 
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the purposes of self-defence" A780 8808 - that birth and death are simply 
appearances! 
11. 0C5 51-53, 64-9 Although these passages can also be treated as simply 
describing the energetic trajectory of thought. 
12. OC5 48 
13. As morality kept the shape of reason. Kant states that the relation 
between reason and understanding is like the relation between founding moral 
principles and the multiplicity of civil laws A302 8358. 
14. see p 105ff below 
15. see p 129 ff 
16. see p 106ff 
17. Kant states B415 that the 'I think' has intensive quantity, degrees of 
reality to zero. This suggests as we see below p 105ff an alternative econany 
and currency to that fixated on the unity=l of apperception. 
18. see p 98ff 
19. Kant portrays the human impulse for moral law/ teleology through reason as 
beyond natural utility and thereby influencing critique; whereas Bataille 
presents thinking as enthusiasm on a par with cosmic radiation and utility and 
morality - together - as fleeting and dispersing epiphenomena in the hunan 
realm. We shall see in chapter five how Kant's minimal fonn of human freedom 
- communication - dissolves into the principle of contagious thennic 
contagion. 
20. This is the same movement as Kant shows in his accOlmt of the 
transcendence of the sublime see 138f f • 
21. The thesis of the first conflict of the antinomy argues that only a finite 
series of conditions can be completed by a successive synthesis and that thus 
beginning and limits are implicit in time and space. The antithesis argues 
that beginnings and limits are necessrily dependent on the impossible zeroes 
of empty time and space which as types of nothing cannot be conditions of 
existence, according' to Kant; thus space and time are inf ini te. Cri tique 
points out the contradiction implicit in both thesis and antithesis A487 B515 
that "to obtain absolute totality in the empirical synthesis it is always 
necessary that the unconditioned be an empirical concept", i. e that the 
unconditioned be a conditioned concept. 
22. see p 129 below 
23. see p 99ff 
-217-
24. see chapter five below 
25. see 98ff and for the alternative 'unit' of zero 114ff 
26. "Kant's critical philosophy" by Gilles Deleuze (Athlone 1984) trans 
Tanlinson & Habberjam p ix and "Qu' est ce que la philosophie" by Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari (Editions de minuit 1991) p 35 
27. "Kant's critical philosophy" ix 
28. Letter to Jacques Riviere 5th Jtme 1923 in "Collected Works" Vol 1 by 
Antonin Artaud (Calder & Boyars 1968) p 27-8 
29. see p 121ff 
30. Pure intuitions are simply containers of the possible modes of the 
relation of representations, containing "nothing rut mere relations: of 
locations in an intuition (extension), of change of location (motion) and of 
laws according to which this change is determined (moving forces)" 867. 
However, empirical intuitions are related to objects as representations in so 
far as these objects affect sensibility and cause sensations. 
31. At the same time Kant states that the transcendental exposition of the 
concept of time explains change (as alteration in time and space A32 848) not 
just as succession, but in terms of the three modes of time - thus there is a 
multiplication of the possible alterations and a multitude of virtual 
connections. In ge~eral, Kant downplays the fusion of space and time except 
in so far as it feeds into the spatial hierarchy of the faculties. That is 
why we have to contest the spatial overcoding of time as a tendency throughout 
the critiques. 
32. This applies especially to sensation and intuition: both provide 
representations for the mind machine, yet sensation is only partially mediated 
through forms of intuition, which themselves are exhausted in the relation of 
mutual dependence with the tmderstanding - the tmity of the synthesis proper 
to the understanding depends on the form of the time-sequence in inner sense. 
Thus the forms of intuition are exhaustively drawn into the rational machine 
whereas sensation remains in part pure quanta which register as independent of 
the mind machine at the very point at which they invade the mind and kickstart 
the machine in the form of affects. 
33. see p 101 
34. see p 121ff 
35. According to Kant the understanding is a "lawgiver" - "a faculty of 
rules •• which confer upon appearances their conformity to LruJ' (A125). Thus 
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Kant creates law where it is not necessary, 1.. e· th . 
• 1.n e 1mmanent processes of 
the mind. 
36 "Qu' I • est ce que a philosophie" p 48 
37. see p 97ff 
38. see p 120 and "The philosophy of material nature" by Inmanuel Kant 
(Hackett 1985) trans J Ellington cbs 2 & 3 'The metaphysical foundations of 
dynamics' and 'The metaphysical fotmdations of mechanics' 
39. see p 121ff 
40. see p 158ff 
41. "Anti-Oedipus" by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (Athlone 1984) trans 
Hurley, Seem & Lane 
42. The first section of Anti-Oedipus distinguishes three operations of the 
energetics of desiring production: a connective synthesis of production, a 
disjtmctive synthesis of recording and a conjtmctive synthesis of 
consunption/consUllIl8tion. (Anti-Oedipus 73ff). The connective synthesis has an 
immanent nature, producing the sequences, series and flows of desire/energy, 
and a transcendent use - in psychoanalysis and philosophy - which is 
justified/underwritten by the paralogistic argunent (as Kant would have it, 
although he associates the hypostasization of cause with the antinomy of pure 
reason) that series presuppose conditions which constitute those series as 
their additions or totals. The transcendent use involves an operation in 
which one term from the series is extracted and considered as the unity of 
that series, the tmity from which that series is derived. The difference 
between origin and derivation is held to be qualitative i.e the difference is 
between a first order origin and a secondary derivative series. In the 
transcendent use of the disjtmCtive synthesis the derived reality of the 
illegitimate connective synthesis is differentiated in line with its 
transcendent presupposition/principle. This constitutes a reintegration of 
the transcendent principle into the series where it carries out a series of 
mutual exclusions between terms and creates the illusion that all tenns are 
derived from a larger reality i.e are at least less than their sun, if not 
qualitatively different from it. In relation to this synthesis Deleuze and 
Guattari carry out a critical move which is not to be fotmd in Kant, for who 
the disjunctive synthesis is exclusive and only definitive because the 
divisions presuppose a given body of knowledge or a full first order reality. 
Deleuze and Guattari transform the a priori principle of disjunction into an 
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energy of production and inscription whose attributes are significantly 
different from those of an a priori principle, in that this energy is an 
irrmanent process. They describe their legitimate inmanent diSjunction as 
(A076): "A disjunction that remains diSjunctive, and that still affinns the 
disjoined terms, that affirms them throughout their entire distance, without 
restricting one by the other or the other from the one •••• 'Either •• or •• or', 
instead of 'either/or'." The tenn 'distance' alerts us to the dissipative 
nature of the inclusive process, i.e its reliance on time, whereas the 
exclusive use of the synthesis emphasises the simultaneity of the division of 
parts within a given derived reality. The inclusive disjunction carries out 
its synthesis as it passes from one tenn to another: either z or a or b ••• , 
where each term is the terminal point of a distance from another point and a 
point in a distance which exceeds it. The result is a disjunctive network of 
differences, a continuum of differentiations, a multiplication of parts 
obeying the principle· that "everything divides, but into itself". In one 
sense then this synthesis is a connective synthesis operating according to an 
:i.rrmanent disjunctive principle. The transcendent use of this synthesis 
Lmposes an exclusivity of relations between both the disjunctions qua 
differentiation and the whole of those differentiations and its 
presupposition, which is not conceived as an origin (as it was in the 
transcendent use of the connective synthesis, thereby giving us the model of 
the transcendent operation) but as an alternative (either/or) to the whole of 
the disjunctions i.e as undifferentiated. The disjunctive principle enters 
into the series of exclusive disjunctions, after excluding a presupposed 
alternative to the whole of its operation. Deleuze and Guattari present this 
presupposition as itself presupposed by the operation and as the factor which 
kicks tarts the operation on a logical grounding of opposition and 
contradiction. It is the "one too many" (AntiOedipus 79) which is envisaged 
and presupposed by the operation as the tenninal alternative to its complete 
disjunctive whole. In tenns of the Kantian schema which they are inflecting, 
Deleuze and Guattari' s treatment of the third inmanent conjunctive synthesis 
of consunption/consUllllation reorients all three syntheses around sensation 
rather than the understanding, and arolUld a peripheral subject proper to 
intensive sensation. In so doing they are holding onto an exaggerated 
conception of the relevance of the hunan for intensive processes. The 
conjunctive synthesis is a matter of "a series of aootions and feelings as a 
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constmnation and consunption of intensive quantities" (A084), a matter of 
intensive emotions or affects which inhabit an intensive order. The series of 
singularities created by the disjunctive network become intensive states in a 
"conjtmctive tissue" (A088) and a transpositional subject moves through these 
states as a changing fonnation which changes as it 'identifies' itself with 
them. The inadequacy of this picture arises from the stubborness of the 
values which have accreted to the notion of the subject for the duration that 
it was considered more than a blip in libidinal processes. 
43. Thus Anti-Oedipus traces the fragmentation of the economy of the oedipal 
triangle which is protected by transcendent operations back into the 
multiplicities and flows from which those operations are illegitimately 
extrapolated. Anti-Oedipus shows that these flows themselves operate to 
produce more singularities than appear as a resul t of those transcendent 
operations and thus those transcendent operations can be said to replicate 
restricted versions of those flows. I use the word replicate carefully for as 
we shall see the relation ,between flows and their extrapolations is reducible 
to quanta of the recursions of simple combinations, i.e to the quantative 
replication of recursive formations. At the level of economies and 
operations Anti-Oedipus opposes the restricted transcendent uses of movements 
and energies which are themselves unbounded. Deleuze and Guattari describe 
the oedipal triangle as (A096): "a porous or seeping triangle, an exploded 
triangle from which the flows of desire escape in the direction of other 
territories". The threesided triangle is supplemented by the transcendent 
operation and the transcendent quantity which defines it. This constitutes an 
economy; but the explosion of the triangle relates the restricted economy to 
the economy of n values or mul tiplici ty • So the oedipal triangle does not 
consist of 3 or 4 singularities but is created from a multiplicity of 
singularities which are tmrelated to this restrictive use or application; thus 
the transcendent operation can be opposed to the inmanent operation: the tenns 
are "not even 3+1 rut 4+n" 
<llapter Four: KANT - SENSATIONS AND AFFEcrs 
1. see p 104 
2. see "Thousand Plateaux" by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (Athlone 
1987) trans Brian Massumi p 389 
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3. see p 121ff and chapter seven 
4. Kant's fear of the zero . . ~s present ~n his obsession with the 
impossibilities of empty space and t;~ ( 129ff) 
"U1;;; see p • He sees these notions 
of emptiness as pathologically tempting a transcendent application of the 
understanding. This may actually be a fear of the fractional and the zero as 
opposed to the unit of measurement; a fear not of empty dimensions but of 
rnultiplicitous dimensions which do not suffer the exclusive logic of 
transcendent(al) application. There can be no doubt that Kant's definition of 
magnitudes is exclusive: 1 time=l magnitude=l reality. 
5. see p 121ff 
6. see p 90 
7. For instance, Kant attempts to consolidate the necessity of intensity's 
anticipation of perception by referring to the continuity of sensations as 
degrees; yet continuity is thereby related to extensive degrees too, and the 
attributes of sensation to extensive magnitudes and the intellectual processes 
which utilise them as well. 
8. see p 129 
9. see chapter seven, especially p 198ff 
10. This constitutes a reformulation of the category of community at the level 
of a fusion of space and time see p 121ff. Deleuze and Guattari invoke the 
attributes of intensive magnitudes in their account of the intensive 
'spatiun'. They liberate time by equating it with space and matter under the 
rubric of libidinal production or energy. They thus replace the base unit 
with the intensive zero. Bataille does sanething similar but stresses the 
value of that zero, the intensifying differentiations and annihilations which 
it brings about. 
11. see p 121ff 
12. Kant states that an extensive magnitude is a representation, entails an 
intuition of space and time, and thus occurs as (A167 B209) "a successive 
synthesis proceeding 'fran parts to the whole representation". An intensive 
magnitude or sensation, on the other hand, 'occupies' a moment only and is 
thus instantaneous: intensive magnitude is "a magnitude which is apprehended 
only as unity and in which nrultiplicity can be represented only through 
approximation to negation=O". This conception of intensive magnitude breaks 
the hold of space on time, despite the fact that this magnitude is seen as 
occupying an instant, and precisely because each magnitude is a unity i.e in 
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this case a multiplicity. 
13. Kant describes the alteration of an entity from state a-b as a novum a , 
zero by which a and b are measured in relation to a base unit. But from the 
perspective of time there remains a causal connection between instants _ 
sequence. 1hus Kant distinguishes the sequence of degrees of the durational 
cause a-b fran the indivisible relations a-o, b-o which constitute singular 
magnitudes of measurement. Kant displaces the status of singularity from the 
measurement onto the object qua pennanent substance which is undergoing 
alteration, turning the instants a and b into the limits of the time of an 
alteration which is itself continuous: (A208 B253-4) "Between two instants 
there is always a time and between any two states there is always a difference 
which has magnitude •• the magnitude of the reality is •• genera ted through all 
smaller degrees which are contained between the first and the last". 
In Kant's description the alteration is given so that it is itself only 
continuous in so far as it is the period of a continuous action of causality. 
Even though Kant identifies continuity with the (A208 B254) "continuous 
action" of a cause over the period of an alteration, he remains very aware of 
the apparent paradox of "the law of the continuity of alteration": (A209 B254) 
"that neither time nor appearance in time consists of parts which are the 
smallest •• and that nevertheless the state of a thing passes in its alteration 
through all these parts, as elements, to its second state". It seems then 
that Kant must depict change as a given which can only be measured in relation 
to a base unit, yet assigns it a cause whose effects are also measured in 
tenns of divisible magnitudes of time. Kant simply describes change as a 
measurement of extensive magnitudes. 
14. Kant reorients intuition to the hierarchy of the faculties in the 
'Analogies of Experience' section. The analogies of experience emphasise that 
relations between appearances lie under rules which connect them to the 
unities of time, space and apperception (Al80 B222) in that perceptions must 
be in a time-relation to each other of duration, succession or coexistence 
(which all stress the form of inner sense's dependence on space). As we 
stated above Kant discusses alteration rather than change because alteration 
is defined as a rearrangement of points within pennanent space. Kant uses 
the notion of spatial alteration to disavow the chaos of temporal flows. 
The rules appear hierarchical with the third rule from coexis tence con taining 
the other two in 'camrunity', in a manner which is analogous with the 
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communities organised and limited by the syntheses of the forms of intuition 
and the unity of apperception. The analogy of duration states that changes 
of appearances in time presuppose and occur within a 'substratun' of time in 
general and that the permanence of substance is analogous to this pennanent 
time. (Al83 B226) The rule fran the analogy of succession states that (A189 
B234) "the apprehension of the manifold of appearances is always successive". 
This rule emphasises that the sequence of perceptions obeys the necessary 
order of cause and effect and that thus the extension or the advance of time 
in the determinations of inner sense (A210 B255) is linked inexorably to the 
understanding's causality based series of appearances. The third rule from 
the analogy of co-existence states that (A211 B257) "the perception 
of •• objects can follow each other reciprocally". Kant states that appearances 
can be perceived in a "reciprocal sequence", where, given a & b, each 
influences the other: (A211 B258) "the relation of substances in which the one 
contains determinations the ground of which is contained in the other is the 
relation of influence; and when each substance reciprocally contains the 
ground of the determinations in the other the relation is that of community or 
reciprocity". 
The relevance of temporal sequence becomes secondary to the completed 
apprehension of a dynamical community. Without this community there can be 
no perception of coexistence or s~ltaneity or permanence in space and in its 
analogue the time-space proper to the (A214 B261) "community of apperception" 
of appearances in a possible experience. The notion of community repeats 
those problems of illegitimate totality and equilibrium i.e of the status of 
the transcendent(al) seen as a reserve and an application, which Kant solved 
with critique only to reintroduce them in order to orient his account of 
perception around the horizon of useful transcendent ideas; hypothetical god, 
hypothetical purposiveness, hypothetical unity. 
15. see p 114 
16. It could be countered that this transformed definition of unity does not 
emphasise the difference between the accreted value of unity and the novun of 
the zero as virulent multiplicity. 
17. see chapter seven especially p 198ff 
18. see p 158ff 
19. The general economy which drives Bataille's biophysics and thermodynamic 
genealogies of culture has obvious links to Nietzsche's will to power. 
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Although it can only be asserted here, it seems to me that philosophers after 
Nietzsche are involved in the slow shrugging off of Kantian jargon. Deleuze 
and Guattari render this necessary abortion of sense respectable by feeding 
the will to power as desiring production back through the Kantian synthetic 
machine to arrive at a philosophy of intensities. In terms of the syntactic 
explosions of Bataille' s texts and the sensibility to which it is wi tness , 
these are regressions to the staidness of philosophical culture. 
20. see p 201ff 
21. see p 87ff 
22. Recursion is best defined as replication by isomorphism i.e sanething 
being defined in terms of simpler versions of itself, versions which are 
information preserving transformations of a formula, such as a DNA structure. 
To take another example drawn from "An eternal golden braid" by Douglas 
Hofstatder (Penguin 1980) p146 subatomic particles made up of electrons, 
protons, neutrons and photons can be said to be nested inside each other in a 
way which can only be described recursively; and these recursions create a 
complicated loop of virtual processes (possible and necessary) in which every 
particle interacts with every other. Thus the physical particle consists of a 
bare particle only minimally distinguishable fran "a huge tangle of virtual 
particles inextricably wound together in a recursive mess". This process 
should not be seen as made up of logical or reflexive dependencies of 
particles on each other, nor is it simply a question of enunerating the 
recursions involved. 
23. It is not enough to sLmply stamp a process with the attribute of infinity 
in order to stop those who ~uld reduce the fusion of replication and 
complication to a state of accotmtability by logical reflexion. Kant as we 
have seen tames infinity in such a manner, and in so doing typifies idealist 
and phenomenological philosophies in so far as they force mathematics - and 
physics previously - into commonsense and create abominable mutations for the 
philosophy of experience. 
24. The technical difference between the two types of infinity is best 
described by Hofstadter who remains suspicious of the artificial 
presupposition of an infinite directory (EGB421-2): "one kind of infinity 
describes how many entries there can be in an infinite directory or table and 
another describes how many real numbers there are (i.e how many points on a 
line or line segment) and this latter is 'bigger' in the sense that the real 
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numbers cannot be squeezed into a table whose length is described by the 
former kind of infinity ••• The set of integers is just not big enough to index 
the set of reals". 
25. As we have seen the virtual aspects of the transfinite associate it with 
mooels in many fields outside meta-mathematics, in any area where 
proliferations of activity or growth occur. 
26. In tenns of set theory the Cantor set is a set intermediate between a 
denumerable set such as the integers and a continuum such as the points of a 
line. But moving up the dimensions the Cantor set allows us to think the 
possibility of objects whose dimensionality is between that of a point and a 
line or between that of a line and a surface or between that of a surface and 
a volume. These Objects are often called fractal objects. Deleuze and 
Guattari define them thus: (TP486) ''Fractals are aggregates whose nunber of 
dtmensions is fractional rather than whole, or else whole but with continuous 
variation in direction." For example if one takes a closed segment on a line 
and divide it into three equal parts, subtract the middle part and repeat the 
procedure for the remaining parts endlessly you will end up with an infinite 
non-denumerable set of non-connected points, which has no intrinsic length but 
has a dimension in between that of zero and one, between that of a point and a 
line. The Cantor set is exemplified at the level of three dtmensional space 
in a variety of ways, the most distinct being the Sierpinsky sponge, in which 
each surface of a cube has a segment cut from it and is then surrounded by 
segments a third of its size for each direction of the surface, which are 
themselves surrotmded by segments a third of their size and so on ad 
infinitum, leaving us with a cube of proliferating surface area and near zero 
volume. This is an example of a recursive operation which proouces a 
transfinite set of points (here area surfaces). Displayed differently on a 
Poincare surface of section this 'non-denumerable infinity' would describe the 
onset of chaotic turbulent behaviour in dynamical systems which are evolving 
in phase spaces of dimensions greater than two. And this might operate as a 
physical model for the intensive space which Deleuze and Guattari concern 
themselves with. Indeed in sunming up the ''!he Smooth and the Striated' 
plateau of 'Thousand Plateaus' they pick on several attributes of fractals 
which provide general determinations of 'smooth space' - the intensive space 
as it is coordinated by numbers as multiplicities (TP488). They emphasise 
that smooth space is the construction of a line or of a surface which has a 
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fractional number of dimensions; that only a fractional number of dimensions 
can give variations in direction in space; that - unlike geometrical fractal 
objects which must have less dimensions than the phase-space in which they 
move - mul tiplici ties have the same dimensions as the space in which they are 
distributed (and thus multiplicities are flat), and thus that space is 
identified with that multiplicity due to the "anexact yet rigourous fom" of 
the number as multiplicity which occupies space without measuring in relation 
to a unit; and finally that the fuzzy nature of the mEber as multiplicity 
entails proximities and tendential transformations of dimensions. 
27. "Fntretiens avec le professeur yt' by LF Ce1.ine "Oeuvres de LF Ce1.ine" Vol 
3 (Andre Ballard 1967) p 389 
28. see p 113-20 
29. Kant's image of an empty space left open for "other and different objects" 
A288 B344 emphasises - by the fact that Kant countenances this impossibility -
the central point which I have made concerning the Kantian topography; its 
spatial tendency. Kant argues in the 'Amphiboly of the concepts of 
reflection' that even the concepts of the thing in general and the unity of 
apperception presuppose a space of relations proper to intuition. At the base 
of all intuition and all perception lies the intuition of things as relations, 
a space of possible relations: A285 B341 "All that we know in matter is merely 
relations (what we call the inner determinations of it are inward only in a 
comparative sense) but among these relations some are self-subsistent and 
permanent, and through these we are given a determinate object" 
<llapter Five: KANI' - AFFEcrs AND CCM1UNlCATION 
1. "Critique of judgement" by Irrmanuel Kant (Clarendon Press Oxford 1958) 
trans JC Meredith 
2. Kant notes that sensation has two senses: that associated with the first 
critique where sensation is "the representation of a thing through sense as a 
receptivity pertaining to the faculty of knowledge" pp3 p 45; and the sense 
associated with the agreeable, in which the subject seeks pathological 
gratification through the influence and affects of objects which effect "a 
modification of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure" in the passive 
subject. I would argue that the difference is minimal. 
3. Kant distinguishes the idea - the concept of reason - and the ideal which 
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he defines here as "the representation of an individual existence as adequate 
to an idea" (17 76) It is the form of the individual hunan which Kant will 
associate with communication and freedom. 
4. see p 119ff 
5. Kant admits that the pure mathematical estimation of the magnitude of the 
sensation entails no maximal tmit, but emphasises that only the negative 
estimation of 'rude nature' calls forth the feeling of the sublime. The 
aesthetic estimation contains the infinite mathematical measuring operation 
and introduces the ceiling necessary for comprehension. We have seen that the 
process whiCh Kant perceives as culminating in the sublime entails processes 
of libido, sensation and affectivity which are not fixated on rational unity; 
but Kant subjects all these to the aesthetic estimate of subjective finality. 
6. Kant posits the affective overWhelming of the imagination as attesting to 
the "point of excess" of the imagination. It is in fact the subjection of 
reason to the pulsional overcoding of the unconscious libido which can be 
called, following Kant, the "point of excess" proper to reason in general; for 
Kant's protection of the rational ideas of the supersensible fran this 
overcoding is tmnecessary humanist mawkishness. Bataille's deployment of the 
tenn 'excess' can be exclusively traced to the Kantian treatment of the 
sublime as the excess of spatial limitations proper to reason. For Bataille, 
however, reason is physiological as well. 
7. see p 82 
8. see p 84 
9. for Bataille as well see p 149 
10. Laughter and repulsion (disgust) are privileged sites of contagions of 
energy for Bataille too see chapter six. 
11. Although morality is only a minor mode of the restriction of such energy. 
12. which is eminently Nietzschean in its genealogical principles 
13. see chapter seven 
<l1apter Six: BATAIllE CONTRA KANT - CXH1UNICATION AND INFECTION 
1. see p 98 
2. see p 114ff 
3. see p 168ff 
4. see p 158ff 
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5. '!hus. coomm~cation in Bataille' s sense has an energetic sense foreign to 
the Kant1an not1on of communication which designates an abstract form proper 
to human freedom and morality. 
6. It would be a mistake to identify death and zero unless one considered 
death as the liberation of energy in a local envirorunent, and zero as that 
liberation of energy on the scale of the universe. 
7. And this is valid in Kantian terms, given the accord of natural organisms 
and reason in the 'Critique of Judgement'. 
8. 'Beyond the pleasure principle' by Sigmund Freud in Penguin Freud Library 
Vol 11 (Penguin 1984) 
9. The association of this 'instinct' with death entails the moves which 
symptomatically differentiate the two modes of philosophy - major and minor: 
in the major mode, death is associated with a logicised negation of all 
concepts Whereas in the minor mode the death of the organism is a masochistic 
humiliation of the values of the individual at the hands of biological energy. 
The role of transcendental philosophy is interesting in this respect, as it 
situates the problematic of critique in relation to the two modes of 
philosophy. Deleuze' s account of 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' in 
'Coldness and Cruelty' in ''Masochism'' (Zone Books 1991) is an extreme case of 
the former association. Deleuze approaches Freud's text as if it were a work 
of transcendental philosophy. He justifies this by emphasising the 
'critical' aspect of the term 'principle', and proceeds to show that if the 
death instinct is regulated by Eros within the Pleasure Principle, that 
principle itself cannot account for its own status as the regulator of psychic 
life (M97). A further fotmdation is required, in line with the general 
precept of transcendental enquiry: "It is proper to any transcendental enquiry 
that you cannot stop it When you want to. How could one determine a 
foundation without being pushed again and beyond into the groundlessness out 
of which the ground emerges?" (M114). Deleuze posits the idea of the 
transcendental principle of a Death Instinct outside of the Pleaure Principle, 
and calls it in a moment of almost Derridean phenanenological logorrhea, a 
principle of "absolute negation" (M27). Due to some momentary reassertion of 
the lesser principles, Deleuze feels constrained to follow the logical 
argunent of traditional philosophy and define in a negative fashion as a 
negative quantity, the chaotic flows of energy outside of the pleasure 
principle. Deleuze, surprisingly, given his other works, seems to have 
-229-
forgotten the inversion of the critical principle by the motors of the will to 
power, Eros and 1banatos, general economy: it is less a question of 
transcendental principles than of primary and secondary processes, the primary 
process which includes the secondary process, and for which the secondary 
process is still primary. Nor is the primary process simply impenetrable. 
10. DC7 281-361, OC6 1-205 
11. previous section 
12. of course the wolf does not find itself anywhere, the analyst does, 
thereby discovering the truth of general economy and transgression: the 
inevitability of the liberation of energy at a level at which no law applies 
any longer see OC1 319 "matter can only be defined by the 'non-logical 
difference' which represents in relation to the economy of the universe what 
crime represents in relation to the law'. 
13. see chapter three 
14. Deleuze and Guattari examine some of these in ''Thousand Plateaux". It is 
worthwhile mentioning the differences between Bataille's account of the plane 
of transcendence in relation to irrmanence and Deleuze/Guattari' s account in 
"Thousand Plateaux" and "Dialogues" (Athlone 1987) trans Tomlinson & Habberjam 
92ff of the planes of consistence and organisation. Bataille has intensive 
'stackings' of matter on scales from zero, whereas Deleuze/Guattari have a 
plane of consistence (relations of movement between particles) and a plane of 
transcendence (organisation) which is only inferred: Bataille's notion 
designates a thermodynamic plane of complexity of transcendence relative to 
inmanence. 
15. see p 138, 145-6 
16. Such scales of perception inform medical accounts of pathology: for 
instance the chaotic and turbulent behaviour of cells ata micro-level affects 
the behaviour of a macro-organism. 
17. just as Bataille's account of transcendence/ inmanence differentiates 
planes of transcendence from the ccmnunications of the zero of inmanence, 
which can be visualised as the horizontal laminae of transcendence in relation 
to the horizon of zero. 
18. a version of an essay first published in 'Recherches Philosophiques' 5 
1935-6 OCl 433-41 
19. This basic principle informs all levels of Bataille's accotmt of the 
general economy of energy including human culture. 
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20. We saw above the fractal nature of the sponge see p 127-8 
21. Such a change is primarily thermic. 
22. see p 122ff 
23. The relation between law and transgression is secondary to considerations 
of the increase of intensity (as Bataille points out the transformation of a 
depressive content into excitation is essential to religious rituals). Crime 
OC2 331-2 is an energetic phenomenon involving the liberation of energy 
repressed by prohibition. Where taboos are set up to regulate the social body 
and its wastes using the force of repulsion, crime is the resurgence of 
attraction "Crime puts into circulation massive quantities of energy in a free 
state". 
24. Bataille juxtaposes his account of sacred power to Hegel'sl Kojeve' s 
account of negativity OC2 324 ''What Hegel described was perhaps only thre 
effect of the shadow projected across the conscious region of spirit by 
areality which remained unknown or very obscurely known by him in so far as it 
is unconscious". 
25. Thus here Bataille demands (as a project) "a virulent religious 
organisation" OC2 353 to be set up to counter the homogeneity of man and 
recreate the attractive power of sacred society. This demand is the result of 
the analysis of the history of military/imperial subordination of religious 
sacred power 0C2 350. 
26. see p 60ff 
27. see "La distribution" by Michel Serres (Editions de minuit 1977) 
28. One example of the sensible value of contagion is presented in Bataille's 
account of laughter OC7 272 "Amongst all the sorts of intense corrmunication, 
none is more ccmnunal than the laughter which spreads through a group". 
Laughter is best understood for Bataille in terms of the patterns of 
contagious growth of sensations rather than in psychological terms of the 
alleviation of dynamical tensions. Bataille treats tickling as a potentially 
ceilingless sensation in a similar manner DC7 274-5. Tensions and resistances 
are second order attributes of these processes. The contagious aspect of 
single cell organisms and viruses is instructive in this respect. The virus 
is a parasitic genome, a cell-free block of genetic material in a protein coat 
which is activated inside a host cell where it is integrated into the DNA of 
that cell and reproduces along with it. Its simple organisation means that it 
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is only perceptible in its infective mode when only speeds of replication 
distinguish moderate or stable viruses from destructive ones. 
Chapter Seven: BATAIllE- RELAPSE AND COllAPSE 
1. OC7 1-179 
2. Bataille will often present projects for science, philosophy or political 
econany, but always in the fonn of the fragment which attenuates the 
possibility of a project; he presents the reader with paradoxical, impossible 
projects with a certain mania which conceals his ironic intent. 
3. in 'Critique' Tome 6 1949-50 P 80 
4. see p 175-6 
5. see p 138, 146 
6. The scalar perception proper to the energetic scale of the universe 
corrects this metaphysical prejudice. 
7. Inso far as composition=decanposition, a more fluid and unpmctual 
timescale could be used to describe biological systems. 
8. see p 162ff 
9. see p 160ff 
10. We have already seen this in the early writing OCl 183 "If we lend a 
general value to the improbable character of the scientific universe, it 
becomes possible ••• to reduce the apparition of the I to that of a fly". 
11. see ''The Gay Science" by Friedrich Nietzsche (Vintage 1974) trans W 
Kaufmann pp 276 
12. Bataille quotes Nietzsche OC6 154 ''We haven't the right to only wish for a 
sole state, we must will to become periodic beings - like existence". The 
major difference between Nietzsche and Bataille concerns the role of time, as 
being periodic or annihilatory. For Nietzsche the cycles of the Eternal 
Return produce the proliferating compositions of life. For Bataille a single 
and irreversible arrOw of time composes and dissolves - time is annihilatory 
and energy productive. This is the difference between quantun mechanics and 
thermodynamics • 
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